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Abstract. Security protocols are used in many of our daily-life applica-
tions, and our privacy largely depends on their design. Formal verification
techniques have proved their usefulness to analyse these protocols, but
they become so complex that modular techniques have to be developed.
We propose several results to safely compose security protocols. We con-
sider arbitrary primitives modeled using an equational theory, and a rich
process algebra close to the applied pi calculus.
Relying on these composition results, we are able to derive some security
properties on a protocol from the security analysis performed on each of
its sub-protocols individually. We consider parallel composition and the
case of key-exchange protocols. Our results apply to deal with confiden-
tiality but also privacy-type properties (e.g. anonymity, unlinkability)
expressed using a notion of equivalence. We illustrate the usefulness of
our composition results on protocols from the 3G phone application and
electronic passport.
1 Introduction
Privacy means that one can control when, where, and how information about
oneself is used and by whom, and it is actually an important issue in many
modern applications. For instance, nowadays, it is possible to wave an electronic
ticket, a building access card, a government-issued ID, or even a smartphone in
front of a reader to go through a gate, or to pay for some purchase. Unfortu-
nately, as often reported by the media, this technology also makes it possible for
anyone to capture some of our personal information. To secure the applications
mentioned above and to protect our privacy, some specific cryptographic pro-
tocols are deployed. For instance, the 3G telecommunication application allows
one to send SMS encrypted with a key that is established with the AKA proto-
col [2]. The aim of this design is to provide some security guarantees: e.g. the
SMS exchanged between phones should remain confidential from third parties.
Because security protocols are notoriously difficult to design and analyse,
formal verification techniques are important. They have become mature and
have known several successes. For instance, a flaw has been discovered in the
Single-Sign-On protocol used by Google Apps [6], and several verification tools
are nowadays available (e.g. ProVerif [9], the AVANTSSAR platform [7]). These
tools perform well in practice, at least for standard security properties (e.g.
secrecy, authentication). Regarding privacy properties, the techniques and tools
are more recent. Most of the verification techniques are only able to analyse a
bounded number of sessions and consider a quite restrictive class of protocols
(e.g. fixed set of primitives and/or no conditional branching [21]). A slightly
different approach consists in analysing a stronger notion of equivalence, namely
diff-equivalence. In particular, ProVerif implements a semi-decision procedure
for checking diff-equivalence [9].
Security protocols used in practice are more and more complex and it is dif-
ficult to analyse them altogether. For example, the UMTS standard [2] specifies
tens of sub-protocols running concurrently in 3G phone systems. While one may
hope to verify each protocol in isolation, it is however unrealistic to expect that
the whole application will be checked relying on a unique automatic tool. Ex-
isting tools have their own specificities that prevent them to be used in some
cases. Furthermore, most of the techniques do not scale up well on large systems,
and sometimes the ultimate solution is to rely on a manual proof. It is therefore
important that the protocol under study is as small as possible.
Related work. There are many results studying the composition of security proto-
cols in the symbolic model [18,15,14], as well as in the computational model [8,19]
in which the so-called UC (universal composability) framework has been first de-
veloped before being adapted in the symbolic setting [10]. This result belongs to
the first approach. Most of the existing composition results are concerned with
trace-based security properties, and in most cases only with secrecy (stated as
a reachability property), e.g. [18,15,14,17]. They are quite restricted in terms of
the class of protocols that can be composed, e.g. a fixed set of cryptographic
primitives and/or no else branch. Lastly, they often only consider parallel com-
position. Some notable exceptions are the results presented in [20,17,14]. This
paper is clearly inspired from the approach developed in [14].
Regarding privacy-type properties, very few composition results exist. In a
previous work [4], we consider parallel composition only. More precisely, we iden-
tify sufficient conditions under which protocols can “safely” be executed in paral-
lel as long as they have been proved secure in isolation. This composition theorem
is quite general from the point of view of the cryptographic primitives allowed.
We consider arbitrary primitives that can be modelled by a set of equations,
and protocols may share some standard primitives provided they are tagged
differently. We choose to reuse this quite general setting in this work.
Our contributions. Our main goal is to analyse privacy-type properties in a
modular way. These security properties are usually expressed as equivalences
between processes. Roughly, two processes P and Q are equivalent (P ≈ Q) if,
however they behave, the messages observed by the attacker are indistinguish-
able. Actually, it is well-known that:
if P1 ≈ P2 and Q1 ≈ Q2 then P1 | P2 ≈ Q1 | Q2.
However, this parallel composition result works because the processes that
are composed are disjoint (e.g. they share no key). Moreover, here we want to go
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beyond parallel composition. In particular, we want to capture the case where a
protocol uses a sub-protocol to establish some keys.
To achieve our goal, we first enrich the applied pi calculus with an assignment
construction. This will allow us to share some data (e.g. session keys) between
sub-protocols. Our calculus is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we present a
first composition result to deal with confidentiality properties. The purpose of
this section is to review the difficulties that arise when composing security pro-
tocols even in a simple setting. In Section 4, we go beyond parallel composition,
and we consider the case of key-exchange protocols. We present in Section 5
some additional difficulties that arise when we want to consider privacy-type
properties expressed using trace equivalence. In Section 6, we present our com-
position results for privacy-type properties. We consider parallel composition as
well as the case of key-exchange protocols.
Actually, all these composition results are derived from a generic composition
result which is quite technical and presented only in Appendix E. This result
allows one to map a trace of the composed protocol into a trace of a disjoint case
(protocol where the sub-protocols do not share any data), and conversely. It can
be seen as an extension of the result presented in [14] where only a mapping from
the shared case to the disjoint case is provided (and not the converse). Moreover,
we consider a richer process algebra than the one used in [14]. In particular, we
are able to deal with protocols with else branches and to compose protocols that
both rely on asymmetric primitives (i.e. asymmetric encryption and signature).
In Section 7, we illustrate the usefulness of our composition results on proto-
cols from the 3G phone application, as well as on protocols from the e-passport
application. We show how to derive some security guarantees from the analysis
performed on each sub-protocol in isolation.
2 Models for security protocols
Our calculus is close to the applied pi calculus [3]. We consider an assignment
operation to make explicit the data that are shared among different processes.
2.1 Messages
As usual in this kind of models, messages are modelled using an abstract term
algebra. We assume an infinite set of names N of base type (used for representing
keys, nonces, . . . ) and a set Ch of names of channel type. We also consider a set of
variables X , and a signature Σ consisting of a finite set of function symbols. We
rely on a sort system for terms. The details of the sort system are unimportant,
as long as the base type differs from the channel type, and we suppose that
function symbols only operate on and return terms of base type.
Terms are defined as names, variables, and function symbols applied to other
terms. The set of terms built from N ⊆ N ∪Ch, and X ⊆ X by applying function
symbols in Σ (respecting sorts and arities) is denoted by T (Σ,N∪X). We write
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fv (u) (resp. fn(u)) for the set of variables (resp. names) occurring in a term u.
A term u is ground if it does not contain any variable, i.e. fv (u) = ∅.
The algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives are specified by the
means of an equational theory which is defined by a finite set E of equations
u = v with u, v ∈ T (Σ,X ), i.e. u, v do not contain names. We denote by =E the
smallest equivalence relation on terms, that contains E and that is closed under
application of function symbols and substitutions of terms for variables.
Example 1. Consider the signature ΣDH = {aenc, adec, pk, g, f, 〈 〉, proj1, proj2}.
The function symbols adec, aenc of arity 2 represent asymmetric decryption
and encryption. We denote by pk(sk) the public key associated to the private
key sk. The two function symbols f of arity 2, and g of arity 1 are used to model
the Diffie-Hellman primitives, whereas the three remaining symbols are used to
model pairs. The equational theory EDH is defined by:
EDH =
{
proj1(〈x, y〉) = x adec(aenc(x, pk(y)), y) = x
proj2(〈x, y〉) = y f(g(x), y) = f(g(y), x)
Let u0 = aenc(〈nA, g(rA)〉, pk(skB)). We have that:
f(proj2(adec(u0, skB)), rB) =EDH f(g(rA), rB) =EDH f(g(rB), rA).
2.2 Processes
As in the applied pi calculus, we consider plain processes as well as extended
processes that represent processes having already evolved by e.g. disclosing some
terms to the environment. Plain processes are defined by the following grammar:
P,Q := 0 null P | Q parallel
new n.P restriction !P replication
[x := v].P assignment if ϕ then P else Q conditional
in(c, x).P input out(c, v).Q output
where c is a name of channel type, ϕ is a conjunction of tests of the form u1 = u2
where u1, u2 are terms of base type, x is a variable of base type, v is a term of base
type, and n is a name of any type. Note that the terms that occur in ϕ and v may
contain variables. We consider an assignment operation that instantiates x with
a term v. Note that we consider private channels but we do not allow channel
passing. For the sake of clarity, we often omit the null process, and when there
is no “else”, it means “else 0”.
Names and variables have scopes, which are delimited by restrictions, inputs,
and assignment operations. We write fv(P ), bv (P ), fn(P ) and bn(P ) for the sets
of free and bound variables, and free and bound names of a plain process P .
Example 2. Let PDH = new skA.new skB.(PA | PB) a process that models a
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol:
– PA
def
= new rA.newnA.out(c, aenc(〈nA, g(rA)〉, pk(skB))).in(c, yA).
if proj1(adec(yA, skA)) = nA then [xA := f(proj2(adec(yA, skA)), rA)].0
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– PB
def
= new rB.in(c, yB).out(c, aenc(〈proj1(adec(yB, skB)), g(rB)〉, pk(skA))).
[xB := f(proj2(adec(yB, skB)), rB)].0
The process PA generates two fresh random numbers rA and nA, sends a message
on the channel c, and waits for a message containing the nonce nA in order to
compute his own view of the key that will be stored in xA. The process PB
proceeds in a similar way and stores the computed value in xB.
Extended processes add a set of restricted names E (the names that are a
priori unknown to the attacker), a sequence of messages Φ (corresponding to
the messages that have been sent so far on public channels) and a substitution σ
which is used to store the messages that have been received as well as those that
have been stored in assignment variables.
Definition 1. An extended process is a tuple (E ;P ;Φ;σ) with:
– E a set of names that represents the names that are restricted in P, Φ and σ;
– P a multiset of plain processes where null processes are removed and with
fv (P) ⊆ dom(σ);
– Φ = {w1 ⊲ u1, . . . , wn ⊲ un} where u1, . . . , un are ground terms, w1, . . . , wn
are variables;
– σ = {x1 7→ v1, . . . , xm 7→ vm} where v1, . . . , vm are ground terms, x1, . . . , xm
are variables.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that extended processes are name and
variable distinct, i.e. a name (resp. variable) is either free or bound, and in the
latter case, it is at most bound once. Moreover, we often write (E ;P ;Φ) instead
of (E ;P ;Φ; ∅).
The semantics is given by a set of labelled rules that allows one to reason
about processes that interact with their environment (see Figure 1). This defines
the relation
ℓ
−→ where ℓ is either an input, an output, or a silent action τ . The
relation
tr
−−→ where tr denotes a sequence of labels is defined in the usual way
whereas the relation
tr′
==⇒ on processes is defined by: A
tr′
==⇒B if, and only if,
there exists a sequence tr such that A
tr
−−→ B and tr′ is obtained by erasing all
occurrences of the silent action τ in tr.
Example 3. Continuing Example 1 and Example 2, we consider the sequence
ΦDH
def
= {w1 ⊲ pk(skA), w2 ⊲ pk(skB)}, and ADH
def
= ({skA, skB};PA | PB;ΦDH).
We have that:
ADH
νw3.out(c,w3).in(c,w3).νw4.out(c,w4).in(c,w4)
=============================⇒ (E ; ∅;ΦDH ⊎ Φ;σ ∪ σ′)
where Φ =EDH {w3 ⊲ u0, w4 ⊲ aenc(〈nA, g(rB)〉, pkA)}, E = {skA, skB, rA, rB, nA},
σ =EDH {yA 7→ aenc(〈nA, g(rB)〉, pkA), yB 7→ aenc(〈nA, g(rA)〉, pkB)}, and lastly
σ′ =EDH {xA 7→ f(g(rB), rA), xB 7→ f(g(rA), rB)}. We used pkA (resp. pkB) as a
shorthand for pk(skA) (resp. pk(skB)).
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(E ; {if ϕ then Q1 else Q2} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→ (E ;Q1 ⊎ P ;Φ;σ) (Then)
if uσ =E vσ for each u = v ∈ ϕ
(E ; {if ϕ then Q1 else Q2} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→ (E ;Q2 ⊎ P ;Φ;σ) (Else)
if uσ 6=E vσ for some u = v ∈ ϕ
(E ; {out(c, u).Q1; in(c, x).Q2} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→ (E ;Q1 ⊎Q2 ⊎ P ;Φ; σ ∪ {x 7→ uσ})(Comm)
(E ; {[x := v].Q} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→ (E ;Q ⊎ P ;Φ; σ ∪ {x 7→ vσ}) (Assgn)
(E ; {in(c, z).Q} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
in(c,M)
−−−−−→ (E ;Q ⊎ P ;Φ; σ ∪ {z 7→ u}) (In)
if c 6∈ E , MΦ = u, fv(M) ⊆ dom(Φ) and fn(M) ∩ E = ∅
(E ; {out(c, u).Q} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
νwi.out(c,wi)−−−−−−−−−→ (E ;Q ⊎ P ;Φ ∪ {wi ⊲ uσ}; σ) (Out-T)
if c 6∈ E , u is a term of base type, and wi is a variable such that i = |Φ|+ 1
(E ; {new n.Q} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→ (E ∪ {n};Q ⊎ P ;Φ;σ) (New)
(E ; {!Q} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→ (E ; {!Q;Qρ} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ) (Repl)
ρ is used to rename bv(Q)/bn(Q) with fresh variables/names
(E ; {P1 | P2} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→ (E ; {P1, P2} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ) (Par)
where n is a name, c is a name of channel type, u, v are terms of base type, and x, z
are variables of base type.
Fig. 1. Semantics of extended processes
2.3 Process equivalences
We are particularly interested in security properties expressed using a notion of
equivalence such as those studied in e.g. [5,11]. For instance, the notion of strong
unlinkability can be formalized using an equivalence between two situations: one
where each user can execute the protocol multiple times, and one where each
user can execute the protocol at most once.
We consider here the notion of trace equivalence. Intuitively, two protocols P
and Q are in trace equivalence, denoted P ≈ Q, if whatever the messages they
received (built upon previously sent messages), the resulting sequences of mes-
sages sent on public channels are indistinguishable from the point of view of an
outsider. Given an extended process A, we define its set of traces as follows:
trace(A) = {(tr, new E .Φ) | A
tr
=⇒ (E ;P ;Φ;σ) for some process (E ;P ;Φ;σ)}.
The sequence of messages Φ together with the set of restricted names E (those
unknown to the attacker) is called the frame.
Definition 2. We say that a term u is deducible (modulo E) from a frame
φ = new E .Φ, denoted new E .Φ ⊢ u, when there exists a term M (called a recipe)
such that fn(M) ∩ E = ∅, fv (M) ⊆ dom(Φ), and MΦ =E u.
Two frames are indistinguishable when the attacker cannot detect the differ-
ence between the two situations they represent.
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Definition 3. Two frames φ1 and φ2 with φi = new E .Φi (i ∈ {1, 2}) are stat-
ically equivalent, denoted by φ1 ∼ φ2, when dom(Φ1) = dom(Φ2), and for all
terms M,N with fn({M,N})∩E = ∅ and fv({M,N}) ⊆ dom(Φ1), we have that:
MΦ1 =E NΦ1, if and only if, MΦ2 =E NΦ2.
Example 4. Consider Φ1 = {w1 ⊲ g(rA), w2 ⊲ g(rB), w3 ⊲ f(g(rA), rB)}, and
Φ2 = {w1 ⊲ g(rA), w2 ⊲ g(rB), w3 ⊲ k}. Let E = {rA, rB, k}. We have that
new E .Φ1 ∼ new E .Φ2 (considering the equational theory EDH). This equivalence
shows that the term f(g(rA), rB) (the Diffie-Hellman key) is indistinguishable
from a random key. This indistinguishability property holds even if the messages
g(rA) and g(rB) have been observed by the attacker.
Two processes are trace equivalent if, whatever the messages they sent and
received, their frames are in static equivalence.
Definition 4. Let A and B be two extended processes, A ⊑ B if for every (tr, φ) ∈
trace(A), there exists (tr′, φ′) ∈ trace(B) such that tr = tr′ and φ ∼ φ′. We say
that A and B are trace equivalent, denoted by A ≈ B, if A ⊑ B and B ⊑ A.
This notion of equivalence allows us to express many interesting privacy-type
properties e.g. vote-privacy, strong versions of anonymity and/or unlinkability.
3 Composition result: a simple setting
It is well-known that even if two protocols are secure in isolation, it is not pos-
sible to compose them in arbitrary ways still preserving their security. This has
already been observed for different kinds of compositions (e.g. parallel [18], se-
quential [14]) and when studying standard security properties [15] (e.g. secrecy,
authentication) and even privacy-type properties [4]. In this section, we intro-
duce some well-known hypotheses that are needed to safely compose security
protocols.
3.1 Sharing primitives
A protocol can be used as an oracle by another protocol to decrypt a message,
and then compromise the security of the whole application. To avoid this kind of
interactions, most of the composition results assume that protocols do not share
any primitive or allow a list of standard primitives (e.g. signature, encryption)
to be shared as long as they are tagged in different ways. In this paper, we adopt
the latter hypothesis and consider the fixed common signature:
Σ0 = {sdec, senc, adec, aenc, pk, 〈, 〉, proj1, proj2, sign, check, vk, h}
equipped with the equational theory E0, defined by the following equations:
sdec(senc(x, y), y) = x check(sign(x, y), vk(y)) = x
adec(aenc(x, pk(y)), y) = x proji(〈x1, x2〉) = xi with i ∈ {1, 2})
This allows us to model symmetric/asymmetric encryption, concatenation, sig-
natures, and hash functions. We consider a type seed which is a subsort of the
7
base type that only contains names. We denote by pk(sk) (resp. vk(sk)) the pub-
lic key (resp. the verification key) associated to the private key sk which has to
be a name of type seed. We allow protocols to both rely on Σ0 provided that each
application of aenc, senc, sign, and h is tagged (using disjoint sets of tags for the
two protocols), and adequate tests are performed when receiving a message to
ensure that the tags are correct. Actually, we consider the same tagging mech-
anism as the one we have introduced in [4] (see Appendix C for more details).
Here, we simply illustrate this tagging mechanism on our running example. Note
that this tagging mechanism has no effect when protocols do not rely on Σ0 (i.e.
when the protocols we want to compose do not share any primitive).
Example 5. In order to compose the protocol introduced in Example 2 with
another one that also relies on the primitive aenc, we may want to consider
a tagged version of this protocol. For this, we introduce two function symbols
tag1/untag1, and the equation untag1(tag1(x)) = x to model the interaction
between these two symbols. The tagged version (using tag1) of PB is given below
(with u = untag1(adec(yB, skB))):

new rB .in(c, yB).
if tag1(untag1(adec(yB, skB))) = adec(yB, skB) then
if u = 〈proj1(u), proj2(u)〉 then
out(c, aenc(tag1(〈proj1(u), g(rB)〉), pk(skA))).[xB := f(proj2(u), rB)].0
The first test allows one to check that yB is an encryption tagged with tag1
and the second one is used to ensure that the content of this encryption is a
pair as expected. Then, the process outputs the encrypted message tagged with
tag1. The tagged version (using tag1) of PA can be obtained in a similar way,
and we obtain the tagged version of the whole process by putting the resulting
two processes in parallel.
3.2 Revealing shared keys
Consider two protocols, one whose security relies on the secrecy of a shared
key whereas the other protocol reveals it. Such a situation will compromise the
security of the whole application. It is therefore important to ensure that shared
keys are not revealed. To formalise this hypothesis, and to express the sharing
of long-term keys, we introduce the notion of composition context. This will help
us describe under which long-term keys the composition has to be done.
A composition context C is defined by the grammar:
C := | new n. C | !C where n is a name of base type.
Definition 5. Let C be a composition context, A be an extended process of the
form (E ;C[P ];Φ), key ∈ {n, pk(n), vk(n) | n occurs in C}, and c, s two fresh
names. We say that A reveals key when
(E ∪ {s};C[P | in(c, x). if x = key thenout(c, s)];Φ)
tr
=⇒ (E ′;P ′;Φ′;σ′)
for some E ′, P ′, Φ′, and σ′ such that new E ′.Φ′ ⊢ s.
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3.3 A first composition result
Before stating our first result regarding parallel composition for confidentiality
properties, we gather the required hypotheses in the following definition.
Definition 6. Let C be a composition context and E0 be a finite set of names
of base type. Let P and Q be two plain processes together with their frames Φ
and Ψ . We say that P/Φ and Q/Ψ are composable under E0 and C when fv (P ) =
fv (Q) = ∅, dom(Φ) ∩ dom(Ψ) = ∅, and
1. P (resp. Q) is built over Σα ∪ Σ0 (resp. Σβ ∪ Σ0), whereas Φ (resp. Ψ) is
built over Σα ∪ {pk, vk, 〈 〉} (resp. Σβ ∪ {pk, vk, 〈 〉}), Σα ∩ Σβ = ∅, and P
(resp. Q) is tagged;
2. E0 ∩ (fn(C[P ]) ∪ fn(Φ)) ∩ (fn(C[Q]) ∪ fn(Ψ)) = ∅; and
3. (E0;C[P ];Φ) (resp. (E0;C[Q];Ψ)) does not reveal any key in
{n, pk(n), vk(n) | n occurs in fn(P )∩fn(Q)∩bn(C)}.
Condition 1 is about sharing primitives, whereas Conditions 2 and 3 ensure
that keys are shared via the composition context C only (not via E0), and are
not revealed by each protocol individually.
We are now able to state the following theorem which is in the same vein as
those obtained previously in e.g. [18,15]. However, the setting we consider here
is more general. In particular, we consider arbitrary primitives, processes with
else branches, and private channels.
Theorem 1. Let C be a composition context, E0 be a finite set of names of base
type, and s be a name that occurs in C. Let P and Q be two plain processes
together with their frames Φ and Ψ , and assume that P/Φ and Q/Ψ are com-
posable under E0 and C. If (E0;C[P ];Φ) and (E0;C[Q];Ψ) do not reveal s then
(E0;C[P | Q];Φ ⊎ Ψ) does not reveal s.
As most of the proofs of similar composition results, we show this result going
back to the disjoint case. Indeed, it is well-known that parallel composition works
well when protocols do not share any data (the so-called disjoint case). We show
that all the conditions are satisfied to apply our generic result (presented in
Appendix E) that allows one to go back to the disjoint case. Thus, we obtain
that the disjoint case D = (E0;C[P ] | C[Q];Φ ⊎ Ψ) exhibits the same traces as
those exhibited by the shared case S = (E0;C[P | Q];Φ ⊎ Ψ) (more formally we
have that D and S are in trace equivalence), and this allows us to conclude.
4 The case of key-exchange protocols
Our goal is to go beyond parallel composition, and to further consider the par-
ticular case of key-exchange protocols. Assume that P = new n˜.(P1 | P2) is a
protocol that establishes a key between two parties. The goal of P is to establish
a shared session key between P1 and P2. Assume that P1 stores the key in the
variable x1, while P2 stores it in the variable x2, and then consider a protocol Q
that uses the values stored in x1/x2 as a fresh key to secure communications.
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4.1 What is a good key exchange protocol?
In this setting, sharing between P and Q is achieved through the composition
context as well as through assignment variables x1 and x2. The idea is to abstract
these values with fresh names when we analyse Q in isolation. However, in order
to abstract them in the right way, we need to know their values (or at least
whether they are equal or not). This is the purpose of the property stated below.
Definition 7. Let C be a composition context and E0 be a finite set of names.
Let P1[ ] (resp. P2[ ]) be a plain process with an hole in the scope of an assignment
of the form [x1 := t1] (resp. [x2 := t2]), and Φ be a frame.
We say that P1/P2/Φ is a good key-exchange protocol under E0 and C when
(E0;Pgood;Φ) does not reveal bad where Pgood is defined as follows:
Pgood = new bad .new d.
(
C[new id.(P1[out(d, 〈x1, id〉)] | P2[out(d, 〈x2, id〉)])]
| in(d, x).in(d, y).if proj1(x) = proj1(y) ∧ proj2(x) 6= proj2(y) then out(c, bad)
| in(d, x).in(d, y).if proj1(x) 6= proj1(y) ∧ proj2(x) = proj2(y) then out(c, bad)
| in(d, x).in(c, z).if z ∈ {proj1(x), pk(proj1(x)), vk(proj1(x))} then out(c, bad)
)
where bad is a fresh name of base type, and c, d are fresh names of channel type.
The expressions u 6= v and u ∈ {v1, . . . , vn} used above are convenient no-
tations that can be rigorously expressed using nested conditionals. Roughly, the
property expresses that x1 and x2 are assigned to the same value if, and only if,
they are joined together, i.e. they share the same id. In particular, two instances
of the role P1 (resp. P2) cannot assign their variable with the same value: a fresh
key is established at each session. The property also ensures that the data shared
through x1/x2 are not revealed.
Example 6. We have that PA/PB/ΦDH described in Example 2, as well as its
tagged version (see Example 5) are good key-exchange protocols under E0 =
{skA, skB} and C = . This corresponds to a scenario where we consider only a
single execution of the protocol (no replication).
Actually, the property mentioned above is quite strong, and never satisfied
when the context C under study ends with a replication, i.e. when C is of the
form C′[! ]. To cope with this situation, we consider an other version of this
property. When C is of the form C′[! ], we define Pgood as follows (where r1
and r2 are two additional fresh names of base type):
new bad , d, r1, r2.
(
C′[new id.!(P1[out(d, 〈x1, id, r1〉)] | P2[out(d, 〈x2, id, r2〉)])]
| in(d, x).in(d, y).if proj1(x) = proj1(y) ∧ proj2(x) 6= proj2(y) then out(c, bad)
| in(d, x).in(d, y).if proj1(x) = proj1(y) ∧ proj3(x) = proj3(y) then out(c, bad)
| in(d, x).in(c, z).if z ∈ {proj1(x), pk(proj1(x)), vk(proj1(x))} then out(c, bad)
)
Note that the id is now generated before the last replication, and thus is not
uniquely associated to an instance of P1/P2. Instead several instances of P1/P2
may now share the same id as soon as they are identical. This gives us more flexi-
bility. The triplet 〈u1, u2, u3〉 and the operator proj3(u) used above are convenient
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notations that can be expressed using pairs. This new version forces distinct val-
ues in the assignment variables for each instance of P1 (resp. P2) through the 3rd
line. However, we do not fix in advance which particular instance of P1 and P2
should be matched, as in the first version.
Example 7. We have that PA/PB/ΦDH as well as its tagged version are good
key-exchange protocols under E0 = {skA, skB} and C =! .
4.2 Do we need to tag pairs?
When analysing Q in isolation, the values stored in the assignment variables
x1/x2 are abstracted by fresh names. Since P and Q share the common signa-
ture Σ0, we need an additional hypothesis to ensure that in any execution, the
values assigned to the variables x1/x2 are not of the form 〈u1, u2〉, pk(u), or
vk(u). These symbols are those of the common signature that are not tagged,
thus abstracting them by fresh names in Q would not be safe. This has already
been highlighted in [14]. They however left as future work the definition of the
needed hypothesis and simply assume that each operator of the common signa-
ture has to be tagged. Here, we formally express the required hypothesis.
Definition 8. An extended process A satisfies the abstractability property if
for any (E ;P ;Φ;σ) such that A
tr
=⇒(E ;P ;Φ;σ), for any x ∈ dom(σ) which corre-
sponds to an assignment variable, for any u1, u2, we have that xσ 6=E 〈u1, u2〉,
xσ 6=E pk(u1), and xσ 6=E vk(u1).
Note also that, in [14], the common signature is restricted to symmetric
encryption and pairing only. They do not consider asymmetric encryption, and
signature. Thus, our composition result generalizes theirs considering both a
richer common signature, and a lighter tagging scheme (we do not tag pairs).
4.3 Composition result
We retrieve the following result which is actually a generalization of two theorems
established in [14] and stated for specific composition contexts.
Theorem 2. Let C be a composition context, E0 be a finite set of names of
base type, and s be a name that occurs in C. Let P1[ ] (resp. P2[ ]) be a plain
process without replication and with an hole in the scope of an assignment of
the form [x1 := t1] (resp. [x2 := t2]). Let Q1 (resp. Q2) be a plain process such
that fv(Q1) ⊆ {x1} (resp. fv(Q2) ⊆ {x2}), and Φ and Ψ be two frames. Let
P = P1[0] | P2[0] and Q = new k.[x1 := k].[x2 := k].(Q1 | Q2) for some fresh
name k, and assume that:
1. P/Φ and Q/Ψ are composable under E0 and C;
2. (E0;C[Q];Ψ) does not reveal k, pk(k), vk(k);
3. (E0;C[P ];Φ) satisfies the abstractability property; and
4. P1/P2/Φ is a good key-exchange protocol under E0 and C.
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If (E0;C[P ];Φ) and (E0;C[Q];Ψ) do not reveal s then (E0;C[P1[Q1]|P2[Q2]];Φ ⊎ Ψ)
does not reveal s.
Basically, we prove this result relying on our generic composition result.
In [14], they do not require P to be good but only ask for secrecy of the shared
key. In particular they do not express any freshness or agreement property about
the established key. Actually, when considering a simple composition context
without replication, freshness is trivial (since there is only one session). More-
over, in their setting, agreement is not important since they do not have else
branches. The analysis of Q considering that both parties have agreed on the
key corresponds to the worst scenario. Note that this is not true anymore in pres-
ence of else branches. The following example shows that as soon as else branches
are allowed, as it is the case in the present work, agreement becomes important.
Example 8. Consider a simple situation where:
– P1[0] = new k1.[x1 := k1].0 and P2[0] = newk2.[x2 := k2].0;
– Q1 = if x1 = x2 then out(c, ok) else out(c, s) and Q2 = 0.
Let E0 = ∅, and C = new s. . We consider the processes P = P1[0] | P2[0], and
Q = new k.[x1 := k].[x2 := k].(Q1 | Q2) and we assume that the frames Φ and Ψ
are empty. We clearly have that (E0;C[P ];Φ) and (E0;C[Q];Ψ) do not reveal s
whereas (E0;C[P1[Q1] | P2[Q2];Φ ⊎ Ψ) does. The only hypothesis of Theorem 2
that is violated is the fact that P1/P2/Φ is not a good key-exchange protocol
due to a lack of agreement on the key which is generated (bad can be emitted
thanks to the 3rd line of the process Pgood given in Definition 7).
Now, regarding their second theorem corresponding to a context of the form
new s. ! , as before agreement is not mandatory but freshness of the key estab-
lished by the protocol P is crucial. As illustrated by the following example, this
hypothesis is missing in the theorem stated in [14] (Theorem 3).
Example 9. Consider A = ({kP }; new s.!([x1 := kP ].0 | [x2 := kP ].0); ∅), as well
as B = ({kP }; new s. !Q; ∅) where Q = new k.[x1 := k].[x2 := k].(Q1 | Q2) with
Q1 = out(c, senc(senc(s, k), k)); and Q2 = in(c, x).out(c, sdec(x, k)).
Note that neither A nor B reveals s. In particular, the process Q1 emits the
secret s encrypted twice with a fresh key k, but Q2 only allows us to remove one
level of encryption with k. Now, if we plug the key-exchange protocol given above
with no guarantee of freshness (the same key is established at each session), the
resulting process, i.e. (E0;C[P1[Q1] | P2[Q2]]; ∅) does reveal s.
Note that this example is not a counter example of our Theorem 2: P1/P2/∅
is not a good key-exchange protocol according to our definition.
5 Dealing with equivalence-based properties
Our ultimate goal is to analyse privacy-type properties in a modular way. In [4],
we propose several composition results w.r.t. privacy-type properties, but for
parallel composition only. Here, we want to go beyond parallel composition, and
consider the case of key-exchange protocols.
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5.1 A problematic example
Even in a quite simple setting (the shared keys are not revealed, protocols do
not share any primitives), such a sequential composition result does not hold.
Let C = new k.! new k1.! new k2. be a composition context, yes/no, ok/ko be
public constants, u = senc(〈k1, k2〉, k), and consider the following processes:
Q(z1, z2) = out(c, u).in(x).if x = u then 0 else
if proj1(sdec(x, k)) = k1 then out(c, z1) else out(c, z2)
P [ ] = out(c, u).
(
| in(c, x).if x = u then 0 else
if proj1(sdec(x, k)) = k1 then out(c, ok) elseout(c, ko)
)
Of course, we have that C[P [0]] ≈ C[P [0]]. Actually, we have also that
C[Q(yes, no)] ≈ C[Q(no, yes)]. This latter equivalence is non-trivial. Intuitively,
when C[Q(yes, no)] unfolds its outermost ! and then performs an output, then
C[Q(no, yes)] has to mimic this step by unfolding its innermost ! and by per-
forming the only available output. This will allow it to react in the same way as
C[Q(yes, no)] in case encrypted messages are used to fill some input actions.
Since the two processes P [0] and Q(yes, no) (resp. Q(no, yes)) are almost
“disjoint”, we could expect the equivalence C[P [Q(yes, no)]] ≈ C[P [Q(no, yes)]]
to hold. Actually, this equivalence does not hold. The presence of the process P
gives to the attacker some additional distinguishing power. In particular, through
the outputs ok/ko outputted by P , the attacker will learn which ! has been
unfolded. This result holds even if we rename function symbols so that protocols
P and Q do not share any primitives.
In the example above, the problem is that the two equivalences we want to
compose hold for different reasons, i.e. by unfolding the replications in a differ-
ent and incompatible way. Thus, when the composed process C[P [Q(yes, no)]]
reaches a point where Q(yes, no) can be executed, on the other side, the process
Q(no, yes) is ready to be executed but the instance that is available is not the one
that was used when establishing the equivalence C[Q(yes, no)] ≈ C[Q(no, yes)].
Therefore, in order to establish equivalence-based properties in a modular way,
we rely on a stronger notion of equivalence, namely diff-equivalence, that will
ensure that the two “small” equivalences are satisfied in a compatible way.
Note that this problem does not arise when considering reachability proper-
ties and/or parallel composition. In particular, we have that:
C[P [0] | Q(yes, no)] ≈ C[P [0] | Q(no, yes)].
5.2 Biprocesses and diff-equivalence
We consider pairs of processes, called biprocesses, that have the same structure
and differ only in the terms and tests that they contain. Following the approach
of [9], we introduce a special symbol diff of arity 2 in our signature. The idea
being to use this diff operator to indicate when the terms manipulated by the
processes are different. Given a biprocess B, we define two processes fst(B) and
snd(B) as follows: fst(B) is obtained by replacing each occurrence of diff(M,M ′)
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(resp. diff(ϕ, ϕ′)) withM (resp. ϕ), and similarly snd(B) is obtained by replacing
each occurrence of diff(M,M ′) (resp. diff(ϕ, ϕ′)) with M ′ (resp. ϕ′).
The semantics of biprocesses (detailed in Appendix D) is defined as expected
via a relation that expresses when and how a biprocess may evolve. A biprocess
reduces if, and only if, both sides of the biprocess reduce in the same way: a
communication succeeds on both sides, a conditional has to be evaluated in
the same way in both sides too. When the two sides of the biprocess reduce in
different ways, the biprocess blocks. For instance, the else rule is as follows:
(E ; {if diff(ϕL, ϕR) then Q1 else Q2} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→bi (E ;Q2 ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
if uσ 6=E vσ for some u = v ∈ ϕL, and u′σ 6=E v′σ for some u′ = v′ ∈ ϕR
The relation
tr
=⇒bi on biprocesses is defined as for processes. This leads us to
the following notion of diff-equivalence.
Definition 9. An extended biprocess B0 satisfies diff-equivalence if for every
biprocess B = (E ;P ;Φ;σ) such that B0
tr
=⇒biB for some trace tr, we have that
1. new E .fst(Φ) ∼ new E .snd(Φ)
2. if fst(B)
ℓ
−→ AL then there exists B′ such that B
ℓ
−→bi B′ and fst(B′) = AL
(and similarly for snd).
Note that, considering diff-equivalence instead of trace equivalence, the exam-
ple given in Section 5.1 is not a counter-example anymore. Indeed, the biprocess
B = Q0(diff(yes, no), diff(no, yes)), does not satisfy diff-equivalence.
The notions introduced so far on processes are extended as expected on bipro-
cesses: the property has to hold on both fst(B) and snd(B). Sometimes, we also
say that the biprocessB is in trace equivalence instead of writing fst(B) ≈ snd(B).
As expected, this notion of diff-equivalence is actually stronger than the usual
notion of trace equivalence.
Lemma 1. A biprocess B that satisfies diff-equivalence is in trace equivalence.
6 Composition results for diff-equivalence
We first consider the case of parallel composition. This result is in the spirit of
the one established in [4]. However, in order to combine this composition result
with the one in the case of key-exchange protocol (Theorem 4), we also adapt it
to diff-equivalence.
Theorem 3. Let C be a composition context and E0 be a finite set of names
of base type. Let P and Q be two plain biprocesses together with their frames Φ
and Ψ , and assume that P/Φ and Q/Ψ are composable under E0 and C.
If (E0;C[P ];Φ) and (E0;C[Q];Ψ) satisfy diff-equivalence (resp. trace equiv-
alence) then the biprocess (E0;C[P | Q];Φ ⊎ Ψ) satisfies diff-equivalence (resp.
trace equivalence).
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Proof. (sketch) As for the proof for Theorem 1, parallel composition works
well when processes do not share any data. Hence, we easily deduce that D =
(E0;C[P ] | C[Q];Φ ⊎ Ψ) satisfies the diff-equivalence (resp. trace equivalence).
Then, our generic composition result allows one to compare the behaviours of
the biprocess D to those of the biprocess S = (E0;C[P | Q];Φ ⊎ Ψ). More pre-
cisely, this allows us to establish that fst(D) and fst(S) are in diff-equivalence
(as well as snd(D) and snd(S)), and then we conclude relying on the transitivity
of the equivalence. ⊓⊔
Now, regarding sequential composition and the particular case of key-exchange
protocols, we obtain the following composition result.
Theorem 4. Let C be a composition context and E0 be a finite set of names of
base type. Let P1[ ] (resp. P2[ ]) be a plain biprocess without replication and with
an hole in the scope of an assignment of the form [x1 := t1] (resp. [x2 := t2]).
Let Q1 (resp. Q2) be a plain biprocess such that fv(Q1) ⊆ {x1} (resp. fv (Q2) ⊆
{x2}), and Φ and Ψ be two frames. Let P = P1[0] | P2[0] and Q = new k.[x1 :=
k].[x2 := k].(Q1 | Q2) for some fresh name k, and assume that:
1. P/Φ and Q/Ψ are composable under E0 and C;
2. (E0;C[Q];Ψ) does not reveal k, pk(k), vk(k);
3. (E0;C[P ];Φ) satisfies the abstractability property; and
4. P1/P2/Φ is a good key-exchange protocol under E0 and C.
Let P+=P1[out(d, x1)] | P2[out(d, x2)] | in(d, x).in(d, y).ifx = y then 0 else 0.
If the biprocesses (E0; new d.C[P+];Φ) and (E0;C[Q];Ψ) satisfy diff-equivalence
then (E0;C[P1[Q1] | P2[Q2]];Φ ⊎ Ψ) satisfies diff-equivalence.
Note that we require (E0; new d.C[P+];Φ) to be in diff-equivalence (and not
simply (E0;C[P ];Φ)). Actually, when the composition context C under study is
not of the form C′[! ], and under the hypothesis that P1/P2/Φ is a good key-
exchange protocol under E0 and C, we have that these two requirements coincide.
However, the stronger hypothesis is important to conclude when C is of the form
C′[! ]. Indeed, in this case, we do not know in advance what are the instances
of P1 and P2 that will be “matched”. This is not a problem but to conclude about
the diff-equivalence of the whole process (i.e. (E0;C[P1[Q1] | P2[Q2]];Φ⊎Ψ)), we
need to ensure that such a matching is the same on both sides of the equivalence.
Note that to conclude about trace equivalence only, this additional requirement
is actually not necessary.
7 Case studies
As mentioned in the introduction, many applications rely on several protocols
running in composition (parallel, sequential, or nested). In this section, we show
that our results can help in the analysis of this sort of complex system. ProVerif
models of our case studies are made available online at:
http://www.loria.fr/~chevalvi/other/compo/.
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7.1 3G mobile phones
We look at confidentiality and privacy guarantees provided by the AKA protocol
and the Submit SMS procedure (sSMS ) when run in composition as specified
by the 3GPP consortium in [2].
Protocols description. The sSMS protocol allows a mobile station (MS) to send
an SMS to another MS through a serving network (SN). The confidentiality of
the sent SMS relies on a session key ck established through the execution of the
AKA protocol between the MS and the SN. The AKA protocol achieves mutual
authentication between a MS and a SN, and allows them to establish a shared
session key ck . The AKA protocol consists in the exchange of two messages: the
authentication request and the authentication response. The AKA protocol as
deployed in real 3G telecommunication systems presents a linkability attack [5],
and thus we consider here its fixed version as described in [5]. At the end of
a successful execution of this protocol, both parties should agree on a fresh
ciphering key ck . This situation can be modelled in our calculus as follows:
new skSN . !new IMSI . new kIMSI . !new sqn. new sms .
(AKASN [sSMSSN ] | AKAMS [sSMSMS ])
where skSN represents the private key of the network; while IMSI and kIMSI
represent respectively the long-term identity and the symmetric key of the MS.
The name sqn models the sequence number on which SN and MS are synchro-
nised. The two subprocessesAKAMS and sSMSMS (resp. AKASN , and sSMSSN )
model one session of the MS’s (resp. SN’s) side of the AKA, and sSMS protocols
respectively. Each MS, identified by its identity IMSI and its key kIMSI , can run
multiple times the AKA protocol followed by the sSMS protocol.
Security analysis. We explain how some confidentiality and privacy properties
of the AKA protocol and the sSMS procedure can be derived relying on our
composition results. We do not need to tag the protocols under study to perform
our analysis since they do not share any primitive but the pairing operator. Note
that the AKA protocol can not be modelled in the calculus given in [14] due to
the need of non-trivial else branches.
Strong unlinkability requires that an observer does not see the difference between
the two following scenarios: (i) a same mobile phone sends several SMSs; or (ii)
multiple mobile phones send at most one SMS each. To model this requirement,
we consider the composition context4:
CU [ ]
def
= !new IMSI 1. new kIMSI 1. !new IMSI 2. new kIMSI 2.
let IMSI = diff[IMSI 1, IMSI 2] in let kIMSI = diff[kIMSI 1, kIMSI 2] in
new sqn. new sms.
To check if the considered 3G protocols satisfy strong unlinkability, one needs to
check if the following biprocess satisfies diff-equivalence (Φ0 = {w1 ⊲ pk(skSN )}):
4 We use let x = M in P to denote the process P{M/x}.
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(skSN ;CU [AKA
SN [sSMSSN ] | AKAMS [sSMSMS ]];Φ0)
Hypotheses (1-4) stated in Theorem 4 are satisfied, and thus this equivalence
can be derived from the following two “smaller” diff-equivalences:
(skSN ; new d. CU [AKA
+];Φ0) and (skSN ;C
′
U [sSMS]; ∅)
where:
– sSMS
def
= sSMSSN | sSMSMS ,
– AKA+
def
= AKASN [out(d, xckSN )] | AKA
MS [out(d, xckMS)] |
in(d, x). in(d, y). if x = y then 0 else 0
– C′U [ ]
def
= CU [new ck.let xckSN = ck in let xckMS = ck in ].
Weak secrecy requires that the sent/received SMS is not deducible by an out-
sider, and can be modelled using the context
CWS [ ]
def
=!new IMSI . new kIMSI . !new sqn.new sms. .
Note that the composition context CWS is the same as fst(CU ) (up to some
renaming), thus Hypotheses (1-4) of Theorem 2 also hold and we derive the
weak secrecy property by simply analysing this property on AKA and sSMS in
isolation.
Strong secrecy means that an outsider should not be able to distinguish the
situation where sms1 is sent (resp. received), from the situation where sms2 is
sent (resp. received), although he might know the content of sms1 and sms2.
This can be modelled using the following composition context:
CSS [ ]
def
=!new IMSI . new kIMSI . !new sqn. let sms = diff[sms1, sms2] in
where sms1 and sms2 are two free names known to the attacker. Again, our
Theorem 4 allows us to reason about this property in a modular way.
7.2 E-passport application
We look at privacy guarantees provided by three protocols of the e-passport
application when run in composition as specified in [1].
Protocols description. The information stored in the chip of the passport is or-
ganised in data groups (dg1 to dg19). For example, dg5 contains a JPEG copy
of the displayed picture, and dg7 contains the displayed signature. The verifica-
tion key vk(skP ) of the passport, together with its certificate sign(vk(skP ), skDS )
issued by the Document Signer authority are stored in dg15. The corresponding
signing key skP is stored in a tamper resistant memory, and cannot be read or
copied. For authentication purposes, a hash of all the dgs together with a signa-
ture on this hash value issued by the Document Signer authority are stored in a
separate file, the Security Object Document:
sod
def
= 〈sign(h(dg1, . . . , dg19), skDS ), h(dg1, . . . , dg19)〉.
The ICAO standard specifies several protocols through which these infor-
mation can be accessed [1]. First, the Basic Access Control (BAC ) protocol
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establishes a key seed kseed from which two sessions keys kenc and kmac are de-
rived. The purpose of kenc and kmac is to prevent skimming and eavesdropping
on the subsequent communication with the e-passport. The security of the BAC
protocol relies on two master keys, ke and km , which are optically retrieved from
the passport by the reader before executing the BAC protocol. Once the BAC
protocol has been successfully executed, the reader gains access to the informa-
tion stored in the RFID tag through the Passive Authentication (PA) and the
Active Authentication (AA) protocols that can be executed in any order. The
PA protocol is an authentication mechanism that proves that the content of the
RFID chip is authentic whereas the AA protocol can be used to prevent cloning
of the passport chip. It relies on the fact that the secret key skP of the passport
cannot be read or copied. This situation can be modelled calculus as follows:
P
def
= new skDS . !new ke. new km . new skP .new id . new sig. new pic. . . .
!(BACR[PAR | AAR] | BACP [PAP | AAP ])
where id , sig, pic, ... represent the name, the signature, the displayed picture, etc
of the e-passport’s owner, i.e. the data stored in the dgs (1-14) and (16-19). The
subprocesses BACP , PAP and AAP (resp. BACR, PAR and AAR) model one
session of the passport’s (resp. reader’s) side of the BAC, PA and AA protocols
respectively. The name skDS models the signing key of the Document Signing
authority used in all passports. Each passport (identified by its master keys ke
and km , its signing key skP , the owner’s name, picture, signature, ...) can run
multiple times the BAC protocol followed by the PA and AA protocols.
Security analysis. We explain below how strong anonymity of these three pro-
tocols executed together can be derived from the analysis performed on each
protocol in isolation. In [4], as sequential composition could not be handled, the
analysis of the e-passports application had to exclude the execution of the BAC
protocol. Instead, it was assumed that the key kenc (resp. kmac) is “magically”
pre-shared between the passport and the reader. Thanks to our Theorem 4, we
are now able to complete the analysis of the e-passport application.
To express strong anonymity, we need on one hand to consider a system in
which the particular e-passport with publicly known id1, sig1, pic1, etc. is being
executed, while on the other hand it is a different e-passport with publicly known
id2, sig2, pic2, etc. which is being executed. We consider the following context:
CA[ ]
def
=!new ke. new km. new skP .let id = diff[id1, id2] in . . . !
This composition context differs in the e-passport being executed on the left-
hand process and on the right-hand process. In other words, the system satisfies
anonymity if an observer cannot distinguish the situation where the e-passport
with publicly known id1, sig1, pic1, etc. is being executed, from the situation
where it is another e-passport which is being executed. To check if the tagged
version of the e-passport application (we assume here that BAC, PA, and AA are
tagged in different ways) preserves strong anonymity, one thus needs to check if
the following biprocess satisfies diff-equivalence (with Φ0 = {w1 ⊲ vk(skDS )}):
(skDS ;CA[BAC
R[PAR | AAR] | BACP [PAP | AAP ]];Φ0)
18
We can instead check whether BAC, PA and AA satisfy anonymity in isola-
tion, i.e. if the following three diff-equivalences hold:
(skDS ; new d. CA[BAC
+]; ∅) (α)
(skDS ;C
′
A[PA
R | PAP ];Φ0) (β)
(skDS ;C
′
A[AA
R | AAP ]; ∅) (γ)
where
– BAC+
def
= BACR[out(d, (xkencR, xkmacR))]
| BACP [out(d, (xkencP , xkmacP ))]
| in(d, x). in(d, y). ifx = y then 0 else 0;
– C′A[ ]
def
= CA[C
′′
A[ ]]; and
– C′′A[ ]
def
= new kenc.new kmac. let (xkencR, xkmacR) = (kenc, kmac) in
let (xkencP , xkmacP ) = (kenc, kmac) in .
Then, applying Theorem 3 to (β) and (γ) we derive that the following biprocess
satisfies diff-equivalence:
(skDS ;C
′
A[PA
R | AAR | PAP | AAP ];Φ0) (δ)
and applying Theorem 4 to (α) and (δ), we derive the required diff-equivalence:
(skDS ;CA[BAC
R[PAR | AAR] | BACP [PAP | AAP ]];Φ0)
Note that we can do so because Hypotheses (1-4) stated in Theorem 4 are
satisfied, and in particular because BACR/BACP /∅ is a good key-exchange pro-
tocol under {skDS} and CA.
8 Conclusion
We investigate composition results for reachability properties as well as privacy-
type properties expressed using a notion of equivalence. Relying on a generic
composition result that allows one to strongly relate any trace of the composed
protocol to a trace of the so-called disjoint case, we derive parallel composition
results, as well as a sequential composition results (the case of key-exchange
protocols under various composition contexts).
All these results work in a quite general setting, e.g. processes may have
non trivial else branches, we consider arbitrary primitives expressed using an
equational theory, and processes may even share some standard primitives as
long as they are tagged in different ways. We illustrate the usefulness of our
results through the mobile phone and e-passport applications.
We believe that our generic result could be used to derive further composition
results. We may want for instance to relax the notion of being a good protocol
at the price of studying a less ideal scenario when analysing the protocol Q in
isolation. We may also want to consider situations where sub-protocols sharing
some data are arbitrarily interleaved. Moreover, even if we consider arbitrary
primitives, sub-protocols can only share some standard primitives provided that
they are tagged. It would be nice to relax these conditions. This would allow one
to compose protocols (and not their tagged versions) or to compose protocols
that both rely on primitives for which no tagging scheme actually exists (e.g.
exclusive-or).
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A Case study: 3G mobile phones
In this section, we look at the confidentiality and privacy guarantees provided
by the Authentication and Key Agreement protocol (AKA) and the Submit
SMS procedure (sSMS ), when run in composition as specified by the 3GPP
consortium in [2].
The AKA protocol achieves mutual authentication between a Mobile Station
(MS) and the Serving Network (SN), and allows them to establish shared session
keys to be used to secure subsequent communications. We consider here its
fixed version as described in [5] which relies on a public key infrastructure. In
particular, in case of failure, i.e. ϕtest is not satisfied, the answerRES is encrypted
using the public key of the SN, i.e. pk(skSN ).
The functions f1 − f5, used to compute the authentication parameters, are
one-way keyed cryptographic functions, and ⊕ denotes the exclusive-or operator.
AUTN contains a MAC of the concatenation of the random number with a
sequence number SQNN generated by the network using an individual counter for
each subscriber. The sequence number SQNN allows the mobile station to verify
the freshness of the authentication request to defend against replay attacks.
The mobile station computes the ciphering key ck and stores it in xckMS . It
also computes the authentication response RES and sends it to the network.
The network authenticates the mobile station by verifying whether the received
response is equal to the expected one. If so, the network also computes its version
of the key ck and stores it in xckSN .
The sSMS protocol allows a MS to send an SMS to another MS through
the Network. The confidentiality of the sent SMS relies on the session key ck
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Mobile Station - MS
KIMSI , IMSI,
SQNMS, pk(skSN )
Serving Network - SN
KIMSI , IMSI,
SQNN , skSN
new RAND
AK ← f5(KIMSI , RAND)
MAC ← f1(KIMSI , 〈SQNN , RAND〉)
AUTN ← 〈SQNN ⊕ AK,MAC〉
Auth Req, RAND, AUTN
if ϕtest then RES ← f2(KIMSI , RAND)
xck← f3(KIMSI , RAND)
else RES ← aenc(..., pk(skSN ))
Auth Resp, RES
if RES = f2(KIMSI , RAND)
thenxckSN ← f3(KIMSI , RAND)
Fig. 2. The AKA protocol (variant proposed in [5])
established through the execution of the AKA protocol between the MS and the
network.
Mobile Station - MS
xckMS
Serving Network - SN
xckSN
new SMS
senc(〈Submit,To, SMS, T 〉, xckMS)
senc(〈Ack, T ′〉, xckSN)
It is always the MS that initiates the sSMS procedure. It does so by en-
crypting the content of the SMS it wants to submit, together with the number
of the destination MS and a timestamp T , with the session key ck previously
established. The message also contains a constant Submit. The Network ac-
knowledges the receipt of this message with a message that includes a constant
Ack and a timestamp T ′, encrypted with ck .
Security analysis. The sSMS procedure uses a ciphering session key CK estab-
lished through the execution of the AKA protocol for the confidentiality of the
sent and received SMSs. We can thus use Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 to reason
in a modular way about the confidentiality and privacy guarantees provided by
these two protocols.
Strong unlinkability requires that an outside observer does not see the differ-
ence between the two following scenarios: (i) a same mobile phone sends several
SMSs; or (ii) multiple mobile phones send at most one SMS each. To model this
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requirement, we consider the composition context5:
CU [ ]
def
= !new IMSI 1. new kIMSI 1. !new IMSI 2. new kIMSI 2.
let IMSI = diff[IMSI 1, IMSI 2] in let kIMSI = diff[kIMSI 1, kIMSI 2] in
new sqn. new sms.
In the left-hand process, the identity of the phone in the filling process is
IMSI 1 and the long-term key is kIMSI 1, allowing the same phone to execute
multiple times the AKA protocol followed by the sSMS protocol. In the right-
hand process, the values that are used in the filling process are IMSI 2 and
kIMSI 2, restricting the execution of the considered protocols to at most one
time. To check if the considered 3G protocols satisfy strong unlinkability, one
needs to check if the following biprocess satisfies diff-equivalence:
(skSN ;CU [AKA
SN [sSMSSN ] | AKAMS [sSMSMS ]];Φ0) where Φ0 = {w1 ⊲ pk(skSN )}.
Actually, thanks Theorem 4, this equivalence can be derived from the following
two smaller diff-equivalences:
(skSN ; new d. CU [AKA
+];Φ0) and (skSN ;C
′
U [sSMS]; ∅)
where sSMS
def
= sSMSSN | sSMSMS ,
AKA+
def
= AKASN [out(d, xckSN )] | AKA
MS [out(d, xckMS)] |
in(d, x). in(d, y). ifx = y then 0 else 0
and C′U [ ]
def
= CU [new ck.let xckSN = ck in let xckMS = ck in ].
Indeed, let P = AKASN [0] | AKAMS [0] andQ = new ck.[xckSN := ck].[xckMS :=
ck].(sSMSSN | sSMSMS), and assume that Ψ is the empty frame. Considering
the AKA and sSMS protocols, we can check that P/Φ0 and Q/Ψ are com-
posable under E0 = {skSN } and CU (according to Definition 6). Note that
fn(P ) ∩ fn(Q) ∩ bn(CU ) = ∅, and thus the last condition trivially holds. Fur-
thermore, using ProVerif we can show that the remaining properties are also
satisfied, and that the two “small” equivalences also hold.
Weak secrecy requires that the sent/received SMS is not deducible by an
outsider, and can be modelled using the context
CWS [ ]
def
=!new IMSI . new kIMSI . !new sqn.new sms. .
To check if the considered 3G protocols satisfy weak secrecy of sent/received
SMSs w.r.t. some initial intruder knowledge, e.g. Φ0 = {w1 ⊲ pk(skSN )}, one
needs to check if the following process does not reveal sms
(skSN ;CWS [AKA
SN [sSMSSN ] | AKAMS [sSMSMS ]];Φ0).
5 We use let x = M in P to denote the process P{M/x}.
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However, according to Theorem 2 we can instead check whether AKA and
sSMS satisfy confidentiality of SMSs in isolation, i.e. whether the following pro-
cesses do not reveal sms:
(skSN ;CWS [AKA
SN [0] | AKAMS [0]];Φ0) (α)
(skSN ;C
′
WS [sSMS
SN | sSMSMS ]; ∅) (β)
where C′WS [ ]
def
= CWS [new ck.let xckSN = ck in let xckMS = ck in ].
Note that the composition context CWS is the same as fst(CU ) (up to some
renaming), thus Hypotheses (1-4) of Theorem 2 also hold and we derive the
weak secrecy property by simply analysing this property on AKA and sSMS in
isolation.
We are left with verifying that AKA and sSMS preserve weak secrecy of
exchanged SMSs. AKA trivially does, since sms is not used in AKA. Using
ProVerif we can show that sSMS also preserves weak secrecy of SMSs.
Strong secrecy requires that an outside oberver does not distinguish the sit-
uation where sms1 is sent, from the situation where sms2 is sent, although he
might know the content of sms1 and sms2. To model this requirement we con-
sider the following composition context.
CSS [ ]
def
=!new IMSI . new kIMSI . !new sqn. let sms = diff[sms1, sms2] in
where sms1 and sms2 are two free names known to the attacker. This com-
position context differs on the content of the SMS being sent on the left-hand
process and on the right-hand process. To check if the considered 3G protocols
satisfy confidentiality of sent SMSs w.r.t. some initial intruder knowledge, e.g.
Φ0 = {w1 ⊲ pk(skSN )}, one needs to check if the following biprocess satisfies
diff-equivalence
(skSN ;CSS [AKA
SN [sSMSSN ] | AKAMS [sSMSMS ]];Φ0).
However, according to Theorem 4 we can instead check whether AKA and
sSMS satisfy strong secrecy of SMSs in isolation:
(skSN ;CSS [AKA
+];Φ0) (α) and (skSN ;C
′
SS [sSMS]; ∅) (β)
where AKA+ and sSMS defined as for unlinkability, and
C′SS [ ]
def
= CSS [new ck.let xckSN = ck in let xckMS = ck in ].
Indeed, AKA/Φ0 and sSMS/Ψ (for Ψ = ∅) are composable under E0 =
{skSN } and CSS . Regarding the conditions of Theorem 4: (i) it is easy to see
that AKA satisfies the abstractability property: both the MS and the SN com-
pute the key ck and store it respectively in the assignment variables xckMS and
xckSN by applying the function f3, which is a one way function, to KIMSI and
RAND ; (ii) using ProVerif we can show that the considered two protocols do
not reveal xckMS and xckSN , and that AKA is actually a good key-exchange
protocol. We are left with verifying that AKA and sSMS preserve strong se-
crecy of exchanged SMSs. AKA trivially does, since the left and the right-hand
processes are syntactically equal. Using ProVerif we can show that sSMS also
preserves strong secrecy of SMSs.
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B Case study: e-passport
As mentioned in the introduction, many applications like electronic passports
or mobile phones rely on several protocols running in composition (parallel,
sequential, or nested). In this section, we show that our results can help in the
analysis of this sort of complex system considering the e-passport application.
B.1 Protocols description
The information stored in the chip of the passport is organised in data groups
(dg1 to dg19). For example, dg5 contains a JPEG copy of the displayed picture,
and dg7 contains the displayed signature. The verification key vk(skP ) of the
passport, together with its certificate sign(vk(skP ), skDS ) issued by the Document
Signer authority are stored in dg15. The corresponding signing key skP is stored
in a tamper resistant memory, and cannot be read or copied. For authentication
purposes, a hash of all the dgs together with a signature on this hash value issued
by the Document Signer authority are stored in a separate file, the Security
Object Document:
sod
def
= 〈sign(h(dg1, . . . , dg19), skDS ), h(dg1, . . . , dg19)〉.
The ICAO standard specifies several protocols through which these informa-
tion can be accessed [1].
The Basic Access Control (BAC ) protocol (see Figure 3) establishes a key
seed xkseed from which two sessions keys xkenc and xkmac are derived. The
purpose of ksenc and ksmac is to prevent skimming and eavesdropping on the
subsequent communication with the e-passport (see below). The security of the
BAC protocol relies on two master keys, ke and km , which are optically retrieved
from the passport by the reader before executing the BAC protocol.
The reader initiates the protocol by sending a challenge to the passport and
the passport replies with a random 64-bit string nP . The reader then creates
its own random nonce and some new random key material, both 64-bits. These
are encrypted, along with the tag’s nonce and sent back to the reader. A MAC
is computed using the km key and sent along with the message, to ensure the
message is received correctly. The tag receives this message, verifies the MAC,
decrypts the message and checks that its nonce is correct; this guarantees to the
tag that the message from the reader is not a replay of an old message. The tag
then generates its own random 64-bits of key material and sends this back to the
reader in a similar message, except this time the order of the nonces is reversed,
this stops the readers message being replayed directly back to the reader. The
reader checks the MAC and its nonce, and both the tag and the reader use the
xor of the key material as the seed for a session key, with which to encrypt the
rest of the session.
Once the BAC protocol has been successfully executed, the reader gains
access to the information stored in the RFID tag through the Passive Authenti-
cation (PA) and the Active Authentication (AA) protocols that can be executed
in any order.
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Passport Tag
ke, km
Reader
ke, km
get C
new nP
nP
new nR, new nR
xenc← senc(〈nR, nP , kR〉, ke)
xmac← mac(xmac, km)
〈xenc, xmac〉
if ϕP then xkseed← . . .
xkencP ← ekg(xkseed)
xkmacP ← mkg(xkseed)
resp
if ϕR then xkseed← . . .
xkencR ← ekg(xkseed)
xkmacR ← mkg(xkseed)
Fig. 3. The BAC protocol
The PA protocol (see Figure 4) is an authentication mechanism that proves
that the content of the RFID chip is authentic. Through PA the reader retrieves
the information stored in the dgs and the sod . It then verifies that the hash value
stored in the sod corresponds to the one signed by the Document Signer author-
ity. It further checks that this hash value is consistent with the received dgs.
The AA protocol (see Figure 5) is an authentication mechanism that prevents
cloning of the passport chip. It relies on the fact that the secret key skP of
the passport cannot be read or copied. The reader sends a random challenge to
the passport, that has to return a signature on this challenge using its private
signature key skP . The reader can then verify using the verification key vk(skP )
that the signature was built using the expected passport key.
B.2 Privacy analysis
All three protocols BAC, PA and AA, rely on symmetric encryption and mes-
sage authentication codes. Note that the only publicly known verification key is
vk(skDS ) and is only used by the PA protocol. Thus, we can use our composition
results, and in particular tour Theorems 3 and 4, to reason in a modular way
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Passport Tag
xkencP , xkmacP , skP
Reader
xkencR, xkmacR, vk(skP )
xenc← senc(read, xkencR)
xmac← mac(xenc, xkmacR)
〈xenc, xmac〉
yenc← senc(〈dg1, . . . , dg19, sod〉, xkencP )
ymac← mac(yenc, xkmacP )
〈yenc, ymac〉
Fig. 4. Passive Authentication protocol
about the privacy guarantees provided by the tagged version of the e-passport
application.
In [4], as sequential composition could not be handled, the analysis of the e-
passports application had to exclude the execution of the BAC protocol. Instead,
it was assumed that the keys kenc and kmac were “magically” pre-shared. With
our sequential composition result (Theorem 4), we avoid this unsafe abstraction,
as we can now consider the execution of the BAC protocol for the establishment
of these two keys. In this way, we are here able to complete the analysis of the
e-passport application.
According to the ICAO standard, the reader optically retrieves the passport’s
master keys ke and km before executing the BAC protocol to establish the key
seed for kenc and kmac. The reader can then decide to execute PA and/or AA in
any order. Formally, this corresponds to the sequential composition of the BAC
protocol and of the PA and AA protocols composed in parallel. This system can
be modelled in our calculus as follows:
P
def
= new skDS . !new ke. new km . new skP . new id . new sig. new pic. . . .
!(BACR[PAR | AAR] | BACP [PAP | AAP ])
where id , sig, pic, ... represent the name, the signature, the displayed picture, etc
of the e-passport’s owner, i.e. the data stored in the dgs (1-14) and (16-19). The
subprocesses BACP , PAP and AAP (resp. BACR, PAR and AAR) model one
session of the passport’s (resp. reader’s) side of the BAC, PA and AA protocols
respectively. The name skDS models the signing key of the Document Signing
authority used in all passports. Each passport (identified by its master keys ke
and km , its signing key skP , the owner’s name, picture, signature, ...) can run
multiple times the BAC protocol followed by the PA and AA protocols in any
order.
To express strong anonymity, we need on one hand to consider a system in
which the particular e-passport with publicly known id1, sig1, pic1, etc. is being
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Passport Tag
xkencP , xkmacP , skP
Reader
xkencR, xkmacR, vk(skP )
new rnd
xenc← senc(〈init, rnd〉, xkencR))
xmac← mac(xenc, xkmacR)
〈xenc, xmac〉
new nce
sigma ← sign(〈nce, rnd〉, skP )
yenc← senc(sigma, xkencP )
ymac← mac(yenc, xkmacP )
〈yenc, ymac〉
Fig. 5. Active Authentication protocol
executed, while on the other hand it is a different e-passport with publicly known
id2, sig2, pic2, etc. which is being executed. For this we consider the following
composition context:
CA[ ]
def
= let id = diff[id1, id2] in . . . !
This composition context differs in the e-passport being executed on the
left-hand process and on the right-hand process. In other words, the systems
satisfies anonymity if an observer cannot distinguish whether the e-passport
with publicly known id1, sig1, pic1, etc. is being executed, or another e-passport
is being executed (with publicly known id2, sig2, pic2, etc.)
To check if the tagged version of the e-passport application (we assume here
that BAC, PA, and AA are colored using three distinct colors, and thus will be
tagged in different ways) preserves strong anonymity, one thus needs to check if
the following biprocess satisfies diff-equivalence:
(skDS ;CA[[[BAC
R[PAR | AAR] | BACP [PAP | AAP ]]]];Φ0)
We can instead check whether BAC, PA and AA satisfy anonymity in isola-
tion, i.e. if the following three diff-equivalences hold:
(skDS ; new d. CA[[[BAC
+]]]; ∅) (α)
(skDS ;C
′
A[[[PA
R | PAP ]]];Φ0) (β)
(skDS ;C
′
A[[[AA
R | AAP ]]]; ∅) (γ)
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where BAC+
def
= BACR[out(d, (xkencR, xkmacR))] | BAC
P [out(d, (xkencP , xkmacP ))]
in(d, x). in(d, y). ifx = y then0 else0
C′A[ ]
def
= CA[C
′′
A[ ]]
C′′A[ ]
def
= new kenc. new kmac
let (xkencR, xkmacR) = (kenc, kmac) in
let (xkencP , xkmacP ) = (kenc, kmac) in
Then, applying Theorem 3 to (β) and (γ) we derive that the following biprocess
satisfies diff-equivalence:
(skDS ;C
′
A[[[PA
R | AAR | PAP | AAP ]]];Φ0) (δ)
and applying Theorem 4 to (α) and (δ), we derive the required diff-equivalence:
(skDS ;CA[[[BAC
R[PAR | AAR] | BACP [PAP | AAP ]]]];Φ0)
Indeed, let P = BACR[0]|BACP [0]; and Q = C′′A[PA | AA], and assume that
Ψ is the empty frame. We can check that P/Ψ and Q/Φ0 are composable under
E0 = {skDS} and CA (according to Definition 6). Note that fn(P ) ∩ fn(Q) ∩
bn(CA) = ∅, and thus the last condition trivially holds. Furthermore, using
ProVerif we can show that properties (α) and γ are also satisfied. Unfortunately,
ProVerif does not terminate when given the script corresponding to equivalence
(β). Note that ProVerif does not terminate when given the script corresponding
to the hole system either. At this point our only solution would be to rely
on a manual proof. Our composition results have allowed us to reduce a big
equivalence that existing tools cannot handle, to a much smaller one.
C Sharing primitives via tagging
We recall in this section the tagging scheme as presented in [4]. However, since
we would like to be able to iterate our composition results (in order to compose
e.g. three protocols), we consider a fixed set of colors (not only two), and we
allow a process to be colored with many colors. Actually, a colored process is a
process with a color assigned to each of its action. This gives us enough flexibility
to allow different kinds of compositions, and to iterate our composition results.
We consider a family of signatures Σ1, . . . , Σp disjoint from each other and
disjoint from Σ0. In order to tag a process, we introduce a new family of signa-
tures Σtag1 , . . . , Σ
tag
p . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, we have that Σ
tag
i = {tagi, untagi}
where tagi and untagi are two function symbols of arity 1 that we will use for tag-
ging. The role of the tagi function is to tag its argument with the tag i. The role of
the untagi function is to remove the tag. To model this interaction between tagi
and untagi, we consider the equational theory: Etagi = {untagi(tagi(x)) = x}.
For our composition result, we will assume that the two protocols we want
to compose only share symbols in Σ0. Thus, for this, we split the set {1, . . . , p}
into two disjoint sets α and β. Given a subset γ ⊆ {1, . . . , p}, we denote:
Σγ
def
=
⋃
i∈γ Σi Σ
tag
γ
def
=
⋃
i∈γ Σ
tag
i Σ
+
γ
def
= Σγ ∪Σtagγ
Eγ
def
=
⋃
i∈γ Ei E
tag
γ
def
=
⋃
i∈γ E
tag
i E
+
γ
def
= Eγ ∪ Etagγ
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Definition 10. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, and u be a term built over Σi ∪ Σ0. The
i-tagged version of u, denoted [u]i is defined as follows:
[senc(u, v)]i
def
= senc(tagi([u]i), [v]i)
[aenc(u, v)]i
def
= aenc(tagi([u]i), [v]i)
[sign(u, v)]i
def
= sign(tagi([u]i), [v]i)
[h(u)]i
def
= h(tagi([u]i))
[sdec(u, v)]i
def
= untagi(sdec([u]i, [v]i))
[adec(u, v)]i
def
= untagi(adec([u]i, [v]i))
[check(u, v)]i
def
= untagi(check([u]i, [v]i))
[f(u1, . . . , un)]i
def
= f([u1]i, . . . , [un]i) otherwise.
Note that we do not tag the pairing function symbol (this is actually useless),
and we do not tag the pk and vk function symbols. Note that tagging pk and
vk would lead us to consider an unrealistic modelling for asymmetric keys. This
definition is extended as expected to formulas ϕ (those involved in conditionals)
by applying the transformation on each term that occurs in ϕ.
Example 10. Let Σ1 = {f, g}, and consider the terms u = senc(g(r), k) and
v = f(sdec(y, k), r) built on Σ1 ∪ Σ0. We have that [u]1 = senc(tag1(g(r)), k),
and [v]1 = f(untag1(sdec(y, k)), r).
We also introduce the following notion that allows us to associate a color to
a term that is not necessarily well-tagged.
Definition 11. Let u be a term. We define tagroot(u), namely the tag of the
root of u as follows:
– tagroot(u) = ⊥ when u ∈ N ∪ X ;
– tagroot(u) = i if u = f(u1, . . . , un) and either f ∈ Σi ∪ Σ
tag
i , or f ∈
{senc, aenc, sign, h} and u1 = tagi(u
′
1) for some u
′
1.
– tagroot(u) = 0 otherwise.
Before extending the notion of tagging to processes, we have to express the
tests that are performed by an agent when he receives a message that is supposed
to be tagged. This is the purpose of testi(u) that represents the tests which
ensure that every projection and every untagging performed by an agent during
the computation of u is successful.
Definition 12. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, and u be a term built on Σ+i ∪Σ0. We define
testi(u) as follows:
– testi(u)
def
= testi(u1)∧ testi(u2)∧ tagi(untagi(u)) = u when u = g(u1, u2) with
g ∈ {sdec, adec, check}
– testi(u)
def
= testi(u1) ∧ u1 = 〈proj1(u1), proj2(u1)〉 when u = projj(u1) with
j ∈ {1, 2}
– testi(u)
def
= true when u is a name or a variable
– testi(u)
def
= testi(u1) ∧ . . . ∧ testi(un) otherwise (with u = f(u1, . . . , un)).
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This definition is extended as expected to formulas ϕ, i.e. testi(ϕ)
def
=
∧
u=v∈ϕ testi(u)∧
testi(v).
Example 11. Again, consider u = senc(g(r), k) and v = f(sdec(y, k), r). We have
that:
– test1([u]1) = true
– test1([v]1) = tag1(untag1(sdec(y, k))) = sdec(y, k)
We consider colored plain processes meaning that initially the actions of a
plain process will be annotated with a color, i.e. an integer in {1, . . . , p}. The
actions that need to be annotated are those that involve some composed terms,
i.e. inputs, outputs, conditionals, and assignments. An action colored by i ∈
{1, . . . , p} can only contain function symbol from Σi. Given a set γ ⊆ {1, . . . , p},
we say than an action is colored with γ if this action is colored by i ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
For colored plain processes, the transformation [[P ]] is defined as follows:
[[0]]
def
= 0 [[!P ]]
def
= ![[P ]] [[new k.P ]]
def
= new k.[[P ]] [[P | Q]]
def
= [[P ]] | [[Q]]
[[in(u, x)i.P ]]
def
= in(u, x)i.[[P ]] [[[x := v]i.P ]]
def
= (if testi([v]i) then [x := [v]i]
i.[[P ]])i
[[out(u, v)i.Q]]
def
= (if testi([v]i) then out(u, [v]i)
i.[[Q]])i
[[(if ϕ then P else Q)i]]
def
= (if ϕtest then (if [ϕ]i then [[P ]] else [[Q]]))
i else 0)i
where ϕtest = testi([ϕ]i)
Roughly, instead of simply outputting a term v, a process will first perform
some tests to check that the term is correctly tagged and he will output its
i-tagged version [v]i. For an assignment, we will also check that the term is
correctly tagged. For a conditional, the process will first check that the terms in-
volved in the test ϕ are correctly tagged before checking that the test is satisfied.
The annotations that occur on a plain process do not affect its semantics.
Definition 13. Consider a set γ ⊆ {1, . . . , p}. Consider a plain process P built
over Σ+γ ∪Σ0. We say that P is tagged if there exists a colored plain process Q
built over Σγ such that P = [[Q]].
D Biprocesses
The semantics of biprocesses is defined via a relation
ℓ
−→bi that expresses when
and how a biprocess may evolve. Intuitively, a biprocess reduces if and only if
both sides of the biprocess reduce in the same way: a communication succeeds
on both sides, a conditional has to be evaluated in the same way in both sides
too. When the two sides of the biprocess reduce in different ways, the biprocess
blocks. The semantics of biprocesses is formally described in Figure 6.
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(E ; {if diff(ϕL, ϕR) then Q1 else Q2} ⊎ P ;Φ; σ)
τ
−→bi (E ;Q1 ⊎ P ;Φ; σ) (Then)
if uσ =E vσ for each u = v ∈ ϕL ∪ ϕR
(E ; {if diff(ϕL, ϕR) then Q1 else Q2} ⊎ P ;Φ; σ)
τ
−→bi (E ;Q2 ⊎ P ;Φ; σ) (Else)
if uLσ 6=E vLσ for some uL = vL ∈ ϕL
and uRσ 6=E vRσ for some uR = vR ∈ ϕR
(E ; {out(c, u).Q1; in(c, x).Q2} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→bi (E ;Q1 ⊎Q2 ⊎ P ;Φ;σ ∪ {x 7→ uσ}) (Comm)
(E ; {[x := v].Q} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→bi (E ;Q ⊎ P ;Φ; σ ∪ {x 7→ vσ}) (Assgn)
(E ; {in(c, z).Q} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
in(c,M)
−−−−−→bi (E ;Q ⊎ P ;Φ;σ ∪ {z 7→ u}) (In)
if c 6∈ E , MΦ = u, fv(M) ⊆ dom(Φ) and fn(M) ∩ E = ∅
(E ; {out(c, u).Q} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
νwn.out(c,wn)
−−−−−−−−−→bi (E ;Q ⊎ P ;Φ ∪ {wn ⊲ uσ};σ) (Out-T)
if c 6∈ E , u is a term of base type, and wn is a variable such that n = |Φ|+ 1
(E ; {new n.Q} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→bi (E ∪ {n};Q ⊎ P ;Φ;σ) (New)
(E ; {!Q} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→bi (E ; {!Q;Qρ} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ) (Repl)
where ρ is used to rename variables in bv(Q)
(resp. names in bn(Q)) with fresh variables (resp. names).
(E ; {P1 | P2} ⊎ P ;Φ;σ)
τ
−→bi (E ; {P1, P2} ⊎ P ;Φ; σ) (Par)
where n is a name, c is a name of channel type (here we can have c = diff(c1, c2)), u, v
are terms that may contain the diff operator, and x, z are variables. The term M used
in the In rule is a term that does not contain any occurrence of the diff operator. The
attacker has to do the same computation in both sides.
Fig. 6. Semantics for biprocesses
E The disjoint case for a trace
Composition usually works well in the so-called disjoint case, i.e. when the pro-
tocols under study do not share any secrets. The goal of this section is to show
that we can map any trace corresponding to an execution of a protocol (with
some sharing) to another trace which corresponds to an execution of a “disjoint
case” (where protocols do not share any secrets) preserving static equivalence.
We need a strong mapping to ensure that processes evolve simultaneously, and
we rely for this on the notion of biprocesses.
We will see in this section that the composition of processes sharing some
secrets (the so-called shared case) behaves as if they did not share any secret
(the so-called disjoint case), provided that the shared secrets are never revealed
and processes are tagged.
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E.1 Material for combination
To handle the different signatures and equational theories, we consider the notion
of ordered rewriting. It has been shown that by applying the unfailing completion
procedure to E where E = E1 ⊎ E2 ⊎ . . .Ep is the union of disjoint equational
theories (Σi,Ei) (for all i, j, we have that Σi∩Σj = ∅), we can derive a (possibly
infinite) set of equations O such that on ground terms:
1. the relations =O and =E are equal,
2. the rewriting system →O is convergent.
Since the relation→O is convergent on ground terms, we define M↓E (or briefly
M↓) as the unique normal form of the ground term M for →O. These notations
are extended as expected to sets of terms.
We now introduce our notion of factors and state some properties on them
w.r.t. the different equational theories. A similar notion is also used in [13].
Definition 14 (factors). Let M ∈ T (Σ,N ∪ X ). The factors of M , denoted
Fct(M), are the maximal syntactic subterms of M that are alien to M
Lemma 2. Let M be a ground term such that all its factors are in normal form
and root(M) ∈ Σi. Then
– either M↓ ∈ Fct(M) ∪ {nmin},
– or root(M↓) ∈ Σi and Fct(M↓) ⊆ Fct(M) ∪ {nmin}.
Lemma 3. Let t be a ground term with t = C1[u1, . . . , un] where C1 is a context
built on Σi, i ∈ {1, . . . , p} and the terms u1, . . . , un are the factors of t in
normal form. Let C2 be a context built on Σi (possibly a hole) such that t↓ =
C2[uj1 , . . . , ujk ] with j1, . . . , jk ∈ {0 . . . n} and u0 = nmin (the existence is given
by Lemma 2). We have that for all ground terms v1, . . . , vn in normal form and
alien to t, if
for every q, q′ ∈ {1 . . . n} we have uq = uq′ ⇔ vq = vq′
then C1[v1, . . . , vn]↓ = C2[vj1 , . . . , vjk ] with v0 = nmin.
A proof of these lemmas can be found in [16,12].
E.2 Generic composition result
We consider two sets α, β such that α∪β = {1, . . . , p} and α∩β = ∅. We consider
a plain colored process P built on Σα ∪ Σβ∪Σ0 without replication and such
that bn(P ) = fv (P ) = ∅. This means that P is a process with no free variables,
and we assume that it contains no name restrictions (i.e. no new instructions).
Example 12. We consider the process PDH as given in Example 2 but we replace
– the 0 at the end of PA with QA = new sA.out(c, sencDH(sA, xA)), and
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– the 0 at the end of PB with QB = new sB .out(c, sencDH(sB, xB)).
Intuitively, once the Diffie-Hellman key has been established and stored in xA
(resp. xB), each participant will use it to encrypt a fresh secret, namely sA or
sB, and then send it to the other participant.
Note that when function symbols of Σ0 are used by only one of the protocols
to compose, we can either consider them as part of Σ0 and so they will be tagged,
or they can be put into distinct signatures (using renaming as above) and so they
will not be tagged. The composition theorem can be applied both ways.
To avoid confusion between the encryption schemes that processes can share,
i.e. the function symbols in Σ0, and the asymmetric encryption used in PDH but
not used in QA and QB, we will rename them by aencDH , adecDH , pkDH . Thus,
we consider p = 2, α = {1}, β = {2} with (Σα,Eα) = (ΣDH,EDH) with
– ΣDH = {aencDH , adecDH , pkDH , f, g}, and
– EDH = {adecDH(aencDH(x, pkDH(y)), y) = x, f(g(x), y) = f(x, g(y))}
whereas Σβ = {sencDH , sdecDH} and Eβ = {sdecDH(sencDH(x, y), y) = x}.
This equational theory is used to model symmetric encryption/decryption, i.e.
the primitives used in the processes QA and QB.
Now, we consider P = P ′A | P
′
B where:
– P ′A = out(c, aencDH(〈nA, g(rA)〉, pkDH(skB))).in(c, yA).
if proj1(adec(yA, skA)) = nA
then [xA := f(proj2(adecDH(yA, skA)), rA)].out(c, sencDH(sA, xA))
– P ′B = in(c, yB).out(c, aencDH(〈proj1(adecDH(yB, skB)), g(rB)〉, pkDH(skA))).
[xB := f(proj2(adecDH(yB, skB)), rB)].out(c, sencDH(sB, xB))
Note that bn(P ) = fv(P ) = ∅. We choose to color the three first actions of
P ′A (resp. P
′
B) with 1 ∈ α, and the remaining ones (i.e. those that come from
QA and QB) with 2 ∈ β.
We denote fnγ(P ) the set of free names of P that occur in actions colored
with γ, and fvγ(P ) the set of variables of P that occur in an action colored with
γ, and that are not bound by an action colored with γ. We consider a set E0 of
names such that fnα(P )∩ fnβ(P )∩E0 = ∅. This means that each name in E0 can
only occur in one type of actions (those colored α or those colored β). We denote
zα1 , . . . , z
α
k (resp. z
β
1 , . . . , z
β
l ) the variables occurring in the left-hand side of an
assignment colored α (resp. β), i.e. the variable x such that the action [x := v]
occurs in P and is colored α (resp. β). We assume that fvα(P ) ⊆ {zβ1 , . . . , z
β
l }
and fvβ(P ) ⊆ {zα1 , . . . , z
α
k }.
These conditions ensure that sharing between the parts of the process which
are colored in different ways is only possible via the assignment variables. This
is not a real limitation but this allows us to easily keep track of the shared data.
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Example 13. Continuing our example, we have fnα(P ) = {rA, rB, nA, skA, skB}
and fnβ(P ) = {sA, sB}. Regarding variables: fv
α(P ) = ∅, whereas fvβ(P ) =
{xA, xB}.
Let E0 = fn
α(P ) ∪ fnβ(P ). To follow the same notation as those introduced
in this section, we may want to rename xA with z
α
1 and xB with z
α
2 . Note that
fvβ(P ) ⊆ {zα1 , z
α
2 }.
Let Eα = {nα1 , . . . , n
α
k} and Eβ = {n
β
1 , . . . , n
β
l } be two sets of fresh names of
base type such that Eα ∩ Eβ = ∅. We define ρα and ρβ as follows:
– dom(ρα) = {z
β
1 , . . . , z
β
l }, dom(ρβ) = {z
α
1 , . . . , z
α
k };
– ρα(z
β
i ) = n
β
i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , l}; and
– ρβ(z
α
i ) = n
α
i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
We do not assume that names in Eα (resp. Eβ) are distinct. For instance, we
may have nαj = n
α
j′ for some j 6= j
′.
Given a colored plain process P , we denote by δρα,ρβ (P ), the process ob-
tained by applying ρα on actions colored α, and ρβ on actions colored β. This
transformation maps the shared case to a particular disjoint case.
Example 14. Let Eα = {kα} and Eβ = ∅, and consider the function ρβ defined as
follows: ρβ(z
α
1 ) = ρβ(z
α
2 ) = k
α. Applying δρα,ρβ on P gives us DA | DB where:
– DA = out(c, aencDH(〈nA, g(rA)〉, pkDH(skB))).in(c, yA).
if proj1(adecDH(yA, skA)) = nA
then [xA := f(proj2(adecDH(yA, skA)), rA)].out(c, sencDH(sA, k
α))
– DB = in(c, yB).out(c, aencDH(〈proj1(adecDH(yB, skB)), g(rB)〉, pkDH(skA))).
[xB := f(proj2(adecDH(yB, skB)), rB)].out(c, sencDH(sB , k
α))
Note that there is no sharing anymore between the part of the process colored
α and the part of the process colored β.
Actually, the disjoint case obtained using the transformation δρα,ρβ behaves
as the shared case but only along executions that are compatible with the chosen
abstractions, i.e. executions that preserve the equalities and the inequalities
among assignment variables as done by the chosen abstraction. This notion is
formally defined as follows:
Let A be any extended process derived from (Eα ⊎ Eβ ⊎ E0; [[P ]]; ∅), i.e. such
that (Eα ⊎ Eβ ⊎ E0; [[P ]]; ∅)
tr
=⇒A. For γ ∈ {α, β}, we say that ργ is compatible
with A = (E ;P ;Φ;σ) when:
1. for all x, y ∈ dom(σ) ∩ dom(ργ), we have that xσ =E yσ if, and only if,
xργ = yργ ; and
2. for all z ∈ dom(ργ), either tagroot(zσ↓) = ⊥ or tagroot(zσ↓) 6∈ γ ∪ {0}.
We say that (ρα, ρβ) is compatible with A when both ρα and ρβ are com-
patible with A. For γ ∈ {α, β}, we define the extension of ργ , denoted ρ+γ , as
follows:
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– dom(ρ+γ ) = dom(ργ) ∪ {xσ↓ | x ∈ dom(ργ)}, and
– for any x ∈ dom(ργ), ρ+γ (x)
def
= ρ(x) and ρ+γ (xσ)
def
= ργ(x) .
Before stating our generic composition result, we have also to formalize the
fact that the shared keys are not revealed. Since sharing is performed via the
assignment variables, we say that A0 does not reveal the value of its assignments
w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ) if for any extended process A = (E ;P ;Φ;σ) derived from A0 and
such that (ρα, ρβ) is compatible with A, we have:
newE .Φ 6⊢ k for any k ∈ Kα ∪Kβ
where for all γ ∈ {α, β}, Kγ = {t, pk(t), vk(t) | z ∈ dom(σ) ∩ dom(ργ) and
(t = zσ or t = zργ)}.
Theorem 5. Let P be a plain colored process as described above, and B0 be an
extended colored biprocess such that:
– S0 = (Eα ⊎ Eβ ⊎ E0; [[P ]]; ∅; ∅)
def
= fst(B0),
– D0 = (Eα ⊎ Eβ ⊎ E0;PD; ∅; ∅)
def
= snd(B0), and
– PD = δρα,ρβ ([[P ]]) for some (ρα, ρβ) compatible with D0, and
– D0 does not reveal its assignments w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ).
We have that:
1. For any extended process S = (ES ;PS;ΦS ;σS) such that S0
tr
=⇒S with (ρα, ρβ)
compatible with S, there exists a biprocess B and an extended process D =
(ED;PD;ΦD;σD) such that B0
tr
=⇒biB, fst(B) = S, snd(B) = D, and new ES .ΦS ∼
new ED.ΦD.
2. For any extended process D = (ED;PD;ΦD;σD) such that D0
tr
=⇒D with
(ρα, ρβ) compatible with D, there exists a biprocess B and an extended process
S = (ES ;PS ;ΦS ;σS) such that B0
tr
=⇒biB, fst(B) = S, snd(B) = D, and
new ES .ΦS ∼ newED.ΦD.
This theorem is proved by induction on the length of the derivation. For this,
a strong correspondence between the process S0 (shared case) and D0 (disjoint
case) has to be maintained along the derivation, and the transformation δρα,ρβ
has to be extended to allow replacements also in σ and Φ. The rest of this section
is dedicated to the proof of this theorem.
Example 15. Going back to our running example, and forming a biprocess with
S0 = (E0 ∪ {k
α};P ′A | P
′
B; ∅; ∅) and D0 = (E0 ∪ {k
α};DA | DB; ∅; ∅), Theorem 5
gives us that these two processes behave in the same way when considering
executions that are compatible with the chosen abstraction ρβ, i.e. executions
that instantiate xA and xB by the same value.
A similar result as the one stated in Theorem 5 was proved in [14]. Here, we
consider in addition else branches, and we consider a richer common signature.
Moreover, relying on the notion of biprocess, we show a strong link between the
shared case and the disjoint case, and we prove in addition static equivalence of
the resulting frames.
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E.3 Name replacement
Now that we have fixed some notations, we have to explain how the replacement
will be applied on the shared process to extract the disjoint case. Actually a
same term will be abstracted differently depending on the context which is just
above it.
Definition 15. Let (ρ+α , ρ
+
β ) be two functions from terms of base type to names
of base type. Let δ
ρ+α ,ρ
+
β
γ , or shortly δγ , (γ ∈ {α, β}) be the functions on terms
that is defined as follows:
δγ(u) = u↓ρ+γ when
{
u↓ ∈ dom(ρ+γ )
and tagroot(u) 6∈ γ ∪ {0}
Otherwise, we have that δγ(u) = u when u is a name or a variable; and
δγ(f(t1, . . . , tk)) is equal to
– f(δγ(t1), . . . , δγ(tk)) if tagroot(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = 0;
– f(δα(t1), . . . , δα(tk)) if tagroot(f(t1, . . . , tn)) ∈ α.
– f(δβ(t1), . . . , δβ(tk)) if tagroot(f(t1, . . . , tn)) ∈ β.
Definition 16 (Factor for Σ0). Let u be a term. We define FctΣ0(u) the
factors of a term u for Σ0 as the maximal syntactic subterms v of u such that
tagroot(v) 6= 0.
Let σ be a substitution. We consider a pair (ρα, ρβ) as defined in Sec-
tion E.2 and compatible with σ. We denote (ρ+α , ρ
+
β ) the extension of (ρα, ρβ)
w.r.t. σ. Thanks to compatibility, ρ+α (resp. ρ
+
β ) is injective on dom(ρ
+
α ) r
{zβ1 , . . . , z
β
l } (resp. dom(ρ
+
β )r {z
α
1 , . . . , z
α
k }). Moreover, we also have that for all
u ∈ dom(ρ+α )r {z
β
1 , . . . , z
β
l } (resp. dom(ρ
+
β )r {z
α
1 , . . . , z
α
k }), either tagroot(u) =
⊥ or tagroot(u) 6∈ α ∪ {0} (resp. tagroot(u) 6∈ β ∪ {0}).
Lemma 4. Let t1 and t2 be ground terms in normal form such that (fn(t1) ∪
fn(t2)) ∩ (Eα ⊎ Eβ) = ∅. We have that:
t1 = t2 if, and only if, δγ(t1) = δγ(t2)
where γ ∈ {α, β}.
Proof. The right implication is trivial. We consider the left implication, and we
prove the result by induction on max(|t1|, |t2|) when γ = α. The other case γ = β
can be handled in a similar way.
Base case max(|t1|, |t2|) = 1: In such a case, we have that t1, t2 ∈ N . We first
assume that δα(t1) (and thus also δα(t2)) is in Eα ⊎Eβ . By hypothesis, we know
that t2 and t1 do not use names in Eα ⊎ Eβ. Therefore, by definition of δα, we
can deduce that t1, t2 ∈ dom(ρ+α ) and t1ρ
+
α = t2ρ
+
α , and thus t1 = t2 thanks to
ρ+α being injective on dom(ρ
+
α )r {z
β
1 , . . . , z
β
l }. Now, we assume that δα(t1) (and
37
thus also δα(t2)) is not in Eα ⊎ Eβ. In such a case, by definition of δα, we have
that δα(t1) = t1 and δα(t2) = t2, and thus t1 = t2.
Inductive step max(|t1|, |t2|) > 1: Assume w.l.o.g. that |t1| > 1. Thus, there
exists a symbol function f and terms u1, . . . un such that t1 = f(u1, . . . un). We
do a case analysis on t1 which is in normal form.
Case t1 ∈ dom(ρ+α ): In such a case, δα(t1) = δα(t2) = n for some n ∈ Eα. By
hypothesis, we know that t2 and t1 do not use names in Eα, and we have that
t1ρ
+
α = t2ρ
+
α . Therefore, we necessarily have that t1 = t2.
Case t1 6∈ dom(ρ+α ): We do a new case analysis on t1.
Case f ∈ Σ+i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}: Let γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ. In such
a case, we have that δα(t1) = f(δγ(u1), . . . , δγ(un)). But δα(t2) = δα(t1) and by
definition of δα, it implies that there exist v1, . . . , vn such that t2 = f(v1, . . . , vn)
and f(δγ(v1), . . . , δγ(vn)) = δα(t2). Thus we have that δγ(vj) = δγ(uj) for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Furthermore, since t1 and t2 are in normal form and not using
names in Eα⊎Eβ , we also know that uj and vj are in normal form and not using
names in Eα⊎Eβ , for every j. Since, we have that max(|t1|, |t2|) > max(|uj |, |vj |),
for any j, by our inductive hypothesis, we can deduce that uj = vj , for all j and
so t1 = f(u1, . . . , un) = f(v1, . . . , vn) = t2.
Case t1 = f(tagi(w1), w2) with i ∈ {1, . . . , p} and f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}:
Let γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ. In such a case, we know that δα(t1) =
f(tagi(δγ(w1)), δγ(w2)). But we know that δα(t2) = δα(t1) = f(tagi(δγ(w1)), δγ(w2)).
Thus thanks to t2 being in normal form and by definition of δα, it implies
that there exists v1 and v2 such that t2 = f(tagi(v1), v2) and so δα(t2) =
f(tagi(δγ(v1)), δγ(v2)). Thus, we have that δγ(v1) = δγ(u1) and δγ(v2) = δγ(u2).
Moreover, t1 and t2 being in normal form and not using names in Eα ⊎ Eβ, so
are uj and vj for j ∈ {1, 2}, so we can apply inductive hypothesis and conclude
that v1 = u1 and v2 = u2 and so t1 = t2.
Case t1 = h(tagi(w1)) with i ∈ {1, . . . , p}: This case is analogous to the
previous one.
Case f ∈ Σ0 and root(u1) 6= tagi, i = 1 . . . p: By definition of δα, we can
deduce that δα(t1) = f(δα(u1), . . . , δα(un)). Since δα(t1) = δα(t2), we can deduce
that the top symbol of t2 is also f and so there exists v1, . . . , vn such that t2 =
f(v1, . . . , vn). In the previous cases, we showed that if f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign, h} and
the top symbol of v1 is tagj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , p} then δα(t1) = δα(t2) implies
that the top symbol of u1 is also tagj . Thus, thanks to our hypothesis, we can
deduce that either f 6∈ {senc, aenc, sign, h} or the top symbol of v1 is different
from tagj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Hence by definition of δα, we can deduce
that δα(t2) = f(δα(v1), . . . , δα(vn)) and so δα(vj) = δα(uj) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Moreover, t1 and t2 being in normal form and not using names in Eα⊎Eβ , implies
that so are uj and vj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We can thus apply our inductive
hypothesis and conclude that uj = vj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and so t1 = t2.
Lemma 5. Let t1 and t2 be ground terms in normal form such that (fn(t1) ∪
fn(t2)) ∩ (Eα ⊎ Eβ) = ∅. We have that:
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δα(t1) = δβ(t2) implies that t1 = t2.
Proof. We prove the result by induction on |δα(t1)|.
Base case |δα(t1)| = 1: Since δα(t1) = δβ(t2), Eα ∩ Eβ = ∅, and t1, t2 do not use
names in Eα ⊎ Eβ , we necessarily have that t1 6∈ dom(ρ+α ) and t2 6∈ dom(ρ
+
β ).
Hence, we have that δα(t1) = t1 and δβ(t2) = t2. This allows us to conclude.
Inductive step |δα(t1)| > 1: In that case, we have that δα(t1) = f(u1, . . . , un) =
δβ(t2). Assume that f ∈ Σi ∪Σtagi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Let γ ∈ {α, β} such
that i ∈ γ. By definition of δα and δβ, we can deduce that root(t1) = f = root(t2).
Furthermore, if we assume that t1 = f(v1, . . . , vn) and t2 = f(w1, . . . , wn), we
would have δγ(vj) = δγ(wj) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Lemma 4, we deduce that
vj = wj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, we conclude that t1 = t2. Assume now
that f ∈ Σ0. According to the definition of δα and δβ , there exists v1, . . . , vn
and w1, . . . , wn such that t1 = f(v1, . . . , vn), t2 = f(w1, . . . , wn) and δγ1(vj) =
δγ2(wj), for some γ1, γ2 ∈ {α, β}. Moreover, t1 and t2 being in normal form and
not using names in Eα ⊎ Eβ implies that so are vj and wj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Now, either γ1 = γ2 and so by Lemma 4, we have that vj = wj , else γ1 6= γ2 but
then by our inductive hypothesis, we also have vj = wj . Hence we conclude that
t1 = t2.
Lemma 6. Let u be a ground term in normal form such that fn(u)∩(Eα ⊎Eβ) =
∅. Let γ ∈ {α, β}. We have that:
– δγ(u) is in normal form; and
– either root(δγ(u)) = root(u) or root(δγ(u)) = ⊥.
– either tagroot(δγ(u)) = tagroot(u) or tagroot(δγ(u)) = ⊥.
Proof. We prove this result by induction on |u| and we assume w.l.o.g. that
γ = α.
Base case |u| = 1: In such a case, we have that u ∈ N , and we also have that
δα(u) ∈ N and so δα(u) is in normal form with the same root as u, namely ⊥.
Moreover, we have tagroot(δγ(u)) = ⊥.
Inductive |u| > 1: Assume first that u↓ ∈ dom(ρ+α ) and tagroot(u) 6∈ α ∪ {0}.
Hence by definition of δα, we have that δα(u) ∈ Eα. Thus, we trivially obtain
that δα(u) is in normal form, root(δα(u)) = ⊥ and tagroot(δα(u)) = ⊥.
Otherwise, we distinguish two cases:
Case 1. We have that u = C[u1, . . . , un] where C is built on Σj ∪ Σtagj with
j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, C is different from a hole, uk are factors in normal form of
u, k = 1 . . . n. Let ε ∈ {α, β} such that j ∈ ε. Hence, since u 6∈ dom(ρ+α ),
then by definition of δα, we deduce that δα(u) = C[δε(u1), . . . , δε(un)]. Since C
is not a hole, thanks to our inductive hypothesis on u1, . . . , un, we have that
δε(u1), . . . , δε(un) are in normal form and δε(u1), . . . , δε(un) are factors of δα(u).
Thus, since u is in normal form, we have that C[u1, . . . , un]↓ = C[u1, . . . , un].
By Lemmas 4 and 3, we deduce that
C[δε(u1), . . . , δε(un)]↓ = C[δε(u1), . . . , δε(un)]
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i.e. δα(u)↓ = δα(u).
Furthermore, we also have that root(δα(u)) = root(u) and tagroot(δα(u)) =
tagroot(u).
Case 2. We have that u = f(v1, . . . , vn) for some f ∈ Σ0. By definition of δα
there exists ε ∈ {α, β} such that δα(u) = f(δε(v1), . . . , δε(vm)). We do a case
analysis on f:
Case f ∈ {senc, aenc, pk, sign, vk, h, 〈 〉}: In this case, we have that δα(u)↓ =
f(δε(v1)↓, . . . , δε(vm)↓). Since by inductive hypothesis, δε(vk) is in normal form,
for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we can deduce that δα(u) is also in normal form and
root(δα(u)) = f = root(u). If f ∈ {pk, vk, 〈 〉} then we trivially have that
tagroot(δα(u)) = tagroot(u). Let’s focus on f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}. If tagroot(u) 6∈
{0} then it means that root(v1) = tagi for some i ∈ ε. But by definition of δε,
we would have that root(δε(v1)) = tagi. Hence tagroot(δα(u)) = tagroot(u). Now
if tagroot(u) 6∈ {0}, it means that root(v1) 6 {tag1 . . . tagp}. But by inductive
hypothesis, root(δε(v1)) = ⊥ or root(δε(v1)) = root(v1) and so we can conclude
that tagroot(δα(u)) ∈ {0}.
Case f = sdec: Then m = 2, and by definition of δα, we have that δα(u) =
sdec(δα(v1), δα(v2)). Thus, in such a case, we have that root(δα(u)) = f =
root(u). By inductive hypothesis, we have that δα(v1) and δα(v2) are both in nor-
mal form. Assume that sdec cannot be reduced, i.e. δα(u)↓ = sdec(δα(v1)↓, δα(v2)↓) =
sdec(δα(v1), δα(v2)). Thus the result holds. Otherwise, if sdec can be reduced,
there exist w1, w2 with δα(v1) = senc(w1, w2) and δα(v2) = w2. By definition of
δα, there must exist ε
′ ∈ {α, β}, and w′1, w
′
2 such that δα(v1) = senc(δε′ (w
′
1), δε′(w
′
2)),
v1 = senc(w
′
1, w
′
2), w1 = δε′(w
′
1) and w2 = δε′(w
′
2). Thus, we have that δα(v2) =
δε′(w′2). Thanks to Lemmas 4 and 5, we have that v2 = w
′
2. Hence, u =
sdec(senc(w′1, w
′
2), w
′
2). But in such a case, we would have that u is not in normal
form which contradicts our hypothesis.
At last, since root(δα(u)) = ⊥ or root(δα(u)) = root(u) = sdec then we can
deduce that tagroot(δα(u)) = ⊥ or tagroot(δα(u)) = tagroot(u) = 0.
The cases where f = check or f = adec are analogous to the previous one.
E.4 δα and δβ on tagged term
Let σ0 be a ground substitution. Similarly to the previous section, we consider
a pair (ρα, ρβ) as defined in Section E.2 and compatible with σ0. We denote
(ρ+α , ρ
+
β ) the extension of (ρα, ρβ) w.r.t. this substitution. We also denote by Eα
and Eβ the respective image of ρβ and ρα, and we assume that σ0 does not use
any name in Eα and Eβ .
Thanks to compatibility, ρ+α (resp. ρ
+
β ) is injective on dom(ρ
+
α )r{z
β
1 , . . . , z
β
l }
(resp. dom(ρ+β )r{z
α
1 , . . . , z
α
k }). Moreover, we also have that for all z ∈ {z
β
1 , . . . , z
β
l }
(resp. z ∈ {zα1 , . . . , z
α
k }), either tagroot(zσ0↓) = ⊥ or tagroot(zσ0↓) 6∈ α ∪ {0}
(resp. tagroot(zσ0↓) 6∈ β ∪ {0}).
Let i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Let u ∈ T (Σi ∪ Σtagi ∪ Σ0,N ∪ X ). As defined in Sec-
tion C, testi(u) is a conjunction of elementary formulas (equalities between
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terms). Given a substitution σ such that fv(u) ⊆ dom(σ), we say that σ satisfies
t1 = t2, denoted σ  t1 = t2, if t1σ↓ = t2σ↓.
At last, for all substitution σ, for all γ ∈ {α, β}, we denote by δγ(σ) the
substitution such that dom(σ) = dom(δγ(σ)) and for all x ∈ dom(δγ(σ)),
xδγ(σ) = δγ(xσ).
Lemma 7. Let u ∈ T (Σi ∪Σ0,N ∪ X ) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Let γ ∈ {α, β}
such that i ∈ γ and σ0 be a ground substitution such that fv(u) ⊆ dom(σ0).
Moreover, assume that u does not use names in Eα ⊎ Eβ. We have that:
– δγ([u]i(σ0↓)) = δγ([u]i)δγ(σ0↓); and
– If σ0  testi([u]i) then δγ([u]i(σ0↓))↓ = δγ([u]iσ0↓).
Proof. Let σ be the substitution σ0↓. We prove the two results separately. First,
we show by induction on |u| that δγ([u]iσ) = δγ([u]i)δγ(σ):
Base case |u| = 1: In this case, u ∈ N ∪ X . If u ∈ N then we have that
[u]i = u and so [u]iσ = u and δγ(u) ∈ N . Thus, we have that δγ([u]iσ) =
δγ(u) = δγ(u)δγ(σ) = δγ([u]i)δγ(σ). Otherwise, we have that u ∈ X and [u]i = u.
W.l.o.g., we assume that γ = α. First, if u 6∈ {zβ1 , . . . , z
β
l }, then we have that
δα(u) = u. Thus, δα(u)δα(σ) = uδα(σ). Since u ∈ X and fv (u) ⊆ dom(σ), we
have that uδα(σ) = δα(uσ), thus δα([u]iσ) = δα(uσ) = uδα(σ) = δα(u)δα(σ) =
δα([u]i)δα(σ). Now, it remains the case where u = z
β
j for some j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. In
such a case, we have that:
– δα([z
β
j ]iσ) = δα(z
β
j σ) = n
β
j , and
– δα([z
β
j ]i)δα(σ) = δα(z
β
j )δα(σ) = n
β
j δα(σ) = n
β
j .
Inductive step |u| > 1|, i.e. u = f(u1, . . . , un). We do a case analysis on f.
Case f ∈ Σi: In such a case, [u]i = f([u1]i, . . . , [un]i). By definition of δγ ,
δγ([u]iσ) = f(δγ([u1]iσ), . . . , δγ([un]iσ)) and δγ([u]i) = f(δγ([u1]i), . . . , δγ([un]i)).
By our inductive hypothesis, we can deduce that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we
have that δγ([uk]iσ) = δγ([uk]i)δγ(σ). Thus, we can deduce that δγ([u]iσ) =
f(δγ([u1]i), . . . , δγ([un]i))δγ(σ) = δγ([u]i)δγ(σ).
Case f ∈ {aenc, sign, senc}: In this case n = 2, and by definition of [u]i, we
have that [u]i = f(tagi([u1]i), [u2]i). Thus, δγ([u]i) = f(tagi(δγ([u1]i)), δγ([u2]i))
and δγ([u]iσ) = f(tagi(δγ([u1]iσ)), δγ([u2]iσ)). But by our inductive hypothesis,
we have δγ([uk]iσ) = δγ([uk]i)δγ(σ) with k ∈ {1, 2}. We conclude that
δγ([u]iσ) = f(tagi(δγ([u1]i)δγ(σ)), δγ([u2]i)δγ(σ))
= δγ([u]i)δγ(σ).
Case f = h: This case is analogous to the previous one and can be handled
in a similar way.
Case f ∈ {sdec, adec, check}: In this case n = 2, and by definition of [u]i, we
have that [u]i = untagi(f([u1]i, [u2]i)). Thus, δγ([u]i) = untagi(f(δγ([u1]i), δγ([u2]i)))
and δγ([u]iσ) = untagi(f(δγ([u1]iσ), δγ([u2]iσ))). Relying on our inductive hy-
pothesis, we deduce that
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δγ([uk]iσ) = δγ([uk]i)δγ(σ) with k ∈ {1, 2}.
We conclude that
δγ([u]iσ) = untagi(f(δγ([u1]i), δγ([u2]i)))δγ(σ)
= δγ([u]i)δγ(σ).
Otherwise, by definition of [u]i, we have that:
– [u]i = f([u1]i, . . . , [un]i), and
– δγ([u]i) = f(δγ([u1]i), . . . , δγ([un]i)).
Thus, this case is similar to the case f ∈ Σi. Hence the result holds.
We now prove the second property, i.e. if σ  testi([u]i), then δγ([u]iσ)↓ =
δγ([u]iσ↓). We prove the result by induction on |u|:
Base case |u| = 1: In this case, u ∈ N ∪X . In both cases, we have that [u]i = u
and testi(u) = true. If u ∈ N , we know that δγ(u) ∈ N and so δγ(u)↓ = δγ(u).
We also have that uσ↓ = uσ = u. This allows us to conclude that
δγ(uσ)↓ = δγ(u)↓ = δγ(u) = δγ(uσ↓).
Otherwise, we have u ∈ X . Since σ is is normal form, we deduce that uσ↓ = uσ.
By Lemma 6, we also know that δγ(uσ↓)↓ = δγ(uσ↓). Thus, we conclude that
δγ(uσ↓) = δγ(uσ↓)↓ = δγ(uσ)↓.
Inductive step |u| > 1, i.e. u = f(u1, . . . , un). We do a case analysis on f.
Case f ∈ Σi: We have that [u]i = f([u1]i, . . . , [un]i). Hence, we have that
δγ([u]iσ) = f(δγ([u1]iσ), . . . , δγ([un]iσ)) and so δγ([u]iσ)↓ = f(δγ([u1]iσ)↓, . . . ,
δγ([un]iσ)↓)↓. We have that testi([u]i) =
∧n
j=1 testi([uj ]i) which means that
σ  testi([uj]i) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By applying our inductive hypothesis on
u1, . . . , un, we deduce that
δγ([u]iσ)↓ = f(δγ([u1]iσ↓), . . . , δγ([un]iσ↓))↓
= δγ(f([u1]iσ↓, . . . , [un]iσ↓))↓
Let t = f([u1]iσ↓, . . . , [un]iσ↓). We can assume that there exists a context C
built on Σi such that t = C[t1, . . . , tm] with Fct(t) = {t1, . . . , tm} and t1, . . . , tm
are in normal form. Thus, by Lemma 2, there exists a context D (possibly a
hole) such that t↓ = D[tj1 , . . . , tjk ] with j1, . . . , jk ∈ {0, . . . ,m} and t0 = nmin.
Since t1, . . . , tm are in normal form and thanks to Lemma 6, we know that for all
k ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, δγ(tk) is also in normal form and its root is not in Σi. Hence, we
can apply Lemma 3 such that C[δγ(t1), . . . , δγ(tm)]↓ = D[δγ(tj1), . . . , δγ(tjk )].
But since C and D are both built upon Σi, we have that:
– C[δγ(t1), . . . , δγ(tm)]↓ = δγ(C[t1, . . . , tm])↓, and
– D[δγ(tj1), . . . , δγ(tjk )] = δγ(D[tj1 , . . . , tjk ]).
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Hence, we can deduce that δγ(t)↓ = δγ(t↓). But we already know that t↓ = [u]iσ↓
and δγ(t)↓ = δγ([u]iσ)↓. Thus, we can conclude that δγ([u]iσ)↓ = δγ([u]iσ↓).
Case f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}: In such a case, we have that:
– [u]i = f(tagi([u1]i), [u2]i), and
– testi([u]i) = testi([u1]i) ∧ testi([u2]i).
Hence, we have that [u]iσ↓ = f(tagi([u1]iσ↓), [u2]iσ↓), and also δγ([u]iσ)↓ =
f(tagi(δγ([u1]iσ)↓), δγ([u2]iσ)↓). By our inductive hypothesis on u1 and u2, we
have that:
δγ([uk]iσ)↓ = δγ([uk]iσ↓) with k ∈ {1, 2}.
Hence, we can deduce that
δγ([u]iσ)↓ = f(tagi(δγ([u1]iσ↓)), δγ([u2]iσ↓))
= δγ(f(tagi([u1]iσ↓), [u2]iσ↓))
= δγ([u]iσ↓).
Case f = h: This case is analogous to the previous one and can be handled
in a similar way.
Case f ∈ {pk, vk, 〈 〉}: In such a case, we have that:
– [u]i = f([u1]i, . . . , [un]i) with n ∈ {1, 2}, and
– testi([u]i) = ∧nj=1testi([uj ]i).
We have that [u]iσ↓ = f([u1]iσ↓, . . . , [un]iσ↓). Thus, this case is similar to the
senc case and can be handled similarly.
Case f ∈ {sdec, adec, check}: In such a case, we have that:
– [u]i = untagi(f([u1]i, [u2]i)), and
– testi([u]i) is the following formula:
(tagi(untagi(f([u1]i, [u2]i))) = f([u1]i, [u2]i))
∧ testi([u1]i) ∧ testi([u2]i)
By hypothesis, we have that σ  testi([u]i), thus tagi(untagi(f([u1]i, [u2]i)))σ↓ =
f([u1]i, [u2]i)σ↓. Hence, we deduce that the root function symbol f can be reduced
and the root of the plaintext is tagi. More formally, there exist v1, v2 such that:
– f = sdec: [u1]iσ↓ = senc(tagi(v1), v2), [u2]iσ↓ = v2 and [u]iσ↓ = v1. This
implies that:
δγ([u1]iσ↓) = senc(tagi(δγ(v1)), δγ(v2)).
Thus, we can deduce that:
untagi(sdec(δγ([u1]iσ↓), δγ([u2]iσ↓)))↓= δγ(v1)
= δγ([u]iσ↓)
– f = adec: [u1]iσ↓ = aenc(tagi(v1), pk(v2)), [u2]iσ↓ = v2, and [u]iσ↓ = v1.
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– f = check: [u1]iσ↓ = sign(tagi(v1), v2), [u2]iσ↓ = vk(v2), and [u]iσ↓ = v1.
In each case, we have that:
untagi(f(δγ([u1]iσ↓), δγ([u2]iσ↓)))↓ = δγ([u]iσ↓).
By inductive hypothesis, we have δγ([uk]iσ↓) = δγ([uk]iσ)↓ with k ∈ {1, 2}. We
also have that:
δγ([u]iσ)↓ = untagi(f(δγ([u1]iσ)↓, δγ([u2]iσ)↓))↓.
This allows us to conclude that
δγ([u]iσ)↓ = untagi(f(δγ([u1]iσ↓), δγ([u2]iσ↓)))↓
= δγ([u]iσ↓).
Case f = projj, j = 1, 2: In such a case, we have that n = 1, and [u]i =
f([u1]i). Since σ  testi([u]i), we have that there exist v1, v2 such that [u1]iσ↓ =
〈v1, v2〉 and so δγ([u]iσ↓) = δγ(vj). But by inductive hypothesis, we have that
δγ([u1]iσ)↓ = δγ([u1]iσ↓) = 〈δγ(v1), δγ(v2)〉. Hence, δγ([u]iσ)↓ = f(δγ([u1]iσ))↓ =
f(δγ([u1]iσ)↓)↓ = δγ(vj)↓. We have shown that δγ(vj) = δγ([u]iσ↓), thus by
Lemma 6, δγ(vj) is in normal form and which allows us to conclude.
Corollary 1. Let u, v ∈ T (Σi ∪ Σ0,N ∪ X ) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Let γ ∈
{α, β} such that i ∈ γ. Assume that fv(u) ∪ fv(v) ⊆ dom(σ0↓), and σ0 
testi([u]i)∧ testi([v]i). Moreover, assume that u, v do not use names in Eα ⊎Eβ.
[u]iσ0↓ = [v]iσ0↓ ⇔ δγ([u]i)δγ(σ0↓)↓ = δγ([v]i)δγ(σ0↓)↓.
Proof. Thanks to Lemma 4, we have that
[u]iσ0↓ = [v]iσ0↓ ⇔ δγ([u]iσ0↓) = δγ([v]iσ0↓).
Thanks to Lemma 7, we have that:
– δγ([u]iσ0↓) = δγ([u]i(σ0↓))↓ = δγ([u]i)δγ(σ0↓)↓, and
– δγ([v]iσ0↓) = δγ([v]i(σ0↓))↓ = δγ([v]i)δγ(σ0↓)↓.
This allows us to conclude.
Lemma 8. Let u ∈ T (Σi ∪Σ0,N ∪ X ) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Let γ ∈ {α, β}
such that i ∈ γ. Assume that fv(u) ⊆ dom(σ0). Moreover, assume that u does
not use names in Eα ∪ Eβ. We have that :
σ0↓  testi([u]i) ⇔ δγ(σ0↓)  testi(δγ([u]i))
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Proof. To simplify the proof, we denote by σ the substitution σ0↓. We prove this
result by induction on |u| :
Base case |u| = 1: In this case, we have that u ∈ N ∪X , and thus [u]i, δγ([u]i) ∈
N ∪ X . In such a case, we have that testi([u]i) = true and testi(δγ([u]i)) = true.
Hence, the result trivially holds.
Inductive step |u| > 1, i.e. u = f(u1, . . . , un). We do a case analysis on f:
Case f ∈ Σi ∪ {pk, vk, 〈 〉}: In this case, we have that [u]i = f([u1]i, . . . , [un]i)
and δγ([u]i) = f(δγ([u1]i), . . . , δγ([un]i)). Thus, we deduce that testi([u]i) =∧n
j=1 testi([uj ]i) and testi(δγ([u]i)) =
∧n
j=1 testi(δγ([uj ]i)). By inductive hypoth-
esis on u1, . . . , un, the result holds.
Case f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}: In this case, we have that:
– [u]i = f(tagi([u1]i), [u2]i), and
– δγ([u]i) = f(tagi(δγ([u1]i)), δγ([u2]i)).
Thus, we deduce that testi([u]i) = testi([u1]i) ∧ testi([u2]i) and testi(δγ([u]i)) =
testi(δγ([u1]i)) ∧ testi(δγ([u2]i)). By inductive hypothesis on u1, u2, the result
holds.
Case f = h: This case is analogous to de previous one and can be handled in
a similar way.
Case f ∈ {sdec, adec, check}: In this case, we have that:
– [u]i = untagi(f([u1]i, [u2]i)), and
– δγ([u]i) = untagi(f(δγ([u1]i), δγ([u2]i))).
Thus, we deduce that testi([u]i) is the following formula:
testi([u1]i) ∧ testi([u2]i)
∧tagi(untagi(f([u1]i, [u2]i))) = f([u1]i, [u2]i)
and testi(δγ([u]i)) is the following formula:
testi(δγ([u1]i)) ∧ testi(δγ([u2]i))∧
tagi(untagi(f(δγ([u1]i), δγ([u2]i)))) = f(δγ([u1]i), δγ([u2]i))
Whether we assume that σ  testi([u]i) or δγ(σ)  testi(δγ([u]i)), we have by
inductive hypothesis that σ  testi([uk]i) with k ∈ {1, 2}. Thus by Lemma 7, it
implies that δγ([uk]iσ↓) = δγ([uk]i)δγ(σ)↓ with k ∈ {1, 2}. We do a case analysis
on f. We detail below the case where f = sdec. The cases where f = adec, and
f = check can be done in a similar way.
In such a case (f = sdec), we have that
σ  tagi(untagi(f([u1]i, [u2]i))) = f([u1]i, [u2]i)
is equivalent to there exists v1, v2 s.t. [u2]iσ↓ = v2 and [u1]iσ↓ = senc(tagi(v1), v2).
But by Lemma 4, it is equivalent to δγ([u1]iσ↓) = senc(tagi(δγ(v1)), δγ(v2)) and
δγ([u2]iσ↓) = δγ(v2). Thus, it is equivalent to:
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– δγ([u1]i)δγ(σ)↓ = senc(tagi(δγ(v1)), δγ(v2)), and
– δγ([u2]i)δγ(σ)↓ = δγ(v2).
Hence it is equivalent to
δγ(σ) 
(
tagi(untagi(f(δγ([u1]i), δγ([u2]i))))
= f(δγ([u1]i), δγ([u2]i))
)
Case f ∈ {proj1, proj2}: In such a case, we have that [u]i = f([u1]i) and
δγ([u]i) = f(δγ([u1]i)). Thus, we deduce that testi([u]i) is the following formula:
testi([u1]i) ∧ 〈proj1([u1]i), proj2([u1]i)〉 = [u1]i
and testi(δγ([u]i)) is the following formula:
testi(δγ([u1]i))∧
〈proj1(δγ([u1]i)), proj2(δγ([u1]i))〉 = δγ([u1]i)
Whether we assume that σ  testi([u]i) or δγ(σ)  testi(δγ([u]i)), we have by
inductive hypothesis that σ  testi([u1]i). Thus by Lemma 7, it implies that
δγ([u1]iσ↓) = δγ([u1]i)δγ(σ)↓.
Actually σ  〈proj1([u1]i), proj2([u1]i)〉 = [u1]i is equivalent to there exist
v1, v2 such that [u1]iσ↓ = 〈v1, v2〉, which is, thanks to Lemma 4, equivalent to
δγ([u1]iσ↓) = 〈δγ(v1), δγ(v2)〉.
We have shown that this is equivalent to
δγ([u1]i)δγ(σ)↓ = 〈δγ(v1), δγ(v2)〉
Thus, we conclude that σ  〈proj1([u1]i), proj2([u1]i)〉 = [u1]i is equivalent δγ(σ) 
〈proj1(δγ([u1]i)), proj2(δγ([u1]i))〉 = δγ([u1]i).
For a term u that does not contain any tag, we defined a way to construct
a term that is properly tagged (i.e. [u]i). Hence, for a term properly tagged, we
would never have senc(n, k) where n and k are both nonces, for example. Instead,
we would have senc(tagi(n), k). However, even if we can force the processes to
properly tag their terms, we do not have any control on what the intruder can
build. Typically, if the intruder is able to deduce n and k, he is allowed to send
to a process the term senc(n, k). Thus, we want to define the notion of flawed
tagged term.
Definition 17. Let u be a ground term in normal form. Consider γ and γ′
such that {γ, γ′} = {α, β}. We define the flawed subterms of u w.r.t. γ, denoted
Flawedγ(u), as follows:
Flawedγ(u)
def
=
{
v ∈ st(u)
∣∣∣∣ tagroot(v) ∈ {0} ∪ γ
′ and
root(v) 6∈ {pk, vk, 〈 〉}
}
We define the flawed subterms of u, denoted Flawed(u), as the set Flawed(u) =
Flawedα(u) ∩ Flawedβ(u)
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Lemma 9. Let u ∈ T (Σi ∪Σ0,N ∪ X ) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Let γ ∈ {α, β}
such that i ∈ γ. Let γ′ such that γ′ ∈ {α, β}r γ. Let σ be a ground substitution
in normal form such that fv (u) ⊆ dom(σ).
If σ  testi([u]i) then for all t ∈ Flawed
γ([u]iσ↓), there exists x ∈ fv ([u]i)
such that t ∈ Flawedγ(xσ).
Proof. We prove the result by induction on |u|.
Base case |u| = 1: In this case, we have that u ∈ X ∪N and so [u]i = u. If u ∈ N ,
then uσ and [u]iσ↓ are both in N , which means that Flawed
γ([u]iσ↓) = ∅. Thus,
the result holds. Otherwise, we have that u ∈ X and so [u]i = u ∈ dom(σ) which
means that the result trivially holds.
Inductive step |u| > 1, i.e. u = f(u1, . . . , un). We do a case analysis on f.
Case f ∈ Σi: In this case, [u]i = f([u1]i, . . . , [un]i) and [u]iσ↓ = f([u1]iσ↓, . . . ,
[un]iσ↓)↓. By definition, we know that for all t ∈ Flawed
γ([u]iσ↓), root(t) 6∈ Σγ .
Thus, thanks to Lemma 2, for all t ∈ Flawedγ([u]iσ↓), there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that t ∈ st([uk]iσ↓). By hypothesis, σ  testi([u]i) and so σ  testi([uk]i).
Thus, by inductive hypothesis, we know that there exists x ∈ fv([uk]i) such that
t ∈ st(xσ). Since fv([uk]i) ⊆ fv([u]i), we can conclude.
Case f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}: In such a case, [u]i = f(tagi([u1]i), [u2]i) and
[u]iσ↓ = f(tagi([u1]iσ↓), [u2]iσ↓). Moreover, σ  testi([u]i) implies that σ 
testi([uk]i), with k ∈ {1, 2}. Since tagroot([u]iσ↓) = i, then we deduce that :
Flawedγ([u]iσ↓) = Flawed
γ([u1]iσ↓) ∪ Flawed
γ([u2]iσ↓)
Thanks to our inductive hypothesis on u1 and u2, the result holds.
Case f = h: This case is analogous to the previous one and can be handled
in a similar way.
Case f = 〈 〉: In this case, we have that [u]i = f([u1]i, [u2]i), and [u]iσ↓ =
f([u1]iσ↓, [u2]iσ↓). Moreover, σ  testi([u]i) implies that σ  testi([uk]i) with
k ∈ {1, 2}. By definition, since root([u]iσ↓) = 〈 〉, we have that Flawed
γ([u]iσ↓) =
Flawedγ([u1]iσ↓) ∪ Flawed
γ([u2]iσ↓). Applying our inductive hypothesis on u1
and u2, we conclude.
Case f = {vk, pk}: In this case, we have u = f(v) with v ∈ N ∪ X . Thus
[u]i = u and so by definition, Flawed
γ(uσ↓) = ∅. Thus, the result trivially holds.
Case f ∈ {sdec, adec, check}: In this case, we have that [u]i = untagi(f([u1]i, [u2]i))
and
testi([u]i) = testi([u1]i) ∧ testi([u2]i)∧
tagi([u]i) = f([u1]i, [u2]i).
By hypothesis, we know that σ  testi([u]i) and more specifically tagi([u]i)σ↓ =
f([u1]i, [u2]i)σ↓. It implies that there exist v1, v2 such that [u1]iσ↓ = g(tagi(v1), v2)
and [u]iσ↓ = v1, with g ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}. Thus, for all t ∈ Flawed
γ([u]iσ↓),
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t ∈ Flawedγ([u1]iσ↓). Since σ  testi([u1]i), the result holds by inductive hypoth-
esis.
Case f = projj, j ∈ {1, 2}: We have that [u]i = f([u1]i) and testi([u]i) =
testi([u1]i)∧ 〈proj1([u1]i), proj2([u1]i)〉 = [u1]i. Hence, σ  testi([u]i) implies that
there exist v1, v2 such that [u1]iσ↓ = 〈v1, v2〉 and [u]iσ↓ = vj . Thus, for all
t ∈ Flawedγ([u]iσ↓), t ∈ Flawed
γ([u1]iσ↓). Since σ  testi([u1]i), our inductive
hypothesis allows us to conclude.
Corollary 2. Let u ∈ T (Σi∪Σ0,N ∪X ) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Let γ ∈ {α, β}
such that i ∈ γ. Let σ be a ground substitution in normal form such that fv(u) ⊆
dom(σ).
If σ  testi([u]i) then for all t ∈ Flawed([u]iσ↓), there exists x ∈ fv([u]i) such
that t ∈ Flawed(xσ).
Corollary 3. Let u ∈ T (Σi∪Σ0,N ∪X ) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Let γ ∈ {α, β}
such that i ∈ γ. Assume that fv(u) ⊆ dom(σ0). Moreover, assume that u
does not use names in Eα ∪ Eβ. If δγ(σ0↓)  testi(δγ([u]i)), then for all t ∈
Flawed
γ(δγ([u]i)δγ(σ0↓)↓), there exists x ∈ fv (δγ([u]i)) such that t ∈ Flawed
γ(xδγ(σ0↓)).
Proof. By Lemma 6, we deduce that δγ(σ0↓) is a substitution in normal form.
Moreover, since u ∈ T (Σi ∪ Σ0,N ∪ X ) and by definition of δγ , and [ ]i, we
deduce that there exists v ∈ T (Σi ∪ Σ0,N ∪ X ) such that [v]i = δγ([u]i). By
application of Lemma 9, we deduce that for all t ∈ Flawedγ([v]iδγ(σ0↓)↓), there
exists x ∈ fv([v]i) such that t ∈ st(xδγ(σ0↓)). Hence, we conclude that for
all t ∈ Flawedγ(δγ([u]i)δγ(σ0↓)↓), there exists x ∈ fv (δγ([u]i)) such that t ∈
st(xδγ(σ0↓)).
Definition 18. Let u ∈ T (Σ,N ∪X ). The α-factors (resp. β-factors) of u, de-
noted Fctα(u), are the maximal syntactic subterms of u that are also in Flawed
α(u)
(resp. Flawedβ(u)).
Lemma 10. Let u ∈ T (Σi ∪Σ0,N ∪X ) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Let γ ∈ {α, β}
such that i ∈ γ. Let σ be a ground substitution in normal form such that fv(u) ⊆
dom(σ).
If σ  testi([u]i) then
– either [u]iσ↓ ∈ Fctγ([u]iσ),
– otherwise Fctγ([u]iσ↓) ⊆ Fctγ([u]iσ)
Proof. We prove the result by induction on |u|.
Base case |u| = 1: In this case, we have that u ∈ X ∪ N and so [u]i = u. If
u ∈ N , then uσ and [u]iσ↓ are both in N , which means that Fctγ([u]iσ) = ∅
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and Fctγ([u]iσ↓) = ∅. Thus, the result holds. Otherwise, we have that u ∈ X and
so [u]i = u. But σ is in normal form hence [u]iσ↓ = [u]iσ. Thus, Fctα([u]iσ↓) =
Fctα([u]iσ↓) and so the result holds.
Inductive step |u| > 1, i.e. u = f(u1, . . . , un). We do a case analysis on f.
Case f ∈ Σi: In this case, [u]i = f([u1]i, . . . , [un]i) and [u]iσ↓ = f([u1]iσ↓, . . . ,
[un]iσ↓)↓.
By definition, we know that for all t ∈ Fctγ [u]iσ↓, root(t) 6∈ Σγ . Thus,
thanks to Lemma 2, for all t ∈ Fctγ [u]iσ↓, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
t ∈ Fctγ([uk]iσ↓). By hypothesis, σ  testi([u]i) and so σ  testi([uk]i). Thus,
by inductive hypothesis, we know that
– either [uk]iσ↓ ∈ Fctγ([uk]iσ),
– otherwise Fctγ([uk]iσ↓) ⊆ Fctγ([uk]iσ)
Thus, if [uk]iσ↓ ∈ Fctγ([uk]iσ) then it means that t = [uk]iσ↓ and so t ∈
Fctγ([uk]iσ) (otherwise it contradicts the notion of maximal subterm). Thus in
both cases, we obtain that t ∈ Fctγ([uk]iσ). Since Fctγ([uk]iσ) ⊆ Fctγ([u]iγ)
then we deduce that t ∈ Fctγ([u]iγ) hence the result holds.
Case f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}: In such a case, [u]i = f(tagi([u1]i), [u2]i) and
[u]iσ↓ = f(tagi([u1]iσ↓), [u2]iσ↓). Moreover, σ  testi([u]i) implies that σ 
testi([uk]i), with k ∈ {1, 2}. Since tagroot([u]iσ↓) = i, then we deduce that :
Fctγ([u]iσ↓) = Fctγ([u1]iσ↓) ∪ Fctγ([u2]iσ↓)
Thanks to our inductive hypothesis on u1 and u2, the result holds.
Case f = h: This case is analogous to the previous one and can be handled
in a similar way.
Case f = 〈 〉: In this case, we have that [u]i = f([u1]i, [u2]i), and [u]iσ↓ =
f([u1]iσ↓, [u2]iσ↓). Moreover, σ  testi([u]i) implies that σ  testi([uk]i) with
k ∈ {1, 2}. By definition, since root([u]iσ↓) = 〈 〉, we have that Fctγ([u]iσ↓) =
Fctγ([u1]iσ↓) ∪ Fctγ([u2]iσ↓). Applying our inductive hypothesis on u1 and u2,
we conclude.
Case f = {vk, pk}: In this case, we have u = f(v) with v ∈ N ∪ X . Thus
[u]i = u and so by definition, Fctγ(uσ↓) = ∅. Thus, the result trivially holds.
Case f ∈ {sdec, adec, check}: In this case, we have that [u]i = untagi(f([u1]i, [u2]i))
and
testi([u]i) = testi([u1]i) ∧ testi([u2]i)∧
tagi([u]i) = f([u1]i, [u2]i).
By hypothesis, we know that σ  testi([u]i) and more specifically tagi([u]i)σ↓ =
f([u1]i, [u2]i)σ↓. It implies that there exists v1, v2 such that [u1]iσ↓ = g(tagi(v1), v2)
and [u]iσ↓ = v1, with g ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}. Thus, for all t ∈ Fctγ([u]iσ↓),
t ∈ Fctγ([u1]iσ↓). Since σ  testi([u1]i), the result holds by inductive hypothe-
sis.
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Case f = projj, j ∈ {1, 2}: We have that [u]i = f([u1]i) and testi([u]i) =
testi([u1]i)∧ 〈proj1([u1]i), proj2([u1]i)〉 = [u1]i. Hence, σ  testi([u]i) implies that
there exist v1, v2 such that [u1]iσ↓ = 〈v1, v2〉 and [u]iσ↓ = vj . Thus, for all t ∈
Fctγ([u]iσ↓), t ∈ Fctγ([u1]iσ↓). Since σ  testi([u1]i), our inductive hypothesis
allows us to conclude.
E.5 Frame of a tagged process
In this subsection, we will state and prove the lemmas regarding frames and
static equivalence. Let νE .Φ be a frame such that:
Φ = {w1 ⊲ u1, . . . , wn ⊲ un}.
Let M be a recipe, i.e. a term such that fv (M) ⊆ dom(Φ) and fn(M) ∩ E = ∅,
we define the measure µ as follows:
µ(M) = (imax, |M |)
where imax ∈ {1, . . . , n} is the maximal indice i such that wi ∈ fv(M), and |M |
denotes the size of the term M , i.e. the number of symbols that occur in M .
We have that µ(M1)
def
= (i1, s1) < µ(M2)
def
= (i2, s2) when either i1 < i2; or
i1 = i2 and s1 < s2.
Once again, we denote by zα1 , . . . , z
α
k and z
β
1 , . . . , z
β
ℓ the assignment variables
of the extended processes that we are considering.
Definition 19. Let (E ;P ;Φ;σ) be an extended process, ≺ be a total order on
dom(Φ) ∪ dom(σ) and col be a mapping from dom(Φ) ∪ dom(σ) to {1, . . . , p}.
We say that (E ;P ;Φ;σ) is a derived well-tagged extended process w.r.t. ≺ and
col if for every x ∈ dom(Φ) (resp. x ∈ dom(σ)), there exists {γ, γ′} = {α, β}
such that one of the following condition is satisfied:
1. there exist v and i = col(x) ∈ γ such that u = [v]iσ, σ  testi([v]i), and for
all z ∈ fv (v), z ≺ x and either col(z) ∈ γ or there exists j such that z = zγ
′
j ;
or
2. there exists M such that fv(M) ⊆ dom(Φ)∩ {z | z ≺ x}, fn(M)∩E = ∅ and
MΦ = u.
where u = xΦ (resp. u = xσ).
In the case of variables instantiated through an output, and or an internal
communication, it will be the first item that needs to hold; while in the case
of variables intantiated through inputs on public channels it is the second item
that needs to hold. Intuitively, the order ≺ on dom(Φ) ∪ dom(σ) corresponds to
the order in which the variables in dom(Φ)∪dom(σ) have been introduced along
the execution. In particular, we have that w1 ≺ w2 ≺ . . . ≺ wn where dom(Φ) =
{w1, . . . , wn}. In the following, we sometimes simply say that (E ;P ;Φ;σ) is a
derived well-tagged extended process.
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Lemma 11. Let (E ;P ;Φ;σ) be a derived well-tagged extended process w.r.t ≺
and col . Let x ∈ dom(Φ) (resp. x ∈ dom(σ)) and t ∈ Flawed(xΦ↓) (resp. t ∈
Flawed(xσ↓)). We have that there exists M such that fv(M) ⊆ dom(Φ)∩{z | z ≺
x}, fn(M) ∩ E = ∅ and t ∈ Flawed(MΦ↓).
Proof. We prove this result by induction on dom(Φ)∪dom(σ) with the order ≺.
Base case u = xσ or u = xΦ with x ≺ z for any z ∈ dom(Φ) ∪ dom(σ). Assume
t ∈ Flawed(u↓). By definition of a derived well-tagged extended process w.r.t ≺
and col , one of the following condition is satisfied:
1. There exist v and i = col(x) such that u = [v]iσ, σ  testi([v]i), and z ≺ x
for any z ∈ fv (v). Since u = [v]iσ and σ  testi([v]i), we can apply Lemma 9
to v and σ↓. Thus, we have that there exists z ∈ fv ([v]i) such that t ∈
Flawed(zσ↓). However, since x is mimimal w.r.t. ≺, we know that fv (v) = ∅.
Hence, we obtain a contradiction. This case is impossible.
2. There existsM such that fv (M) ⊆ dom(Φ)∩{z | z ≺ x}, fn(M)∩E = ∅, and
MΦ = u. Thus, we have thatMΦ↓ = u↓, and we have that t ∈ Flawed(MΦ↓).
Inductive case u = xσ or u = xΦ. Assume t ∈ Flawed(u↓). By definition of
a derived well-tagged extended process w.r.t ≺ and col , one of the following
condition is satisfied:
1. There exist v and i = col(x) such that u = [v]iσ, σ  testi([v]i), and z ≺ x
for any z ∈ fv (v). Since u = [v]iσ and σ  testi([v]i), we can apply Lemma 9
to v and σ↓. Thus, we have that there exists z ∈ fv ([v]i) such that t ∈
Flawed(zσ↓), and we have that z ≺ x. Hence, we conclude by applying our
induction hypothesis.
2. There existsM such that fv (M) ⊆ dom(Φ)∩{z | z ≺ x}, fn(M)∩E = ∅, and
MΦ = u. Thus, we have thatMΦ↓ = u↓, and we have that t ∈ Flawed(MΦ↓).
This allows us to conclude.
Lemma 12. Let (E ;P ;Φ;σ) be a derived well-tagged extended process w.r.t ≺
and col . Let {γ, γ′} = {α, β}. Let x ∈ dom(Φ) (resp. x ∈ dom(σ)) such that
col(x) ∈ γ. Let u = xΦ (resp. u = xσ). Let t ∈ Fctγ(u↓). We have that
– either there exists M such that fv(M) ⊆ dom(Φ)∩{z | z ≺ x}, fn(M)∩E = ∅
and t ∈ Fctγ(MΦ↓);
– otherwise there exists j such that zγ
′
j ≺ x and z
γ′
j σ↓ = t.
Proof. We prove this result by induction on dom(Φ)∪dom(σ) with the order ≺.
Base case u = xσ or u = xΦ with x ≺ z for any z ∈ dom(Φ) ∪ dom(σ).
Let t ∈ Fctγ(u↓) and col(x) ∈ γ with γ ∈ {α, β}. By definition of a derived
well-tagged extended process w.r.t ≺ and col , one of the following condition is
satisfied:
1. There exist v and i = col(x) such that u = [v]iσ, σ  testi([v]i), and z ≺ x
for any z ∈ fv (v). Since x is minimal by ≺ then fv (v) = ∅. Hence u = [v]i.
Thus we deduce that Fctγ(u↓) = ∅. Hence there is a contradiction with
t ∈ Fctγ(u↓) and so this condition cannot be satisfied.
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2. There exists M such that fv(M) ⊆ dom(Φ) ∩ {z | z ≺ x}, fn(M) ∩ E = ∅,
and MΦ = u. Thus, we have that MΦ↓ = u↓ and so the result holds.
Inductive case u = xσ or u = xΦ. Assume t ∈ Fctγ(u↓) and col(x) ∈ γ. By
definition of a derived well-tagged extended process w.r.t ≺ and col , one of the
following condition is satisfied:
1. There exist v and i = col(x) ∈ γ such that u = [v]iσ, σ  testi([v]i), and
for all z ∈ fv (v), z ≺ x and either col(z) ∈ γ or there exists j such that
z = zγ
′
j . Since u = [v]iσ and σ  testi([v]i), we can apply Lemma 10 to v
and σ↓. Thus we have that t ∈ Fctγ([v]i(σ↓). In such a case, it means that
there exists z ∈ fv(v) with z ≺ x such that t ∈ Fctγ(zσ↓) and one of the
two conditions is satisfied:
– col(z) ∈ γ: In such a case, we can apply our inductive hypothesis on t
and z and so the result holds.
– there exists j such that z = zγ
′
j : Otherwise, we know by hypothesis that
zγ
′
σ↓ ∈ N or Fctγ(zγ
′
σ↓) = {zγ
′
σ↓}. Since t ∈ Fctγ(zσ↓), we deduce
that zγ
′
σ↓ 6∈ N and so Fctγ(z
γ′σ↓) = {zγ
′
σ↓}. But this implies that
t = zσ↓. Hence the result holds.
2. There existsM such that fv (M) ⊆ dom(Φ)∩{z | z ≺ x}, fn(M)∩E = ∅, and
MΦ = u. Thus, we have that MΦ↓ = u↓, and we have that t ∈ Fctγ(MΦ↓).
This allows us to conclude.
Lemma 13. Let (E ;P ;Φ;σ) be a derived well-tagged extended process. Let M
be a term such that fn(M) ∩ E = ∅ and fv (M) ⊆ dom(Φ). Let f(t1, . . . , tm) ∈
Flawed(MΦ↓). There exists M1, . . . ,Mm such that fv (Mk) ⊆ dom(Φ), fn(Mk) ∩
E = ∅, MkΦ↓ = tk, and µ(Mk) < µ(M), for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof. We prove this result by induction on µ(M).
Base case µ(M) = (j, 1): In this case, either we have that M ∈ N or M = wj . If
M ∈ N , then we have MΦ↓ = M ∈ N and Flawed(MΦ↓) = ∅. Thus the result
holds. If M = wj then, by Lemma 11, f(t1, . . . , tm) ∈ Flawed(wjΦ↓) implies that
there exists M ′ such that:
– fv (M ′) ⊆ {w1, . . . , wj−1},
– fn(M) ∩ E = ∅, and
– f(t1, . . . , tm) ∈ Flawed(M ′Φ↓).
Since µ(M ′) < µ(M), thanks to our inductive hypothesis, we deduce that there
exist M1, . . . ,Mm such that for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we have that: fv (Mk) ⊆
dom(Φ), fn(Mk) ∩ E = ∅, MkΦ↓ = tk, and µ(Mk) < µ(M ′) < µ(M).
Inductive step µ(M) > (j, 1): In such a case, we have that M = f(M1, . . . ,Mn).
Let t = g(t1, . . . , tm) ∈ Flawed(MΦ↓). We do a case analysis on f.
Case f ∈ Σi ∪ Σtagi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}: In such a case, MΦ↓ =
f(M1Φ↓, . . . ,MnΦ↓)↓. By definition, we know that for all t ∈ Flawed(MΦ↓),
we have that root(t) 6∈ Σi ∪Σtagi . Thus, thanks to Lemma 2, we deduce that
Flawed(MΦ↓) ⊆ Flawed(M1Φ↓) ∪ . . . ∪ Flawed(MnΦ↓).
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Since µ(Mk) < µ(M) for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, thanks to our inductive hypothesis,
we know that there existsM ′1, . . . ,M
′
m such that fv(M
′
j) ⊆ dom(Φ), fn(M
′
j)∩E =
∅, M ′jΦ↓ = ti and µ(M
′
j) < µ(Mk) < µ(M), for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Hence the result
holds.
Case f = 〈 〉: In such a case, MΦ↓ = f(M1Φ↓,M2Φ↓). Moreover, we have
that Flawed(MΦ↓) = Flawed(M1Φ↓) ∪ Flawed(M2Φ↓). Since µ(M1) < µ(M),
µ(M2) < µ(M) and t ∈ Flawed(M1Φ↓)∪Flawed(M2Φ↓), we conclude by applying
our inductive hypothesis on M1 (or M2).
Case f ∈ {pk, vk}: In this case,MΦ↓ = f(M1Φ↓) and we have that Flawed(MΦ↓) =
∅. Hence the result trivially holds.
Case f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}: In such a case, we have thatMΦ↓ = f(M1Φ↓,M2Φ↓).
We need to distinguish whether root(M1Φ↓) = tagi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p} or
not.
If root(M1Φ↓) = tagi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, then there exists u1 such that
M1Φ↓ = tagi(u1). Hence, we have that Flawed(M1Φ↓) = Flawed(u1). We have
also that:
Flawed(MΦ↓) = Flawed(u1) ∪ Flawed(M2Φ↓).
We deduce that t ∈ Flawed(M1Φ↓) or t ∈ Flawed(M2Φ↓). Since µ(M1) < µ(M)
and µ(M2) < µ(M), we conclude by applying our inductive hypothesis on M1
or M2.
Otherwise root(M1Φ↓) 6∈ {tag1, . . . , tagp}. In such a case, Flawed(MΦ↓) =
Flawed(M1Φ↓)∪ Flawed(M2Φ↓)∪{MΦ↓}. If t = MΦ↓, we have that t1 =M1Φ↓,
t2 = M2Φ↓ and µ(M1) < µ(M), µ(M2) < µ(M). Thus the result holds. If
t ∈ Flawed(M1Φ↓) ∪ Flawed(M2Φ↓), we conclude by applying our inductive hy-
pothesis on M1 or M2.
Case f = h: This case is analogous to the previous one and can be handled
similarly.
Case f ∈ {sdec, adec, check}: In such a case, we have to distinguish two cases
depending on whether f is reduced in MΦ↓, or not.
If f is not reduced, i.e. MΦ↓ = f(M1Φ↓,M2Φ↓), then we have that
Flawed(MΦ↓) = {MΦ↓} ∪ Flawed(M1Φ↓) ∪ Flawed(M2Φ↓).
Thus if t = MΦ↓, we have that t1 = M1Φ↓, t2 = M2Φ↓ and µ(M1) < µ(M),
µ(M2) < µ(M). Thus the result holds. Otherwise, we have that t ∈ Flawed(M1Φ↓)
or t ∈ Flawed(M2Φ↓). Since µ(M1) < µ(M), µ(M2) < µ(M), we can conclude
by applying our inductive hypothesis on M1 or M2.
If f is reduced, then we have that M1Φ↓ = f′(u1, u2) with MΦ↓ = u1 and
f′ ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}. If root(u1) = tagi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, then we have
that there exists u′1 such that u1 = tagi(u
′
1), Flawed(MΦ↓) = Flawed(u
′
1) and
Flawed(M1Φ↓) = Flawed(u′1) ∪ Flawed(u2). Thus, we have that Flawed(MΦ↓) ⊆
Flawed(M1Φ↓). Otherwise, if root(u1) 6∈ {tag1, . . . , tagp}, then we have that
Flawed(M1Φ↓) = {M1Φ↓} ∪ Flawed(u1) ∪ Flawed(u2)
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and Flawed(MΦ↓) = Flawed(u1). Thus, Flawed(MΦ↓) ⊆ Flawed(M1Φ↓). In both
cases, we have that Flawed(MΦ↓) ⊆ Flawed(M1Φ↓) and since µ(M1) < µ(M),
we can conclude by applying our inductive hypothesis on M1.
In the following lemma, we will use the factors of the signature only composed
of 〈 〉, denoted Fct 〈 〉. Typically, for all terms u, for all context built only on 〈 〉, for
all terms u1, . . . , un, if u = C[u1, . . . , un] and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, root(ui) 6= 〈 〉
then Fct 〈 〉(u) = {u1, . . . , un}.
Lemma 14. Let (E ;P ;Φ;σ) be a derived well-tagged extended process w.r.t ≺
and col . Assume that for all assignment variables z, newE .Φ 6⊢ zσ↓. Let M
such that fv (M) ⊆ dom(Φ), fn(M) ∩ E = ∅. For all {γ, γ′} = {α, β}, for all
t ∈ Fctγ(MΦ↓), if t 6∈ Fct〈 〉(MΦ↓) and for all assignment variable z, for all
w ∈ dom(Φ), z ≺ w and µ(w) ≤ µ(M) implies zσ↓ 6= t then there exists M ′
such that µ(M ′) < µ(M), fn(M) ∩ E = ∅ and t ∈ Fct 〈 〉(M
′Φ↓).
Proof. We do a proof by induction on µ(M):
Base case µ(M) = (0, 1): In this case, we have that M ∈ N which means that
MΦ↓ =M ∈ N and Fctγ(MΦ↓) = ∅. Thus the result holds.
Base case µ(M) = (j, 1): In this case, we haveM = wj . Let {γ, γ
′} = {α, β}. Let
t ∈ Fctγ(MΦ↓) such that t 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓). We do a case analysis on col(wj):
Case col(wj) ∈ γ: In this case, since for all assignment variable z, for all
w ∈ dom(Φ), z ≺ w and µ(w) ≤ µ(M) implies zσ↓ 6= t, than we can deduce that
for all assignment variables z ≺ wj , zσ↓ 6= t. Thus by Lemma 12, we obtain that
there exists M ′ such that fv (M ′) ⊆ dom(Φ) ∩ {z | z ≺ x}, fn(M ′) ∩ E = ∅ and
t ∈ Fctγ(M ′Φ↓). fv (M ′) ⊆ dom(Φ) ∩ {z | z ≺ x} implies that µ(M ′) = (k, k′)
with k < j and so µ(M ′) < µ(M). If t ∈ Fct 〈 〉(M
′Φ↓) then the result holds.
Otherwise, we can apply our inductive hypothesis on t and M ′ and so the result
holds.
Case col(wj) ∈ γ′ : Since t 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓), we deduce that there exists u ∈
Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓) s.t. tagroot(u) = γ and t ∈ Fctγ(u). Note that tagroot(u) 6∈ γ
′∪{0}
otherwise it would contradict the fact that t ∈ Fctγ(MΦ↓). But u ∈ Fctγ′(MΦ↓).
Moreover, u ∈ Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓) implies that u is deducible in new E .Φ. Thus we
deduce that for all assignment variables z, zσ↓ 6= u. By applying the same proof
as case col(wj) ∈ γ, we deduce that there exists M
′ such that fn(M ′) ∩ E = ∅,
µ(M ′) < µ(M) and u ∈ Fct 〈 〉(M
′Φ↓). But t ∈ Fctγ(u), tagroot(u) = γ and
u ∈ Fct 〈 〉(M
′Φ↓) implies that t ∈ Fctγ(M ′Φ↓) and t 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(M
′Φ↓). Hence we
can apply our inductive hypothesis on M ′ and t which allows us to conclude.
Inductive step µ(M) > (j, 1): In such a case, we have that M = f(M1, . . . ,Mn).
Let t ∈ Fctγ(MΦ↓) such that t 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓). We do a case analysis on f.
Case f ∈ Σi∪Σtagi for some i ∈ γ: In such a case,MΦ↓ = f(M1Φ↓, . . . ,MnΦ↓)↓.
By definition, we know that for all t ∈ Fctγ(MΦ↓), we have that root(t) 6∈
Σi ∪Σtagi . Thus, thanks to Lemma 10, we deduce that there exists
Fctγ(MΦ↓) ⊆ Fctγ(M1Φ↓) ∪ . . . ∪ Fctγ(MnΦ↓).
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Thus there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that t ∈ Fctγ(MkΦ↓). If t ∈ Fct 〈 〉(MkΦ↓)
then the result holds, else we apply our inductive hypothesis on t and Mk and
so the result also holds.
Case f ∈ Σi∪Σtagi for some i 6∈ γ: In such a case,MΦ↓ = f(M1Φ↓, . . . ,MnΦ↓)↓.
We assumed that t 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓) hence there exists u ∈ Fct〈 〉(MΦ↓) s.t.
tagroot(u) = γ and t ∈ Fctγ(u). But it also implies that tagroot(MΦ↓) ∈ γ∪{0}.
Hence, by applying Lemma 2, we deduce that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such
that MΦ↓ ∈ st(MkΦ↓). Moreover, it also implies that u ∈ Fct
′
γ(MkΦ↓).
If u ∈ Fct 〈 〉(MkΦ↓) then we deduce that root(MkΦ↓) 6∈ γ
′ and so, by
Lemma 2, MkΦ↓ = MΦ↓. Since we had t 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓), then we also have
t 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(MkΦ↓) and so we conclude by applying our inductive hypothesis on t
and Mk.
if u 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(MkΦ↓) then we can apply our inductive hypothesis on u, γ
′ and
Mk. Indeed, since u ∈ Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓), then u is deducible in new E .Φ and so we
deduce that for all assignment variable z, zσ↓ 6= u. Hence we obtain that there
exists M ′ such that µ(M ′) < µ(Mk), fn(M)∩E = ∅ and u ∈ Fct 〈 〉(M
′Φ↓). But
t ∈ Fctγ(u) and u ∈ Fct〈 〉(M
′Φ↓). Hence we deduce that t ∈ Fctγ(M ′Φ↓) and
t 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(M
′Φ↓). We conclude by applying once again our inductive hypothesis
but on t, γ and M ′.
Case f = 〈 〉: In such a case,MΦ↓ = f(M1Φ↓,M2Φ↓). Moreover, we have that
Fctγ(MΦ↓) = Fctγ(M1Φ↓)∪Fctγ(M2Φ↓). Since µ(M1) < µ(M), µ(M2) < µ(M)
and t ∈ Fctγ(M1Φ↓) ∪ Fctγ(M2Φ↓), we conclude by applying our inductive
hypothesis on t and M1 (or M2).
Case f ∈ {pk, vk}: In this case,MΦ↓ = f(M1Φ↓) and we have that FctγMΦ↓ =
∅. Hence the result trivially holds.
Case f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}: In such a case, we have thatMΦ↓ = f(M1Φ↓,M2Φ↓).
We need to distinguish whether root(M1Φ↓) = tagi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p} or
not.
If root(M1Φ↓) = tagi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, then there exists u1 such
that M1Φ↓ = tagi(u1). Assume first that i ∈ γ
′. In such a case Fctγ(MΦ↓) =
{Fctγ(MΦ↓)} and Fct〈 〉(MΦ↓) = {Fct〈 〉(MΦ↓)}. Hence it contradicts the fact
that t 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓). We can thus deduce that i ∈ γ. But in such a case, we
have that Fctγ(M1Φ↓) = Fctγ(u1) and:
Fctγ(MΦ↓) = Fctγ(u1) ∪ Fctγ(M2Φ↓).
We deduce that t ∈ Fctγ(M1Φ↓) or t ∈ Fctγ(M2Φ↓). Since µ(M1) < µ(M) and
µ(M2) < µ(M), we conclude by applying our inductive hypothesis onM1 orM2.
Otherwise root(M1Φ↓) 6∈ {tag1, . . . , tagp}. In such a case, Fctγ(MΦ↓) =
{MΦ↓} and Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓) = {MΦ↓}. But we assume that t 6∈ Fct〈 〉(MΦ↓)
hence this case is impossible.
Case f = h: This case is analogous to the previous one and can be handled
similarly.
Case f ∈ {sdec, adec, check}: In such a case, we have to distinguish two cases
depending on whether f is reduced in MΦ↓, or not.
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If f is not reduced, i.e. MΦ↓ = f(M1Φ↓,M2Φ↓), then we have that
Fctγ(MΦ↓) = {MΦ↓}.
Once again this is in contradiction with our hypothesis that t 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓).
We now focus on the case where f is reduced: we have thatM1Φ↓ = f′(u1, u2)
with MΦ↓ = u1 and f
′ ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}. We have to do a case analysis on
root(u1):
– if root(u1) = tagi for some i ∈ γ. In such a case, there exists u
′
1 such that u1 =
tagi(u
′
1), Fctγ(MΦ↓) = Fctγ(u
′
1) and Fctγ(M1Φ↓) = Fctγ(u
′
1) ∪ Fctγ(u2).
Thus we deduce that Fctγ(MΦ↓) ⊆ Fctγ(M1Φ↓). We can conclude thanks
to our inductive hypothesis on t and M1.
– if root(u1) = tagi for some i 6∈ γ. In such a case, Fctγ(MΦ↓) = {MΦ↓) which
contradicts the hypothesis t 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓).
– otherwise, root(u1) 6∈ {tag1, . . . , tagp}, then we have that f
′(u1, u2) ∈ Flawed(M1Φ↓).
By Lemma 13, we deduce that there exists M ′ such that µ(M ′) < µ(M1),
fn(M ′) ∩ E = ∅ and M ′Φ↓ = u1. Since u1 = MΦ↓ and µ(M ′) < µ(M) then
we can apply our inductive hypothesis on t, α andM ′ and so the result holds.
Lemma 15. Let A = (E ;P ;Φ;σ) be a derived well-tagged process, and let (ρα, ρβ)
be compatible with A. Let u be a ground term in normal form that do not use
names in Eα ⊎ Eβ. We have that there exists a context C (possibly a hole) built
only using 〈 〉, and terms u1, . . . , um such that u = C[u1, . . . , um], and for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
– either ui ∈ Flawed(u);
– or ui ∈ FctΣ0(u) and δα(ui) = δβ(ui),
– or ui = f(n) for some f ∈ {pk, vk} and n ∈ N ,
– or ui ∈ dom(ρ+α ) ∪ dom(ρ
+
β ).
Proof. Let u a ground term in normal form and let {v1, . . . , vn} = FctΣ0(u).
Thus there exists a context D (possibly a hole) built on Σ0 such that u =
D[v1, . . . , vn]. We now prove the result by induction on |D|.
Base case |D| = 0: We show that the result holds and in such a case the context
C is reduced to a hole. Since |D| = 0, we know that FctΣ0(u) = u and so
either tagroot(u) = i with i ∈ {1, . . . , p} or tagroot(u) = ⊥. If u ∈ dom(ρ+α ) ∪
dom(ρ+β ), then the result trivially holds. Otherwise, we have that δα(u) = δβ(u)
by definition of δα and δβ . Hence the result holds.
Inductive step |D| > 0: There exists f ∈ Σ0, and v1, . . . , vk such that u =
f(u1, . . . , uk). We do a case analysis on f.
Case f = 〈 〉: In such a case, there exist two contexts D1, D2 (possibly holes)
built on Σ0 such that:
– D = 〈D1, D2〉 with |D1|, |D2| < |D|,
– u1 = D1[v
1
1 , . . . , v
1
n1
] and {v11 , . . . , v
1
n1
} = FctΣ0(u1),
– u2 = D1[v
2
1 , . . . , v
2
n1
] and {v21 , . . . , v
2
n2
} = FctΣ0(u2)
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By applying our inductive hypothesis on u1 and u2, we know that there exist
two contexts C1 and C2. Since
– Flawed(u) = Flawed(u1) ∪ Flawed(u2), and
– FctΣ0(u) = FctΣ0(u1) ⊎ FctΣ0(u2),
we conclude that C = 〈C1, C2〉 satisfies all the conditions stated in the lemma.
Case f ∈ {pk, vk} and u = f(n) for some n ∈ N : The result trivially hold by
choosing the context C to be a hole.
Otherwise, we have that
Flawed(u) = {u} ∪ Flawed(u1) ∪ . . . ∪ Flawed(uk).
Since u ∈ Flawed(u), we can choose C to be the context reduced to a hole. The
result trivially holds.
Lemma 16. Let A = (E ;P ;Φ;σ) be a derived well-tagged extended process, and
let (ρα, ρβ) be compatible with A. Let M be a term such that fv (M) ⊆ dom(Φ)
and fn(M) ∩ E = ∅. We assume that E = E0 ⊎ Eα ⊎ Eβ, fn(Φ) ∩ (Eα ⊎ Eβ) = ∅,
and one of the two following conditions is satisfied:
1. new E .Φ 6⊢ k for any k ∈ KS; or
2. new E .δ(Φ↓) 6⊢ k for any k ∈ δα(KS) ∪ δβ(KS).
with KS = {t, pk(t), vk(t) | t ground, t ∈ dom(ρ
+
α ) ∪ dom(ρ
+
β )}. We have that
δγ(MΦ↓) =Mδ(Φ↓)↓ with γ ∈ {α, β}.
Proof. Let Φ↓ = {w1 ⊲ u1, . . . , wn ⊲ un}. We prove this result by induction on
µ(M):
Base case µ(M) = (0, 0): There exists no term M such that |M | = 0, thus the
result holds.
Inductive step µ(M) > (0, 0): We first prove there exists γ ∈ {α, β} such that
δγ(MΦ↓) =Mδ(Φ↓)↓ and then we show that δα(MΦ↓) = δβ(MΦ↓).
Assume first that |M | = 1, i.e. either M ∈ N or there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that M = wj .
Case M ∈ N . In such a case, we have that MΦ↓ = M , and M 6∈ E . Hence, we
have that new E .Φ ⊢ M and also that new E .δ(Φ↓) ⊢ M . In case condition 1 is
satisfied, we easily deduce that M 6∈ KS. Otherwise, we know that the condition
2 is satisfied, and thus M 6∈ δα(KS) ∪ δβ(KS). Again, we want to conclude that
M 6∈ KS . Assume that this is not the case, i.e. M ∈ KS . This means that M
is a name in dom(ρ+α ) (or dom(ρ
+
β )). Hence, we have that δβ(M) ∈ δβ(KS),
and δβ(M) = M . Hence, we deduce that M ∈ δβ(KS), and this leads to a
contradiction, since in such a case, by hypothesis M can not be deducible from
new E .δ(Φ↓). Thus, in any case, we have thatM 6∈ KS, and thus M 6∈ dom(ρ+α )∪
dom(ρ+β ). Hence, we have that δγ(MΦ↓) = δγ(M) = M = Mδ(Φ↓)↓ for any
γ ∈ {α, β}.
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Case M = wj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We know that wj is colored with γ ∈
{α, β}. Hence, we have that wjδ(Φ↓) = δγ(wjΦ↓). Since uj is in normal form,
then by Lemma 6, we know that δγ(wjΦ) is also in normal form. Thus, we have
that δγ(MΦ↓) =Mδ(Φ↓)↓.
Otherwise, if |M | > 1, then there exists a symbol f and M1, . . . ,Mn such
that M = f(M1, . . . ,Mn). We do a case analysis on f.
Case f ∈ Σi ∪Σtagi with i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Consider γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ.
In such a case, let t = f(M1Φ↓, . . . ,MnΦ↓). Since f ∈ Σi (resp. Σtagi), then there
exists a context C built upon Σi (resp. Σtagi) such that t = C[u1, . . . , um] and
u1, . . . , um are factor of t in normal form. By Lemma 2, we know that there exists
a context D (possibly a hole) over Σi (resp. Σtagi) such that t↓ = D[ui1 , . . . , uik ]
with i1, . . . , ik ∈ {0, . . . ,m} and u0 = nmin. But thanks to Lemma 3, 4 and 6,
we also that C[δγ(u1), . . . , δγ(um)]↓ = D[δγ(ui1), . . . , δγ(uik)]. But C and D are
both built on Σi (resp. Σtagi), thus by definition of δγ , we have that δγ(t)↓ =
C[δγ(u1), . . . , δγ(um)]↓ and δγ(t↓) = D[δγ(ui1), . . . , δγ(uik)]. Hence, the equality,
δγ(t↓) = δγ(t)↓, holds. But t↓ = MΦ↓ which means that δγ(MΦ↓) = δγ(t)↓. We
have that:
δγ(t)↓ = δγ(f(M1Φ↓, . . . ,MnΦ↓))↓
= f(δγ(M1Φ↓), . . . , δγ(MnΦ↓))↓
Since µ(M1) < µ(M), . . . , µ(Mn) < µ(M), we can apply our inductive hy-
pothesis on M1, . . . ,Mn. This gives us δγ(t)↓ = f(M1δ(Φ↓)↓, . . . ,Mnδ(Φ↓)↓)↓ =
f(M1, . . . ,Mn)δ(Φ↓)↓. Thus we can conclude that δγ(MΦ↓) = δγ(t)↓ = Mδ(Φ↓)↓.
Case f ∈ Σ0r{sdec, adec, check}: In this case, we have that MΦ↓ = f(M1Φ↓,
. . . ,MnΦ↓). By applying our inductive hypothesis on M1, . . . ,Mn, we have that
δα(MkΦ↓) = δβ(MkΦ↓), for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Thus we have that δγ(MΦ↓) = f(δγ′(M1Φ↓), . . . , δγ′(MnΦ↓)) with γ, γ′ ∈ {α, β}.
Applying our inductive hypothesis on M1, . . . ,Mn, we deduce that
δγ(MΦ↓) = f(M1δ(Φ↓)↓, . . . ,Mnδ(Φ↓)↓) = Mδ(Φ↓)↓.
Case f ∈ {sdec, adec, check}: If we first assume that the root occurence f is
not reduced inMΦ↓ then the proof is similar to the previous case. Thus, we focus
on the case where the root occurence of f is reduced, and we consider the case
where f = sdec. The other cases can be done in a similar way. In such a situation,
we know that there exist v1, v2 such that M1Φ↓ = senc(v1, v2), M2Φ↓ = v2
and MΦ↓ = v1. According to the definition of δγ , we know that there exists
γ ∈ {α, β} such that δγ(senc(v1, v2)) = senc(δγ(v1), δγ(v2)). For such γ, we have
that sdec(δγ(M1Φ↓), δγ(M2Φ↓))↓ = δγ(MΦ↓). But by applying our inductive
hypothesis onM1 andM2, we obtain δγ(MΦ↓) = sdec(M1δ(Φ↓)↓,M2δ(Φ↓)↓)↓ =
Mδ(Φ↓)↓.
It remains to prove that δα(MΦ↓) = δβ(MΦ↓). We have shown that there
exists γ0 ∈ {α, β} such that δγ0(MΦ↓) = Mδ(Φ↓)↓. Thanks to Lemma 15, we
know that there exists a context C built over {〈〉}, and v1, . . . , vm terms such
that MΦ↓ = C[v1, . . . , vm] and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}:
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– either vi ∈ Flawed(MΦ↓)
– or vi ∈ FctΣ0(MΦ↓) and δα(vi) = δβ(vi).
– or vi = f(n) for some f ∈ {pk, vk} and n ∈ N ,
– or vi ∈ dom(ρ+α ) ∪ dom(ρ
+
β ).
Note that C being built upon {〈〉} means that vi is deducible in new E .Φ for
all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Furthermore, since C[v1, . . . , vm] is in normal form,
δγ0(MΦ↓) = C[δγ0(v1), . . . , δγ0(vm)].
But we have shown that δγ0(MΦ↓) = Mδ(Φ↓)↓, thus δγ0(vi) is deducible from
δ(Φ↓), for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Now, we distinguish several cases depending on
which condition is fullfilled by vi.
Case vi ∈ Flawed(MΦ↓): There exists w1, . . . , wℓ terms and a function symbol
f such that vi = f(w1, . . . , wℓ). By Lemma 13, there exists N1, . . . , Nℓ such that
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, µ(Nk) < µ(M) and NkΦ↓ = wk. Hence, by applying
inductive hypothesis on N1, . . . , Nℓ, we obtain that δα(NkΦ↓) = δβ(NkΦ↓), for
all k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. Thus, thanks to vi being in normal form, we can conclude that
δα(vi) = δβ(vi).
Case vi ∈ FctΣ0(MΦ↓): In such a case, we have that δα(vi) = δβ(vi). Hence,
we easily conclude.
Case vi = f(n) for some f ∈ {pk, vk} and n ∈ N : By hypothesis, we know
that either new E .Φ 6⊢ k, for all k ∈ KS ; or new E .δ(Φ↓) 6⊢ k, for all k ∈ δα(KS)∪
δβ(KS). Since we have shown that vi is deducible from new E .Φ and δγ0(vi) is
deducible from new E .δ(Φ↓), both hypotheses imply that n 6∈ dom(ρ+α )∪dom(ρ
+
β ),
and so δα(vi) = δβ(vi).
Case vi ∈ dom(ρ+α )∪dom(ρ
+
β ): By hypothesis, we know that either new E .Φ 6⊢
k, for all k ∈ KS; or new E .δ(Φ↓) 6⊢ k, for all k ∈ δα(KS) ∪ δβ(KS). Since we
have shown that vi is deducible from new E .Φ and δγ0(vi) is deducible from
new E .δ(Φ↓), both hypotheses imply that vi 6∈ dom(ρ+α ) ∪ dom(ρ
+
β ) and lead us
to a contradiction.
Corollary 4. Let A = (E ;P ;Φ;σ) be a derived well-tagged extended process and
let (ρα, ρβ) be compatible with A, such that E = E0 ⊎ Eα ⊎ Eβ, and fn(Φ) ∩ (Eα ⊎
Eβ) = ∅. The two following conditions are equivalent:
1. new E .Φ 6⊢ k for any k ∈ KS; or
2. new E .δ(Φ↓) 6⊢ k for any k ∈ δα(KS) ∪ δβ(KS).
with KS = {t, pk(t), vk(t) | t ∈ dom(ρ+α ) ∪ dom(ρ
+
β ), t ground}.
Proof. We prove the two implications separately.
(2) ⇒ (1): Let k ∈ KS such that new E .Φ ⊢ k. In such a case, there exists
M such that fv (M) ⊆ dom(Φ), fn(M) ∩ E = ∅, and MΦ↓ = k↓. We assume
w.l.o.g. that k ∈ {t, pk(t), vk(t) | t ∈ dom(ρ+α ) and t ground}. Let γ ∈ {α, β}. By
Lemma 4, we have that δγ(MΦ↓) = δγ(k↓). Thanks to Lemma 16, we have that
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δγ(MΦ↓) = Mδ(Φ↓)↓, and by Definition of δγ , we have that δγ(k↓) ∈ δγ(KS).
Thus, we deduce that there exists k′ ∈ δγ(KS) such that new E .δ(Φ↓) ⊢ k′.
(1)⇒ (2):Let k ∈ δγ(KS) with γ ∈ {α, β}, and M be a term such that fv(M) ⊆
dom(Φ), fn(M)∩E = ∅, andMδ(Φ↓)↓ = k↓. k ∈ δγ(KS) implies the existence of
k′ ∈ KS such that k = δγ(k′), and thus such that Mδ(Φ↓)↓ = δγ(k′)↓. Thanks
to Lemma 16, we have that δγ(MΦ↓)↓ = δγ(k′)↓. Now, if k′ ∈ KS there must
exist k′′ ∈ dom(ργ′) such that either k′ = k′′, or k′ = pk(k′′), or k′ = vk(k′′).
In any case, because ργ′ is in normal form, we know that k
′′↓ = k′′ and thus
that k′↓ = k′. Hence Mδ(Φ↓)↓ = δγ(k′↓)↓. But, then according to Lemma 6,
δγ(MΦ↓) = δγ(MΦ↓)↓ = δγ(k′↓)↓ = δγ(k′↓). Finally, thanks to Lemma 4 we
can derive that MΦ↓ = k′↓ = k′. This implies that MΦ↓ ∈ KS , and thus there
is a term in KS that is deducible from new E .Φ.
Corollary 5. Let A = (E ;P ;Φ;σ) be a derived extended process and let (ρα, ρβ)
be compatible with A such that E = E0 ⊎ Eα ⊎ Eβ, fn(Φ) ∩ (Eα ⊎ Eβ) = ∅, and
new E .Φ 6⊢ k for any k ∈ KS. We have that new E .Φ ∼ new E .δ(Φ↓).
Proof. The proof directly follows from Lemmas 4 and 16. Indeed, MΦ↓ = NΦ↓
is equivalent to δγ(MΦ↓) = δγ(NΦ↓) (thanks to Lemma 4), which is equivalent
to Mδ(Φ↓)↓ = Nδ(Φ↓)↓ (thanks to Lemma 16).
E.6 Proof of Theorem 5
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 5. We first state and prove two
propositions.
Let S = (ES ;PS ;ΦS ;σS) and D = (ED;PD;ΦD;σD). We say that D = δ(S)
if ES = ED, PD = δ(PS), ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓), and σD↓ = δ(σS↓).
Proposition 1. Let P0 be a plain coloured process without replication and such
that bn(P0) = fv(P0) = ∅. Let B0 be an extended coloured biprocess such that:
– S0 = (Eα ⊎ Eβ ⊎ E0; [[P0]]; ∅; ∅)
def
= fst(B0),
– D0 = (Eα ⊎ Eβ ⊎ E0;P ′0; ∅; ∅)
def
= snd(B0), and
– D0 = δ
ρ+α ,ρ
+
β (S0) for some (ρα, ρβ), and
– D0 does not reveal the value of its assignments w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ).
For any extended process S = (ES ;PS ;ΦS ;σS) such that S0
tr
=⇒S with (ρα, ρβ)
compatible with S, there exists a biprocess B and an extended process D =
(ED;PD;ΦD;σD) such that B0
tr
=⇒biB, fst(B) = S, snd(B) = D, D = δ(S) and
with (ρα, ρβ) compatible with D.
Proof. Let E = E0 ⊎ Eα ⊎ Eβ. We show the result by induction on the length
of the derivation. The base case when S = S0 is trivial. We simply conclude
by considering B = B0, and D = D0. Now, we assume that S0
tr′
=⇒S′ such that
(ρα, ρβ) is compatible with S
′. This means that there exists S′, tr and ℓ such
that:
S0
tr
=⇒S
ℓ
−→ S′ with tr′ = tr · ℓ
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Moreover, we have that (ρα, ρβ) is compatible with S.
By induction hypothesis, we have that there exists an extended biprocess
B and an extended process D such that fst(B) = S, snd(B) = D, B0
tr
=⇒biB,
and D = δ(S). We will show by case analysis on the rule involved in S
ℓ
−→ S′
that exists a biprocess B and an extended process D′ = (E ′D;P
′
D;Φ
′
D;σ
′
D) such
that B0
tr
=⇒biB′, fst(B′) = S′, snd(B′) = D′, D′ = δ(S′). Then it will remain
to prove that (ρα, ρβ) compatible with D
′. To do so, we rely on the fact that
δ(σS′↓) = σD′↓. In particular, by Lemma 4, we have that for all assignment
variables z, z′, zσS′↓ = z′σS′↓ is equivalent to δ(zσS′↓) = δ(z′σS′↓) which is
also equivalent to zδ(σS′↓) = z
′δ(σS′↓). Moreover, since (ρα, ρβ) is compatible
with S′, then for all assignment variable z ∈ dom(ργ), either tagroot(zσS′↓) =
⊥ or tagroot(zσS′↓) 6∈ γ ∪ {0}. Thus, by Lemma 6, we deduce that either
tagroot(δ′γ(zσS′↓)) = ⊥ or tagroot(δ
′
γ(zσS′↓)) 6∈ γ ∪ {0}. This allows us to con-
clude that either tagroot(zσD′) = ⊥ or tagroot(zσD′↓) 6∈ γ ∪ {0}, and so that
(ρα, ρβ) is compatible with D
′.
Let’s now prove the core part of the result. Let S = (ES ;PS;ΦS ;σS) and
S′ = (E ′S ;P
′
S ;ΦS ;σ
′
S).
Case of the rule Out-T. In such a case, we have that E ′S = ES = E , σ
′
S = σS ,
PS = {out(c, [u]i)i.Q} ⊎ QS , P ′S = {Q} ⊎ QS , and Φ
′
S = ΦS ∪ {wn ⊲ [u]iσS}.
Furthermore, we have that ℓ = new wn.out(c, wn), c 6∈ E , and n = |ΦS | + 1.
Lastly, since S is issued from (E ; [[P0]]; ∅; ∅), we have that σS  testi([u]i).
By hypothesis, we have that D = δ(S). Hence, we have that:
D = (E ; {out(c, δγ([u]i)).δ(Q)} ⊎ δ(QS);ΦD;σD)
with ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓), σD↓ = δ(σS↓), and γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ.
Hence, we have that D
newwn.out(c,wn)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ D′ where
D′ = (E ; δ(Q) ⊎ δ(QS);ΦD ∪ {wn ⊲ δγ([u]i)σD};σD).
Hence, we have that B
newwn.out(c,wn)
−−−−−−−−−−−→bi B′ with fst(B′) = S′ and snd(B′) = D′.
It remains to show that D′ = δ(S′), i.e.
(δγ([u]i)σD)↓ = δγ([u]iσS↓).
Since σD↓ = δ(σS↓), we have that:
(δγ([u]i)σD)↓ = (δγ([u]i)δ(σS↓))↓
Let γ′ be equal to α if γ = β, and equal to β if γ = α. Each variable that occurs
in [u]i also occurs in dom(σS) and such a variable is either colored with a color
in γ, or an assignation variable zγ
′
j . Thus, we have that δγ([u]i) only contains
variables that are colored with a color in γ. Hence, we have that
(δγ([u]i)δ(σS↓))↓ = (δγ([u]i)δγ(σS↓))↓
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Relying on Lemma 7 (note that σS↓  testi([u]i)), we have that:
(δγ([u]i)σD)↓ = (δγ([u]i)δγ(σS↓))↓
= δγ([u]i(σS↓))↓
= δγ([u]i(σS↓)↓)
= δγ([u]iσS↓)
Case of the rule In. In such a case, we have that E ′S = ES , Φ
′
S = ΦS , PS =
{in(c, x)i.Q} ⊎ QS , P ′S = {Q} ⊎ QS , σ
′
S = σS ∪ {x 7→MΦS}, and ℓ = in(c,M)
with c 6∈ ES, fv (M) ⊆ dom(ΦS) and fn(M) ∩ ES = ∅.
By hypothesis, we have that D = δ(S). Hence, we have that:
D = (E ; {in(c, x).δ(Q)} ⊎ δ(QS);ΦD;σD)
with ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓), σD↓ = δ(σS↓). Let γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ.
Hence, we have that D
in(c,M)
−−−−−→ D′ where
D′ = (E ; δ(Q) ⊎ δ(QS);ΦD;σD ∪ {x 7→MΦD}).
Hence, we have that B
in(c,M)
−−−−−→bi B′ with fst(B′) = S′ and snd(B′) = D′. It
remains to show that D′ = δ(S′), i.e.
(MΦD)↓ = δγ(MΦS↓).
By hypothesis, we know that D0 does not reveal the values of its assignment
variables w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ). Hence, for all assignment variable x of color α (resp. β)
in dom(σD), for all k ∈ {k, pk(k), vk(k) | k = xσD ∨ k = xρα (resp. xρβ)}, k is
not deducible in new E .ΦD. We denote K this set.
Let KS = {t, pk(t), vk(t) | t ∈ dom(ρ+α ) ∪ dom(ρ
+
β ), t ground} We know that
σD↓ = δ(σS↓), and by definition of ρ+α and ρ
+
β , we have that K = δα(KS) ∪
δβ(KS). We have also that ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓). Hence, we deduce that new E .δ(ΦS↓) 6⊢
k for any k ∈ δα(KS) ∪ δβ(KS) This allow us to apply Lemma 16 and thus to
obtain that:
(MΦD)↓ = (M(ΦD↓))↓ = (Mδ(ΦS↓))↓ = δγ(MΦS↓).
Case of the rule Then. In such a case, we have that E ′S = ES , Φ
′
S = ΦS , σ
′
S = σS ,
PS = {PS} ⊎ QS , and P
′
S = {P
′
S} ⊎ QS where PS and P
′
S are as follows:
– Case a: a test before an output.
PS = if testi([v]i) thenout(c, [v]i)
i.QS
P ′S = out(u, [v]i)
i.QS
σS  testi([v]i)
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
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– Case b: a test before an assignation.
PS = if testi([v]i) then [z := [v]i]
i.QS
P ′S = {[z := [v]i]
i.QS
σS  testi([v]i)
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
– Case c: a test before a conditional.
PS = if testi([ϕ]i) then (if [ϕ]i thenQ
1
S elseQ
2
S)
P ′S = if [ϕ]i thenQ
1
S elseQ
2
S
σS  testi([ϕ]i)
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
– Case d: a test of a conditional.
PS = if [ϕ]i thenQ
1
S elseQ
2
S
P ′S = Q
1
S
σS  [ϕ]i and σS  testi([ϕ]i)
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
Each case can be handled in a similar way. Note that we rely on Corollary 1
instead of Lemma 8 to establish the result in Case d. We assume that we are
in the first case. Let γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ. By hypothesis, we have that
D = δ(S). Hence, we have that D is equal to
(E ; {if testi(δγ([v]i)) then
out(c, δγ([v]i)).δ(QS)} ⊎ QS ;ΦD;σD)
with ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓), and σD↓ = δ(σS↓).
Since σS  testi([v]i), we have also that (σS↓)  testi([v]i). Thanks to
Lemma 8, we deduce that δγ(σS↓)  testi(δγ([v]i)). Actually, each variable that
occurs in testi(δγ([v]i)) is a variable that occurs in dom(σS) and such a variable
is necessarily colored with a color in γ. Hence, we have also that:
δ(σS↓)  testi(δγ([v]i)).
Hence, we have that D
τ
−→ D′ where
D′ = (E ; {out(u, δγ([v]i)).δ(QS)} ⊎ δ(QS);ΦD;σD).
Hence, we have that B
τ
−→bi B′ with fst(B′) = S′ and snd(B′) = D′. We also
have that D′ = δ(S′).
Case of the rule Else. This case is similar to the previous one.
Case of the rule Assgn. In such a case, we have that E ′S = ES , Φ
′
S = ΦS ,
PS = {[x := [v]i].Q} ⊎QS , P ′S = {Q}⊎QS , σ
′
S = σS ∪ {x 7→ [v]iσS}, and ℓ = τ .
Lastly, since S is issued from (E ; [[P0]]; ∅; ∅), we have that σS  testi([v]i).
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By hypothesis, we have that D = δ(S). Hence, we have that:
D = (E ; [x := δ([v]i)].δ(Q) ⊎ δ(QS);ΦD;σD)
with ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓), σD↓ = δ(σS↓), and γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ.
Hence, we have that D
τ
−→ D′ where
D′ = (E ; δ(Q) ⊎ δ(QS);ΦD;σD ∪ {x 7→ δγ([v]i)σD}).
Hence, we have that B
τ
−→ B′ with fst(B′) = S′ and snd(B′) = D′. It remains to
show that D′ = δ(S′), i.e.
(δγ([v]i)σD)↓ = δγ([v]iσS↓).
This can be done as in the case of the rule Out-T.
Case of the rule Comm. In such a case, we have that E ′S = ES , Φ
′
S = ΦS ,
PS = {out(c, [u]i)i.Q1; in(c, x)i
′
.Q2} ⊎ QS , σ′S = σS ∪ {x 7→ [u]iσS}, and ℓ = τ .
Lastly, since S is issued from (E ; [[P0]]; ∅; ∅), we have that σS  testi([u]i).
By hypothesis, we have that D = δ(S). Hence, we have that D is equal to
(E ; {out(c, δγ([u]i)).δ(Q1); in(c, x).δ(Q2)} ⊎ δ(QS);ΦD;σD)
with ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓), σD↓ = δ(σS↓).
Let γ, γ′ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ, and i′ ∈ γ′. Hence, we have that D
τ
−→ D′
where D′ is equal to:
(E ; {δ(Q1); δ(Q2)} ⊎ δ(QS);ΦD;σD ∪ {(x 7→ δγ([u]i)σD)
i′}).
Hence, we have that B
τ
−→ B′ for some biprocess B′ such that fst(B′) = S′
and snd(B′) = D′. It remains to show that D′ = δ(S′), i.e.
(δγ([u]i)σD)↓ = δγ′(([u]iσS)↓)
If γ = γ′, then this can be done as in the previous cases.
Otherwise, since names can only be shared through assignments, and assign-
ments only concern variables/terms of base type, we necessarily have that c 6∈ E .
Hence, we have that S
νwn.out(c,wn)
−−−−−−−−−→ Sout where:
Sout = (E ; {Q1; in(c, x).Q2} ⊎ QS ;ΦS ∪ {wn ⊲ [u]iσS};σS)
Note that (ρα, ρβ) is still compatible with Sout. We would like to apply Lemma 16
withM = wn on the frame of Sout which requires an hypothesis of non deductibil-
ity of the shared key. For these, we will rely on our hypothesis that D0 does not
reveal the values of its assignments w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ):
Let Φ′S = ΦS∪{wn ⊲ [u]iσS}. We already proved our induction result for the
rule Out-T. Hence, we deduce that there exists Dout such that D
νwn.out(c,wn)
−−−−−−−−−→
Dout where Dout = (E ;Pout;Φ′D;σD), Φ
′
D = ΦD ∪ {wn ⊲ δγ([u]i)σD}. Moreover,
64
it implies that Φ′D↓ = δ(Φ
′
S↓}) and σD↓ = δ(σS↓). As mentioned, by hypothesis,
we know that D0 does not reveal the values of its assignments w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ).
Hence, for all assignment variable x of color α (resp. β) in dom(σD), for all
k ∈ {k, pk(k), vk(k) | k = xσD ∨ k = xρα (resp. xρβ)}, k is not deducible in
new E .Φ′D. We denote by K such a set.
Let KS = {t, pk(t), vk(t) | t ∈ dom(ρ+α ) ∪ dom(ρ
+
β ), t ground}. Since σD↓ =
δ(σS↓), and by definition of ρ+α and ρ
+
β , we deduce that K = δα(KS) ∪ δβ(KS).
Moreover, we have that Φ′D↓ = δ(Φ
′
S↓). Hence, we deduce that new E .δ(Φ
′
S↓) 6⊢ k
for any k ∈ δα(KS) ∪ δβ(KS). This allow us to apply Lemma 16 with M = wn
and so we deduce that δγ([u]iσS↓) = δγ′([u]iσS↓). Hence, we can conclude as in
the previsous case.
Case of the rule Par. It is easy to see that the result holds for this case.
Note that the rules New and Repl can not be triggered since the processes
under study do not contain bounded names and replication.
Proposition 2. Let P0 be a plain colored process without replication and such
that bn(P0) = fv(P0) = ∅. Let B0 be an extended colored biprocess such that:
– S0 = (Eα ⊎ Eβ ⊎ E0; [[P0]]; ∅; ∅)
def
= fst(B0),
– D0 = (Eα ⊎ Eβ ⊎ E0;P ′0; ∅; ∅)
def
= snd(B0), and
– D0 = δ
ρ+α ,ρ
+
β (S0) for some (ρα, ρβ).
– D0 does not reveal the value of its assignments w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ).
For any extended process D = (ED;PD;ΦD;σD) such that D0
tr
=⇒D with (ρα, ρβ)
compatible with D, there exists a biprocess B and an extended process S =
(ES ;PS ;ΦS ;σS) such that B0
tr
=⇒biB, ,fst(B) = S, snd(B) = D, and D = δ(S).
Proof. We show the result by induction on the length of the derivation. The base
case when D0 = D is trivial. We simply conclude by considering B = B0, and
S = S0. Now, we assume that D0
tr′
=⇒D′ such that (ρα, ρβ) is compatible with D′.
This means that there exist D, tr, and ℓ such that:
D0
tr
=⇒D
ℓ
−→ D′ with tr′ = tr · ℓ
Note that we necessarily have that (ρα, ρβ) is compatible with D.
By induction hypothesis, we have that there exists an extended biprocess B
and an extended process S such that fst(B) = S, snd(B) = D, B0
tr
=⇒biB, and
D = δ(S). We show the result by case analysis on the rule involved in D
ℓ
−→ D′.
Let D = (ED;PD;ΦD;σD) and D′ = (E ′D;P
′
D;Φ
′
D;σ
′
D). First, note that since D
is issued from D0 = δ(S0) and S0 = (E ; [[P0]]; ∅; ∅), we know that terms invovled
in D are tagged and obtained through the δ transformation.
Case of the rule Out-T. In such a case, we have that E ′D = ED, σ
′
D = σD,
PD = {out(c, δ([v]i)).δ(QS)} ⊎ δ(QS), P ′D = {δ(QD)} ⊎ δ(QD), and Φ
′
D =
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ΦD ∪ {wn ⊲ δγ([v]i)σD} with γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ. Furthermore, we have
that ℓ = newwn.out(c, wn), c 6∈ ED, and n = |ΦD|+ 1. We have also
S = (E ; {out(c, [v]i).QS} ⊎ QS);ΦS ;σS)
with ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓), and σD↓ = δ(σS↓). Hence, we have that S
newwn.out(c,wn)
−−−−−−−−−−−→
S′ where
S′ = (E ;QS ⊎QS ;ΦS ∪ {wn ⊲ [v]iσS};σS).
Hence, we have that B
newwn.out(c,wn)
−−−−−−−−−−−→bi B
′ with fst(B′) = S′ and snd(B′) =
D′. It remains to show that D′ = δ(S′), i.e.
(δγ([v]i)σD)↓ = δγ([v]iσS↓)
SinceD is issued from (E ; δ([[P0]]); ∅; ∅) andB0
tr
=⇒biB, we have that σD  testi(δγ([v]i))
and σS  testi([v]i).
Since σD↓ = δ(σS↓), we have that:
(δγ([v]i)σD)↓ = (δγ([v]i)δ(σS↓))↓
Let γ′ be equal to α if γ = β, and equal to β if γ = α. Each variable that occurs
in [v]i also occurs in dom(σS) and such a variable is either colored with a color
in γ, or an assignation variable zγ
′
j . Thus, we have that δγ([v]i) only contains
variables that are colored with a color in γ. Hence, we have that
(δγ([v]i)δ(σS↓))↓ = (δγ([v]i)δγ(σS↓))↓
Relying on Lemma 7 (note that σS↓  testi([v]i)), we have that:
(δγ([v]i)σD)↓ = (δγ([v]i)δγ(σS↓))↓
= δγ([v]i(σS↓))↓
= δγ([v]i(σS↓)↓)
= δγ([v]iσS↓)
Case of the rule In. In such a case, we have that E ′D = ED, Φ
′
D = ΦD, PD = {∈
(c, x)i.δ(QS} ⊎ δ(QS), P ′D = {δ(QS)} ⊎ δ(QS), σ
′
D = σD ∪ {x 7→ MΦD}, and
ℓ = in(c,M) with c 6∈ ED, fv(M) ⊆ dom(ΦD), and fn(M) ∩ ED = ∅. Moreover,
we have that:
S = (E ; {in(c, x).QS} ⊎ QS ;ΦS ;σS)
with ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓), and σD↓ = δ(σS↓). Let γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ.
Hence, we have that S
in(c,M)
−−−−−→ S′ where
S′ = (E ; {QS} ⊎ QS ;ΦS ;σS ∪ {x 7→MΦS).
Hence, we have that B
in(c,M)
−−−−−→bi B′ with fst(B′) = S′, and snd(B′) = D′. It
remains to show that D′ = δ(S′), i.e.
(MΦD)↓ = δγ(MΦS↓).
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By hypothesis, we know that D0 does not reveal the value of its assignments
w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ). Since ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓) and σD↓ = δ(σS↓). Hence, by following
the definition of ρ+α and ρ
+
β , we deduce that the hypothesis of Lemma 16 are
satisfied. Hence, by relying on it, we have that:
(MΦD)↓ = (M(ΦD↓))↓ = (Mδ(ΦS↓))↓ = δγ(MΦS↓).
Case of the rule Then. In such a case, we have that E ′D = ED, Φ
′
D = ΦD,
σ′D = σD, PD = {PD} ⊎ QD, and P
′
D = {P
′
D} ⊎ QD where PD and P
′
D are as
follows:
– Case a: a test before an output.
PD = if testi(δγ([v]i)) then out(c, δγ([v]i))
i.δ(QS)
P ′D = out(u, δγ([v]i))
i.δ(QS)
σD  testi(δγ([v]i))
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p} and γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ.
– Case b: a test before an assignation.
PD = if testi(δγ([v]i)) then [z := δγ([v]i)]
i.δ(QS)
P ′D = {[z := δγ([v]i)]
i.δ(QS)
σD  testi(δγ([v]i))
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p} and γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ.
– Case c: a test before a conditional.
PD = if testi(δγ([ϕ]i)) then
(if [ϕ]i then δ(Q
1
S) else δ(Q
2
S))
P ′D = if [ϕ]i then δ(Q
1
S) else δ(Q
2
S)
σD  testi(δγ([ϕ])i)
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p} and γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ.
– Case d: a test of a conditional.
PD = if δγ([ϕ]i) then δ(Q
1
S) else δ(Q
2
S)
P ′D = δ(Q
1
S)
σD  δγ([ϕ]i) and σD  testi(δγ([ϕ]i))
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p} and γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ.
Each case can be handled in a similar way. Note that we rely in addition on
Corollary 1 instead of Lemma 8 to establish the result in case d. We assume
that we are in the first case. Let γ ∈ {α, β} such that i ∈ γ. We have that S is
equal to
(E ; {if testi([v]i) thenout(c, [v]i)
i.QS} ⊎ QS;ΦS ;σS)
with ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓), and σD↓ = δ(σS↓).
67
Since σD  testi(δγ([v]i)), we have (σD↓)  testi(δγ([v]i)), and thus δ(σS↓) 
testi(δγ([v]i)). As in the previous cases, we deduce that δγ(σS↓)  testi(δγ([v]i)).
Thanks to Lemma 8, we deduce that σS↓  testi([v]i). Hence, we have that
S
τ
−→ S′ where
S′ = (E ; {out(u, [v]i).QS} ⊎ QS ;ΦS ;σS).
Hence, we have that B
τ
−→bi B′ with fst(B′) = S′, and snd(B′) = D′. We also
have that D′ = δ(S′).
Case of the rule Else. This case is similar to the previous one.
Case of the rule Assgn. In such a case, we have that E ′D = ED, Φ
′
D = ΦD,
PD = {[x := δγ([v]i)].δ(Q)} ⊎ δ(QS), P ′D = {δ(Q)} ⊎ δ(QS), σ
′
D = σD ∪ {x 7→
δγ([v]i)σD}, and ℓ = τ where γ ∈ {α, β} with i ∈ γ. We have also that σD 
testi(δ([v]i)) and σS  testi([v]i). Hence, we have that:
S = (E ; {[x := [v]i].Q} ⊎ QS ;ΦS ;σS)
with ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓), and σD↓ = δ(σS↓).
Hence, we have that S
τ
−→ S′ where:
S′ = (E ; {Q} ⊎ QS ;ΦS ;σS ∪ {x 7→ [v]iσS}).
Hence, we have that B
τ
−→bi B′ with fst(B′) = S′ and snd(B′) = D′. It remains
to show that D′ = δ(S′), i.e.
(δγ([v]i)σD)↓ = δγ([v]iσS↓).
This can be done as in the case of the rule Out-T.
Case of the rule Comm. In such a case, PD = {out(c, δγ([u]i))i.δ(Q1); in(c, x)i
′
.
δ(Q2)} ⊎ δ(QS), E ′D = ED, Φ
′
D = ΦD, σ
′
D = σD ∪ {x 7→ δγ([u]i)σD}, and ℓ = τ .
Moreover, we have that σD  δγ(testi([u]i)) and σS  testi([v]i) where γ ∈ {α, β}
such that i ∈ γ. Hence, we have that S is equal to
(E ; {out(c, [u]i).Q1; in(c, x).Q2} ⊎ QS ;ΦS ;σS)
with ΦD↓ = δ(ΦS↓), and σD↓ = δ(σS↓).
Let γ′ ∈ {α, β} such that i′ ∈ γ′. Hence, we have that S
τ
−→ S′ where S′ is
equal to:
(E ; {Q1;Q2} ⊎ QS ;ΦS ;σS ∪ {(x 7→ [u]iσS)
i′}).
Hence, we have that B
τ
−→ B′ for some biprocess B′ such that fst(B′) = S′ and
snd(B′) = D′. It remains to show that D′ = δ(S′), i.e.
(δγ([u]i)σD)↓ = δγ′([u]iσS↓)
If γ = γ′, then this can be done as in the previous cases. Otherwise, since
names can only be shared through assignations, and assignations only concern
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variables/terms of base type, we necessarily have that c 6∈ E . Hence, we have
that D
νwn.out(c,wn)
−−−−−−−−−→ Dout where Dout is equal to:
(ED; {δ(Q1); in(c, x).δ(Q2)} ⊎ QS ;ΦD ∪ {wn ⊲ δγ([u]i)σD};σD)
Note that (ρα, ρβ) is still compatible withDout. We would like to apply Lemma 16
with M = wn on the frame of Dout which requires an hypothesis of non de-
ductibility of the shared key. For these, we will rely on our hypothesis that D0
does not reveal the values of his assignment variables w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ):
Let Φ′D = ΦD ∪ {wn ⊲ δγ([u]i)σD}. We already proved our induction re-
sult for the rule Out-T. Hence, we deduce that there exists Sout such that
S
νwn.out(c,wn)
−−−−−−−−−→ Sout where Sout = (E ;P ′S ;Φ
′
S ;σS), Φ
′
S = ΦS ∪ {wn ⊲ [u]i)σS}.
Moreover, it implies that Φ′D↓ = δ(Φ
′
S↓}) and σD↓ = δ(σS↓). As mentioned, by
hypothesis, we know that D0 does not reveal the values of its assignments w.r.t.
(ρα, ρβ). Hence, for all assignment variable x of color α (resp. β) in dom(σD), for
all key ∈ {k, pk(k), vk(k) | k = xσD ∨ k = xρα (resp. xρβ)}, key is not deducible
from new E .Φ′D. We denote K this set.
Let KS = {t, pk(t), vk(t) | t ∈ dom(ρ+α ) ∪ dom(ρ
+
β ), t ground}. Since σD↓ =
δ(σS↓), and by definition of ρ+α and ρ
+
β , we deduce that K = δα(KS) ∪ δβ(KS).
We have also that Φ′D↓ = δ(Φ
′
S↓). Hence, we can now apply Lemma 16 with
M = wn and so we deduce that δγ([u]iσS↓) = δγ′([u]iσS↓). Hence, we can
conclude as in the previous case.
Case of the rule Par. It is easy to see that the result holds for this case.
Note that the rules New and Repl can not be triggered since the processes
under study do not contain bounded names and replication.
Theorem 5. Let P be a plain colored process as described above, and B0 be an
extended colored biprocess such that:
– S0 = (Eα ⊎ Eβ ⊎ E0; [[P ]]; ∅; ∅)
def
= fst(B0),
– D0 = (Eα ⊎ Eβ ⊎ E0;PD; ∅; ∅)
def
= snd(B0), and
– PD = δρα,ρβ ([[P ]]) for some (ρα, ρβ) compatible with D0, and
– D0 does not reveal its assignments w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ).
We have that:
1. For any extended process S = (ES ;PS;ΦS ;σS) such that S0
tr
=⇒S with (ρα, ρβ)
compatible with S, there exists a biprocess B and an extended process D =
(ED;PD;ΦD;σD) such that B0
tr
=⇒biB, fst(B) = S, snd(B) = D, and new ES .ΦS ∼
new ED.ΦD.
2. For any extended process D = (ED;PD;ΦD;σD) such that D0
tr
=⇒D with
(ρα, ρβ) compatible with D, there exists a biprocess B and an extended process
S = (ES ;PS ;ΦS ;σS) such that B0
tr
=⇒biB, fst(B) = S, snd(B) = D, and
new ES .ΦS ∼ newED.ΦD.
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Proof. We prove the two items separately.
1. The first item is actually a direct consequence of Proposition 1. We rely on
Corollary 5 and the fact that D = δ(S) to establish that:
newES .ΦS ∼ new ED.ΦD.
2. The second item is actually a direct consequence of Proposition 2. We rely
on Corollary 5, Corollary 4 and the fact that D = δ(S) to establish that:
newES .ΦS ∼ new ED.ΦD.
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
F Parallel composition
The goal of this section is to prove the results that relate to the parallel com-
position, that are Theorem 1 and 3. We prove a slightly improved version of
Theorem 3 assuming that composition contexts may contain several holes. To
prove these composition results, we will rely on Theorem 5, and for this we have
to explain how to get rid of the replications, and the new instructions (see Sec-
tion F.1). We have also to rewrite the process to ensure that names are shared
via assignment variables only (see Section F.2).
F.1 Unfolding a biprocess
Given an extended process A = (E ;P ;Φ) where P may contain name restrictions
and replications, the idea is to unfold the replications and to gather together all
the restricted names in the set E . Of course, it is not possible to apply such
a transformation and to preserve the set of possible traces. However, given a
specific trace issued from A, it is possible to compute an unfolding of A that
will exhibit this specific trace. The converse is also true, any trace issued from
an unfolding of A will correspond to a trace of A. Thus, the process A and all
its possible unfoldings will exhibit exactly the same set of traces. We define this
notion directly on biprocesses.
Definition 20. Let A = (E ;P ;Φ) be an extended biprocess. We define the nth
unfolding of A, denote by Unfn(A), the biprocess (E ⊎En;Pn;Φ) obtained from A
by replacing in P each instance of !Q with n instances of Q (applying α-renaming
to ensure name and variable distinctness), and then removing the new operations
from the resulting process. These names are then put in the set En and added in
the first component of the extended process.
The link between an extended biprocess and its unfoldings is stated in Lemma 17.
Lemma 17. Let A = (E ;P ;Φ) be an extended biprocess. The biprocess A is in
diff-equivalence if, and only if, Unfn(A) is in diff-equivalence for any n ∈ N.
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F.2 Sharing names via assignments
In Theorem 5, one can note that processes may only share data through assign-
ment variables. This is not a real limitation since a name that is shared via the
composition context can be assigned to an assignment variable by one process
and used by the other through the assignment variables. Below, we describe this
transformation that actually preserves diff-equivalence of a biprocess.
Let A = (E ;P ;Φ) be an extended colored (with colors in {1, . . . , p} = α ⊎ β)
biprocess that does not contain any name restriction nor replication in P . Let
K = k1, . . . , kℓ be a sequence of names (of base type) in E that contains at
least all the names occurring in both type of actions – in actions colored α
as well as in actions colored β (intuitively k1, . . . , kℓ are the names shared by
the two processes we want to compose). Since we work with a biprocess, we
do this transformation simulatenously on both sides. We do this each time the
transformation is required by one side of the biprocess. Actually, when we will
apply this transformation, the right-hand side will correspond to the disjoint
case, whereas the left-hand side will correspond to the shared case, and all the
transformations will arise because of the left-hand side.
Let Z = zα1 , . . . , z
α
ℓ be a sequence of fresh variables, and i ∈ α. We denote by
AssiZ:=K(A) the extended biprocess (E ;Pass;Φ) where Pass is defined as follows:
Pass = [z
α
1 := k1]
i. . . . .[zαℓ := kℓ]
i.(|P∈P Pρβ)
where ρβ replaces each occurrence of the name kj (1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ) that occurs in an
action β-colored by its associated assignment variable zαj (1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ). Note that
the replacement ρβ will not affect the process corresponding to the disjoint case.
Note that in the definition above, the α-colored process will assign the shared
names into assignment variables whereas the β-colored process will simply use
those variables instead of the corresponding names. This choice is arbitrary and
the roles played by α and β can be swapped. Again, this transformation preserves
equivalence. This result is stated below in Lemma 18.
Lemma 18. Let A = (E ;P ;Φ) and AssiZ:=K(A) be two extended biprocesses as
described above. We have that A is in diff-equivalence if, and only if, AssiZ:=K(A)
is in diff-equivalence.
F.3 Composing trace equivalence
The theorem we want to prove is stated below. Note that, this theorem differs
from the one stated in the main body of the paper since we work in a slightly
more general setting.
We denote by Σc0 = {senc, aenc, sign, pk, vk, 〈 〉}, i.e. the constructors of the
common signature Σ0. We consider composition contexts that may contain sev-
eral holes. They are formally defined as follows:
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Definition 21. A composition context C is defined by the following grammar
where n is a name of base type.
C,C1, C2 := | new n. C | !C | C1|C2
We only allow names of base type (typically keys) to be shared between
processes through the composition context. In particular, they are not allowed
to share a private channel even if each process can used its own private channels
to communicate internally. We also suppose w.l.o.g. that names occurring in C
are distinct. A composition context may contain several holes. We can index
them to avoid confusion. We write C[P1, . . . , Pℓ] (or shortly C[P ]) the process
obtained by filling the ith hole with the process Pi (or the i
th process of the
sequence P ).
We use the notation P | Q to represent the sequence of processes obtained
by putting in parallel the processes of the sequences P and Q componentwise.
Parallel composition between tagged processes can only be achieved assuming
that the shared keys are not revealed. Indeed, if the security of P is ensure
through the secrecy of the shared key k, there is no way to guarantee that P is
still secure in an environment where another process Q running in parallel will
reveal this key.
Since, we consider a common signature Σ0 and composition contexts with
several holes, we have to generalize a bit the notion of revealing a shared key
stated in the body of the paper. We have to take into account public keys and
verification keys.
Definition 22. Let C be a composition context, A be an extended process of the
form (E ;C[P1, . . . , Pℓ];Φ;σ), and key ∈ {n, pk(n), vk(n) | n occurs in C}. We
say that the extended process A reveals the key key when:
– (E∪{s};C[P+1 , . . . , P
+
ℓ ];Φ;σ)
w
=⇒(E ′;P ′;Φ′;σ′) with P+i0
def
= Pi0 | in(c, x). if x =
key thenout(c, s) and P+i
def
= Pi if i 6= i0; and
– MΦ′ =E s for some M such that fv(M) ⊆ dom(Φ′) and fn(M) ∩ E ′ = ∅
where c is a fresh public channel name, s is a fresh name of base type, and the
i0
th hole of C is in the scope of “new fn(key)”.
Definition 23. Let C be a composition context and E0 be a finite set of names
of base type. Let P and Q be two sequences of plain processes together with their
frames Φ and Ψ . We say that P/Φ and Q/Ψ are composable under E0 and C
when:
1. P (resp. Q) are built over Σα ∪Σ0 (resp. Σβ ∪Σ0), whereas Φ (resp. Ψ) are
built over Σα ∪ {pk, vk} (resp. Σβ ∪ {pk, vk}), Σα ∩ Σβ = ∅, and P (resp.
Q) is tagged;
2. fv (P ) = fv(Q) = ∅, and dom(Φ) ∩ dom(Ψ) = ∅.
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3. E0 ∩ (fn(C[P ]) ∪ fn(Φ)) ∩ (fn(C[Q]) ∪ fn(Ψ)) = ∅;
4. (E0;C[P ];Φ) (resp. (E0;C[Q];Ψ)) does not reveal any key in:
{n, pk(n), vk(n) | n occurs in fn(P )∩fn(Q)∩bn(C)}.
This notion is extended as expected to biprocesses requiring that fst(P )/fst(Φ) and
fst(Q)/fst(Ψ), as well as snd(P )/snd(Φ) and snd(Q)/snd(Ψ), are composable.
Theorem 6. Let C be a composition context, and E0 be a finite set of names
of base type. Let P (resp. Q) be a sequence of plain biprocesses together with
its frame Φ (resp. Ψ), and assume that P/Φ and Q/Ψ are composable under E0
and C.
If (E0;C[P ];Φ) and (E0;C[Q];Ψ) satisfy diff-equivalence (resp. trace equiva-
lence), then (E0;C[P | Q];Φ ⊎ Ψ) satisfies diff-equivalence (resp. trace equiva-
lence).
Proof. According to our hypothesis, P and Q are both tagged hence there exists
two sequences of colored plain processes Pt and Qt such that [[Pt]] = P and
[[Qt]] = Q. Moreover, we can split the set of names E0 into two disjoint sets EP
and EQ depending on whether the name occurs in P/Φ or Q/Ψ .
Let S = (E0;C[P | Q];Φ). Our goal is to show that S satisfies diff-equivalence
(resp trace equivalence). By hypothesis, we actually have that (EP ;C[P ];Φ), and
(EQ;C[Q];Ψ) satisfy diff-equivalence (resp trace equivalence). Let D = (EP ⊎
EQ;C[P ] | C[Q];Φ ⊎ Ψ) (modulo some α-renaming to ensure name and variable
distinctness of the resulting process). Since the two processes that are composed
in parallel do not share any data, we have that D satisfies diff-equivalence (resp
trace equivalence). In order to conclude that S satisfies diff-equivalence (resp
trace equivalence), we will show that fst(S) ≈diff fst(D) and snd(S) ≈diff snd(D)
relying on Theorem 5.
Let B1 be the biprocess obtained by forming a biprocess with fst(S) and
fst(D). Even if the two processes do not have exactly the same structure, this
can be achieved by introducing some new instructions that will not be used
in fst(S). Relying on Lemma 17, we have that B1 is in diff-equivalence if and
only if Unfn(B1) is in diff-equivalence for any n ∈ N. Let n0 ∈ N. We trans-
form the biprocess Unfn0(B1) to introduce assignment variables (and we may
assume w.l.o.g. that the processes under study do not rely on any assignment
variables, thus the resulting process will only contain the assignment variables
introduced by our transformation), namely zα1 , . . . , z
α
ℓ . This leads us to another
biprocess and this transformation still preserves diff-equivalence as stated in
Lemma 18. Note that, on the right-hand side of the biprocess (the disjoint case),
the assignments variables are assigned to names that do not occur in any action
colored β. In order to apply our Theorem 5, we perform a last transformation
on this biprocess that consists in replacing the elements that occur inside the
frame by output actions (colored with α or β depending on its origin) in front
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of the biprocess. This last transformation preserves also diff-equivalence. We fi-
nally consider Eα = ∅, and Eβ = {kα1 , . . . , k
α
ℓ } a set of fresh names, and we add
these two sets of names to the set of E0 (first argument of the biprocess). Now, it
remains to show that this resulting biprocess B′1 is in diff-equivalence. For this,
we rely on Theorem 5. Let ρα be such that dom(ρα) = ∅, and ρβ be such that
dom(ρβ) = {zα1 , . . . , z
α
ℓ }, and z
α
j ρβ = k
α
j for j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. Actually, we have
that D′1 = δ(S
′
1) where S
′
1 = fst(B
′
1) and D
′
1 = snd(B
′
1), and for all possible
executions of S′1 or D
′
1, compatibility will be satisfied. Indeed, by construction,
we know that all the assignment variables (remember that all the assignments
occurring in the process have been introduced by our transformation) will be
assigned to distinct names. Now, to satisfy all the requirements needed to apply
Theorem 5, it remains to establish the non-deducibility of the keys.
By hypothesis, (E0;C[P ];Φ) and (E0;C[Q];Ψ) do not reveal k, pk(k), or vk(k)
for any k ∈ fn(P ) ∩ fn(Q) ∩ bn(C). Hence, we deduce that fst(D) (parallel
composition - disjoint case) does not reveal k, pk(k), or vk(k) for any k ∈ fn(P )∩
fn(Q) ∩ bn(C).
Note that we want to apply Theorem 5 on S′1 and D
′
1 and not on S1 and D1.
However, we built D′1 by unfolding D1 and introducing assignment variables.
First, note that these transformations preserve deducibility. Moreover, secrecy
of k, pk(k), or vk(k) for any k ∈ fn(P )∩ fn(Q)∩ bn(C) actually implies that D′1
does not reveal its assignments w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ). This allows us to apply Theorem 5
and so to conclude.
F.4 Composing reachability
We now prove a variant of Theorem 1 considering our slightly more general
setting.
Theorem 7. Under the same hypotheses as Theorem 6 with processes instead
of bioprocesses, and considering a name s that occurs in C. If (E0;C[P ];Φ) and
(E0;C[Q];Ψ) do not reveal s, then (E0;C[P | Q];Φ ∩ Ψ) does not reveal s.
Proof. The proof follows the same lines as the one for dealing with diff-equivalence
and trace equivalence. In order to show that the process S = (E0;C[P | Q];Φ⊎Ψ)
does not reveal s, we rely on the fact that the secrecy is preserved by parallel
composition of “disjoint” processes. Thanks to our hypotheses, we have that
D = (E0;C[P ] | C[Q];Φ ⊎ Ψ) does not reveal s. Then, by applying Theorem 5
and more specifically the first bullet point of this theorem, we can deduce that
for all (tr, new ES .ΦS) ∈ trace(S), there exists a trace (tr, new ED.ΦD) ∈ trace(D)
such that new ES .ΦS ∼ new ED.ΦD. Since D does not reveal s, we conclude that
S does not reveal s too.
G Sequential composition
In this section we prove Theorems 4 and 2. As for establishing parallel composi-
tion results, we will rely on Theorem 5. This will require to unfold the processes
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under study, and to use assignment variables to share data. However, as already
discussed in Section 5, we also have to tackle some additional difficulties. In par-
ticular, to ensure the compatibility of the executions as required by Theorem 5.
G.1 Unfolding biprocesses and sharing names via assignments
Unfolding the biprocesses for sequential composition follows the same principles
as unfolding the biprocesses for parallel composition. However, we need to be
more specific. In particular, we need to be able to easily talk about the replicated
instances of a nonce after unfolding. We explain in this section how the unfolded
biprocesses are built, and we introduce some notation that we will use throughout
the entire section.
Example 16. Let P =!new k.!new n.out(c, senc(n, k)). The plain process
out(c, senc(n[1, 1], k[1])) | out(c, senc(n[1, 2], k[1]))
| out(c, senc(n[2, 1], k[2])) | out(c, senc(n[2, 2], k[2]))
together with the set
K = {k[1], k[2], n[1, 1], n[1, 2], n[2, 1], n[2, 2]}
will correspond to the 2-unfolding of P , denoted Unf2(P ). In this example,
k[1], k[2], n[1, 1], . . . , n[2, 2] are considered as distinct names.
More generally, in such formalism, two names n1[i1, . . . , ip] and n2[j1, . . . , jq]
are equal if, and only if, they are syntactically equal, i.e. n1 = n2, p = q and
ik = jk for each k ∈ {1 . . . p}. We will use the same convention to represent
the variables occurring in the processes. We will also extend this notation to
processes. Thus P [i1, . . . , in] will represent the instance of P that correspond to
the i
th
1 instance of the 1
st
replication, i
th
2 instance of the 2
nd
replication, etc.
Example 17. Going back to our previous example, we have that Unf2(P ) =
(Q[1, 1] | Q[1, 2] | Q[2, 1] | Q[2, 2],K) where Q[i, j] = out(c, senc(n[i, j], k[i])).
With such notation, we can now be much more precise on how our disjoint
and shared processes are unfolded.
Following notation given in Theorem 2, we will consider the biprocesses:
1. S = (E0;C[P1[Q1] | P2[Q2]];Φ ⊎ Ψ), the so-called shared case;
2. Dpar = (E0;C[P ] | C[Q];Φ ⊎ Ψ), the so-called parallel disjoint case;
3. Dseq = (E0; C˜[P1[Q˜1] | P2[Q˜2]];Φ ⊎ Ψ) where C˜ is as C but each name n is
duplicated n/ nQ in order to ensure disjointness. The processes Q˜1 and Q˜2
are obtained from Q1 and Q2 by replacing each name n occurring in C by
its copy nQ. This represents the so-called sequential disjoint case.
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Then, given a biprocess B (typically one given above), we denote by Bn its
nth unfolding relying on the naming convention introduced in Example 16 and
Example 17.
Using the notation introduced above, it should be clear that for each unfold-
ing n (with n ∈ N), the biprocess that represents the parallel disjoint case, i.e.
Dparn exhibits more behaviours than the biprocess that represents the sequential
disjoint case, i.e. Dseqn .
Lemma 19. If Dparn satisfies diff-equivalence then D
seq
n satisfies diff-equivalence
As for parallel composition, once unfolding has been done, we get rid of names
that are shared through the composition context using assignment variables. We
denote these names r1, . . . rp and their associated assignment variables z1, . . . , zp.
We also get rid of the content of the frame by adding some outputs in front of the
resulting process. Note that, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the only assignment
instructions are those that occur in P1 and P2 to give a value to x1 and x2.
Indeed, an assignment of the form [x := t] that is “local” to P1/P2 (or Q1/Q2)
has the same effect as applying the substitution x 7→ t directly on the process.
This additional hypothesis will help us ensure compatibility of all executions
when applying Theorem 5.
Given a biprocess B, we will denote Bv the biprocess resulting from the
transformation described above. In particular, we will consider Svn the biprocess
obtained by applying the transformation above on Sn (the n
th unfolding of the
shared case), and also Dvseqn the biprocess obtained by applying the transforma-
tion on Dseqn .
Again, it should be clear that these transformations preserve diff-equivalence.
Lemma 20. We have that:
1. Dvseqn satisfies diff-equivalence if, and only if, D
seq
n satisfies diff-equivalence
2. Svn satisfies diff-equivalence if, and only if, Sn satisfies diff-equivalence
Relying on this transformation, by colouring actions of P with α, and actions
of Q with β, given an integer n corresponding to the unfolding under study, and
assuming that the hole of C is under m replications, we consider ρα such that
dom(ρα) = ∅, and ρβ with
dom(ρβ) = {z1, . . . , zp} ∪ {x1[i1, . . . , im], x2[i1, . . . , im] | 1 ≤ i1, . . . , im ≤ n}
– ziρβ = ri for 1 ≤ i ≤ p;
– ρβ(x1[i1, . . . , im]) = k[i1, . . . , im]
– ρβ(x2[i1, . . . , im]) = k[i1, . . . , im].
In other words, we abstract each name shared via the composition context
by a fresh one, i.e. ri, and each term shared through the variables x1 and x2 are
abstracted by a fresh name, a new one for each instance.
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G.2 Secrecy of the shared keys
We now focus on the fourth condition of Theorem 5, i.e. we ensure thatDvseqn does
not reveal the values of its assignments w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ) as defined in Section G.1.
Lemma 21. Assume that P1/P2/Φ is a good key-exchange protocol under E0
and C. Assume also that (E0;C[Q];Ψ ; ∅) does not reveal any k, pk(k) and vk(k).
In such a case, we have that Dvseqn does not reveal the value of its assignment
variables w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ).
Proof. By Definition 7, P1/P2/Φ being a good key-exchange protocol under E0
and C implies that (E0;Pgood;Φ) does not reveal bad where Pgood is defined as
follows:
Pgood = new bad .new d.
(
C[new id.(P1[out(d, 〈x1, id〉)] | P2[out(d, 〈x2, id〉)])]
| in(d, x).in(d, y).if proj1(x) = proj1(y) ∧ proj2(x) 6= proj2(y) then out(c, bad)
| in(d, x).in(d, y).if proj1(x) 6= proj1(y) ∧ proj2(x) = proj2(y) then out(c, bad)
| in(d, x).in(c, z).if z ∈ {proj1(x), pk(proj1(x)), vk(proj1(x))} then out(c, bad)
)
In the case were C is of the form C′[! ], Pgood is defined as follows:
new bad , d, r1, r2.
(
C′[new id.!(P1[out(d, 〈x1, id, r1〉)] | P2[out(d, 〈x2, id, r2〉)])]
| in(d, x).in(d, y).if proj1(x) = proj1(y) ∧ proj2(x) 6= proj2(y) then out(c, bad)
| in(d, x).in(d, y).if proj1(x) = proj1(y) ∧ proj3(x) = proj3(y) then out(c, bad)
| in(d, x).in(c, z).if z ∈ {proj1(x), pk(proj1(x)), vk(proj1(x))} then out(c, bad)
)
In both cases, it indicates that the secrecy of x, pk(x) and vk(x) is preserved,
where x is the value of any assignment variable. Then, the result is actually a
direct consequence of the fact that secrecy is preserved through disjoint composi-
tion, and the transformations that are performed on the process (e.g. unfolding,
adding of some assignments operations) also preserve secrecy.
G.3 Compatibility
To use Theorem 5, a compatibility condition is required. As in the case of parallel
composition, this property will be trivially satisfied for assignments that have
been added by our transformation. However, more work is needed to deal with
assignments present in the original processes, that is in our situation, assignments
of the form [x1[...] = ] and [x2[...] = ] that come from the unfolding of the
process P1/P2. The idea is that the abstractability property and the fact that
P1/P2/Φ is a good key-exchange protocol will give us the required conditions to
apply Theorem 5.
The following lemma focuses on P1/P2/Φ being a good key-exchange protocol
under E0 and C. However, the definition of a good key-exchange protocol depends
on the shape of the composition context, and the properties satisfied by our
processes will depends on the distinction. Hence, to avoid any confusion, unless
the composition context is explicitely mentioned being of the form C′[! ], the
definition of good key-exchange protocol always follows Definition 7.
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Lemma 22. Let (E0;C[P1[0] | P2[0]];Φ; ∅) be a process such that P1/P2/Φ is a
good key-exchange protocol under E0 and C . Let n be an integer, and (E ;P ;Φ′;σ)
a process such that fst(Dseqn )
tr
=⇒(E ;P ;Φ′;σ). Let i1, j1, . . . , im, jm ∈ N, and q1, q2 ∈
{1, 2} such that xq1 [i1, . . . , im] and xq2 [j1, . . . , jm] are in dom(σ). We have that:
xq1 [i1, . . . , im]σ↓ = xq2 [j1, . . . , jm]σ↓
if, and only if,
ip = jp for all 1 ≤ p ≤ m.
A similar property holds for snd(Dseqn ).
Proof. By definition of P1/P2/Φ being a good key-exchange protocol under E0
and C and since secrecy is preserved when considering disjoint composition, we
have that (E0;P ;Φ ⊎ Ψ ; ∅) preserves the secrecy of bad where:
P = new bad . new d.(
C˜[new k.new id.(P1[out(d, 〈x1, id〉).Q˜1{k/x1}]
| P2[out(d, 〈x2, id〉).Q˜2{k/x2}])]
| in(d, x).in(d, y).
if proj1(x) = proj1(y) ∧ proj2(x) 6= proj2(y)
thenout(c, bad)
elseif proj1(x) 6= proj1(y) ∧ proj2(x) = proj2(y)
thenout(c, bad)
)
Here, the notation C˜, Q˜1, and Q˜2 refer to the same renaming as the one used
to define Dseq.
Let n be an integer. Consider the nth unfolding of Dseq as well as the nth
unfolding of the process P defined above. First, note that an output on channel
d is always of the form
out(d, 〈xj [i1, . . . im], id[i1, . . . im]〉) with j ∈ {1, 2}.
Let (E ;P ;Φ′;σ) be a process such that fst(Dseqn )
tr
=⇒(E ;P ;Φ′;σ) with xq1 [i1, . . . , im]
and xq2 [j1, . . . , jm] both in dom(σ). Moreover, assume that xq1 [i1, . . . , im]σ↓ =
xq2 [j1, . . . , jm]σ↓. In such a case, it is easy to build a trace of (E0;Pn;Φ ⊎ Ψ ; ∅)
such that the pairs
– 〈xq1 [i1, . . . , im], id[i1, . . . , im]〉, and
– 〈xq2 [j1, . . . , jm], id[j1, . . . , jm]〉
are outputted on channel d. Since the hole in Pq1 (resp. Pq2) is not in the scope
of a replication, we deduce that these pairs can only be outputted once. We have
seen that such a process preserves the secrecy of bad , and thus we deduce that
(i1, . . . , ip) = (j1, . . . , jp).
Now, relying on the fact that (E0;Pn;Φ ⊎ Ψ ; ∅) preserves the secrecy of bad ,
and more precisely on the fact that the following instructions are part of the
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process:
| in(d, x).in(d, y).
. . .
elseif proj1(x) 6= proj1(y) ∧ proj2(x) = proj2(y)
thenout(c, bad)
we deduce that (i1, . . . , ip) = (j1, . . . , jp) implies that id[i1, . . . , im] = id[j1, . . . , jm]
and so we deduce that xq1 [i1, . . . , im]σ↓ = xq2 [j1, . . . , jm]σ↓.
Note that the property above we established for Dseqn also holds on D
vseq
n . We
have also a similar result in case the composition context is of the form C′[! ]
that is stated below and can be proved in a similar way.
Lemma 23. Let (E0;C[P1[0] | P2[0]];Φ; ∅) be a process such that C = C′[! ] for
some C′ and P1/P2/Φ is a good key-exchange protocol under E0 and C. Let n be
an integer and (E ;P ;Φ′;σ) be a process such that fst(Dseqn )
tr
=⇒(E ;P ;Φ′;σ).
Let i1, j1, . . . , im, jm ∈ N. We have that:
– x1[i1, . . . , im]σ↓ = x2[j1, . . . , jm]σ↓ implies that (i1, . . . , im−1) = (j1, . . . , jm−1);
and
– for q ∈ {1, 2}, xq[i1, . . . , im]σ↓ = xq[j1, . . . , jm]σ↓ implies (i1, . . . , im) =
(j1, . . . , jm).
A similar property holds for snd(Dseqn ).
Now, regarding assingment variables, and in particular the different instances
of x1 and x2, it remains to show that the values assigned to these variables will
be rooted in the right signature. We proceed in two steps. First, we discard terms
rooted with a symbol in {pk, vk, 〈〉} (Lemma 24), and then we show that it is
actually rooted in the right signature (Lemma 25).
Definition 24. We say that a process P satisfies the abstractability property
if for all P
tr
=⇒(E ;P ;Φ;σ), for all assignment variable x ∈ dom(σ), root(xσ↓) 6∈
{pk, vk, 〈〉}.
This property is important for our composition to hold.
Example 18. Let Pi = [xi := 〈k1, k2〉], and Qi = ifxi = 〈proj1(xi), proj2(xi)〉
thenout(c, id i). Let C = new k1.new k2. . We can see that in the shared case,
the branch Then of the process Qi will be executed whereas when considering
in isolation the process C[new k.(Q1{x1 7→ k} | Q2{x2 7→ k})] will not exhibit a
similar behaviour.
Intuitively, we say that a value of an assignment variable can be abstracted
if it is not a pair, a public key or verification key. This is due to the fact that
those three primitives are not tagged and so can be used by processes of any
colour.
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Lemma 24. Let (E0;C[P1[0] | P2[0]];Φ; ∅) be a process satisfying the abstractabil-
ity property. We have that Dvseq satisfies the abstractability property.
Proof. First of all, unfolding the process (E0;C[P1[0] | P2[0]];Φ; ∅) preserves the
abstractability property. Moreover, the transformation that transforms a process
B into a process Bv preserves the abstractability property. Thus, to show that
Dvseq satisfies the abstractability property, it only remains to show that this
property is preserved by disjoint composition assuming that the process we want
to compose does not introduce new assignments (note that this is the case of
Q1/Q2).
In fact, part of the process brought by Q1/Q2 can be viewed as a process
executed by the attacker. Thus, for all Dseq
tr′
=⇒(E ′;P ′;Φ′;σ′), there exists a corre-
spondig execution (E0;C[P1[0] | P2[0]];Φ; ∅)
tr′′
=⇒(E ′′;P ′′;Φ′′;σ′′) such that σ′′ and
σ′ coincide on dom(σ′′), and in particular on the values assigned to x1[. . .] and
x2[. . .]. This allows us to deduce that root(xσ
′′) 6∈ {pk, vk, 〈〉}, and thus Dvseq
satisfies the abstractability property.
The next lemma will allow us to conclude that we obtain traces compatible
with (ρα, ρβ).
Lemma 25. Assume that Dvseqn does not reveal the value of its assignment vari-
ables w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ) and satisfies the abstractability property. We have that for
all Dvseqn
tr
=⇒(E ;P ;Φ;σ), for all γ ∈ {α, β}, for all z ∈ dom(ργ), we have that
either tagroot(zσ↓) = ⊥ or tagroot(zσ↓) 6∈ γ ∪ {0}.
Proof. Since Dvseqn
tr
=⇒(E ;P ;Φ;σ), we know that (E ;P ;Φ;σ) is a derived well-
tagged extended process w.r.t. ≺ and col , for some ≺ and col . Moreover, by
construction of Dvseqn , we also know that dom(ρα) = ∅. We prove the result by
induction of the dom(ρβ) with the order ≺.
Base case z ≺ z′ for all assignment variables z′ different from z: Assume that
tagroot(zσ↓) 6= ⊥ and tagroot(zσ↓) ∈ β ∪ {0}. We now show that zσ↓ ∈
Fctα(zσ). Since tagroot(zσ↓) ∈ β ∪ {0}, we have that if root(zσ↓) 6∈ {vk, pk, 〈 〉}
then zσ ∈ Fctα(zσ). Thus it remains to show that root(zσ↓) 6∈ {vk, pk, 〈 〉}. But
Dvseqn satisfies the abstractability property hence we deduce that root(zσ↓) 6∈
{vk, pk, 〈 〉}.
Since zσ↓ ∈ Fctα(zσ), we can apply Lemma 12 and so we deduce that:
1. either there existsM such that fv (M) ⊆ dom(Φ)∩{z′ | z′ ≺ z}, fn(M)∩E = ∅
and zσ↓ ∈ Fctγ(MΦ↓)
2. otherwise there exists j such that zβj ≺ z and z
β
j σ↓ = zσ↓
The second case is trivially impossible since dom(ρα) = ∅ and so z
β
j does not
exists. We focus on the first case: We know that zσ↓ ∈ Fctγ(MΦ↓). Since zσ↓ is
not deducible in new E .Φ, then zσ↓ 6∈ Fct 〈 〉(MΦ↓). Moreover, we know that for
all assignment variables z′ different from z, z ≺ z′. Thus we can apply Lemma 14
and obtain that there exists M ′′ such that fv(M) ⊆ dom(Φ), fn(M)∩E = ∅ and
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zσ↓ ∈ Fct 〈 〉(M
′Φ↓). But this contradicts the fact that zσ↓ is not deducible in
new E .Φ.
Since we always reach a contradiction, we can conclude that tagroot(zσ↓) = ⊥
or tagroot(zσ↓) 6∈ β ∪ {0}.
Inductive case: Assume once again that tagroot(zσ↓) 6= ⊥ and tagroot(zσ↓) ∈
β ∪ {0}. As in the previous case, we can show that zσ↓ ∈ Fctα(zσ) and so we
can apply Lemma 12 to obtain:
1. either there existsM such that fv (M) ⊆ dom(Φ)∩{z′ | z′ ≺ z}, fn(M)∩E = ∅
and zσ↓ ∈ Fctγ(MΦ↓)
2. otherwise there exists j such that zβj ≺ z and z
β
j σ↓ = zσ↓
Once again the first case is trivially impossible since dom(ρα) = ∅. Thus it
remain to focus on the second case. As in the previous, we can deduce that
zσ↓ 6∈ Fct〈 〉(MΦ↓). Moreover, by our inductive hypothesis, we know that for
all assignment variable z′ ≺ z, tagroot(z′σ↓) = ⊥ or tagroot(z′σ↓) 6∈ β ∪ {0}.
Thus, we can deduce that z′σ↓ 6= zσ↓. Thanks to this, we can apply Lemma 14
and obtain that there exists M ′′ such that fv(M) ⊆ dom(Φ), fn(M)∩E = ∅ and
zσ↓ ∈ Fct 〈 〉(M
′Φ↓). But this contradicts the fact that zσ↓ is not deducible in
new E .Φ.
Since we always reach a contradiction, we can conclude that tagroot(zσ↓) = ⊥
or tagroot(zσ↓) 6∈ β ∪ {0}.
We now establish that when the processes are a good key exchanged protocol,
all possible executions are actually compatible w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ).
Lemma 26. Let (ρα, ρβ) be the two abstraction functions as defined in Sec-
tion G.1. If (E0;C[P1[0] | P2[0]];Φ; ∅) satisfies the abstractability property and
P1/P2/Φ is a good key-exchanged protocol under E0 and C then for any P such
that:
– fst(Dvseqn )
tr
=⇒P (resp. snd(Dvseqn )
tr
=⇒P ), we have that P is compatible w.r.t.
(ρα, ρβ).
– fst(Svn)
tr
=⇒P (resp. snd(Svn)
tr
=⇒P ), we have that P is compatible w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ).
Proof. Let P be a process such that fst(Dvseqn )
tr
=⇒(E ;P ;Φ;σ). Let x, y ∈ dom(σ)∩
dom(ρβ) and assume that xσ =E yσ. Let us denote x = xi[i1, . . . , im] and
y = xj [j1, . . . , jm] where jk, ik ∈ {1, . . . , n}, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
By hypothesis, P1/P2/Φ is a good key-exchanged protocol under E0 and
C . Hence thanks to Lemma 22, xσ =E yσ implies that ik = jk for all k ∈
{1 . . .m}. On the other hand, Lemma 22 also indicates that x1[i1, . . . , im]σ =
x2[i1, . . . , im]σ, for all i1, . . . , im.
Since by definition of ρβ , x1[i1, . . . , im]ρβ = x2[i1, . . . , im]ρβ = k[i1, . . . , im],
we can deduce that xσ = yσ if and only if xρβ = yρβ. At last, relying on
Lemma 25, we can conclude that (E ;P ;Φ;σ) is compatible with (ρα, ρβ).
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We now prove the property for Svn: Let fst(S
v
n)
tr
=⇒(E ;P ;Φ;σ). We prove the
result by induction on the size of tr. Consider a transition (E ;P ;Φ;σ)
ℓ
−→ A. By
inductive hypothesis, we know that (E ;P ;Φ;σ) is compatible with (ρα, ρβ). But,
the only transition that could render A not compatible is the internal transition
(Assgn). Hence assume that P = {[x := t]i.P} ⊎ Q where i ∈ γ and ℓ = τ .
Since (E ;P ;Φ;σ) is compatible, then by Theorem 5 and in particular Propo-
sition 1, we deduce that fst(Dvseqn )
tr
=⇒(E ′;P ′;Φ′;σ′) where δ(σ↓) = σ′↓ and δ(P) =
P ′. It implies that P ′ = {[x := δγ(t)]i.δ(P )}⊎δ(Q). Thus, by Lemma 7, we have
that δγ(tσ↓) = δγ(t)σ′↓.
On the other hand, if A is not compatible, it means that there exists y ∈
dom(σ) such that tσ↓ = yσ↓ is not equivalent to xρβ = yρβ. But δ(σ↓) = σ′↓
and δγ(tσ↓) = δγ(t)σ′↓. Hence tσ↓ = yσ↓ is equivalent to δγ(t)σ′ = yσ′, and
so we can deduce that δγ(t)σ
′ = yσ′ is not equivalent to xρβ = yρβ . However,
(E ′;P ′;Φ′;σ′) can also apply the internal transition (Assgn) on [x := δ(t)]i and
so we obtain (E ′;P ′;Φ′;σ′)
τ
−→ A′ with A′ not compatible with (ρα, ρβ). This is
in contradiction with our result on Dvseqn .
When the composition context is of the form C′[! ], the previous lemma
does not hold. However, we will show that we can modify any trace to be-
come a compatible trace by applying some permutation on the indices of the
names. Intuitively, when considering a trace of Svn, if x1[i1, . . . , im] is equal to
x2[i1, . . . , im−1, i
′
m] after instantiation with im 6= i
′
m, we want to permute all
names of the form t[i1, . . . , im−1, i
′
m] by t[i1, . . . , im−1, im]. Such permutation is
possible since we only consider composition context of the form C′[! ]. We will
call this an index permutation. To ensure that such a permutation is always pos-
sible when needed, we simply ensure that we have enough processes that have
not started their execution by requiring that 2n′ ≤ n (i.e. the length n′ of the
derivation under study is two times smaller than the number of the unfolding
we consider).
Lemma 27. Let (ρα, ρβ) be the two abstraction functions of S
v
n. For all S
v
n
ℓ1−→
A1
ℓ2−→ . . .
ℓn′−−→ An′ with 2n′ < n, there exists an index permutation such that
Svn
ℓ1−→ A′1
ℓ2−→ . . .
ℓn′−−→ A′n′ with A
′
k being the application of the index permutation
on Ak for all k = 1 . . . n
′, and A′n′ is compatible with (ρα, ρβ).
Proof. We prove the result by induction on n′. The initial step n′ = 0 being
trivial, we focus on the inductive step n′ > 0. By hypothesis, we know that there
exists an index permutation such that Svn
ℓ1−→ A′1
ℓ2−→ . . .
ℓn′−−→ A′n′−1 where A
′
k
being the application of the index permutation on Ak for all k = 1 . . . n
′−1, and
A′n′−1 is compatible with (ρα, ρβ). However, we know that An′−1
ℓn′−−→ An′ . Since
A′n′−1 is obtained from An′−1 by an index permutation, then A
′
n′−1
ℓn′−−→ A′n′
where A′n′ is the application of the index permutation on An′ .
Assume first that the transition An′−1
ℓn′−−→ An′ is different from the internal
transition (Assgn), then the compatibility of A′n′−1 implies the compatibility of
A′n′ . Hence the result holds.
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Assume now that the transition An′−1
ℓn′−−→ An′ is the internal transition
(Assgn). Consider that A′n′−1 = (E ;P ;Φ;σ) with P = {[x := t]
i.P} ⊎ Q. Since
A′n′−1 is compatible with (ρα, ρβ), we can apply Proposition 1. Using similar rea-
soning as in proof of Lemma 26, we obtain that tσ = yσ for some assignment vari-
able y implies w.l.o.g. that x = x1[i1, . . . , im−1, im] and y = x2[i1, . . . , im−1, i
′
m].
Thus, by applying the index permutation between im and i
′
m on each A
′
k, we
obtain that Svn
ℓ1−→ A′′1
ℓ2−→ . . .
ℓn′−−→ A′′n′ with A
′′
n′ compatible with (ρα, ρβ), and
A′′k being the application of the index permutation on A
′
k, for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
G.4 Composing diff-equivalence
We are now able to prove our composition results.
Theorem 4. Let C be a composition context and E0 be a finite set of names of
base type. Let P1[ ] (resp. P2[ ]) be a plain biprocess without replication and with
an hole in the scope of an assignment of the form [x1 := t1] (resp. [x2 := t2]).
Let Q1 (resp. Q2) be a plain biprocess such that fv(Q1) ⊆ {x1} (resp. fv (Q2) ⊆
{x2}), and Φ and Ψ be two frames. Let P = P1[0] | P2[0] and Q = new k.[x1 :=
k].[x2 := k].(Q1 | Q2) for some fresh name k, and assume that:
1. P/Φ and Q/Ψ are composable under E0 and C;
2. (E0;C[Q];Ψ) does not reveal k, pk(k), vk(k);
3. (E0;C[P ];Φ) satisfies the abstractability property; and
4. P1/P2/Φ is a good key-exchange protocol under E0 and C.
Let P+=P1[out(d, x1)] | P2[out(d, x2)] | in(d, x).in(d, y).ifx = y then 0 else 0.
If the biprocesses (E0; new d.C[P+];Φ) and (E0;C[Q];Ψ) satisfy diff-equivalence
then (E0;C[P1[Q1] | P2[Q2]];Φ ⊎ Ψ) satisfies diff-equivalence.
Proof. Let S = (E0;C[P1[Q1] | P2[Q2]];Φ⊎Ψ ; ∅). Thanks to Lemma 17, we know
that S is in diff-equivalence if, and only if, Sn is in diff-equivalence for all n ∈ N.
By hypothesis, we know that:
– (E0;C[P1[0] | P2[0]];Φ; ∅), and
– (E0;C[new k.(Q1{k/x1} | Q2{
k/x2})];Ψ ; ∅)
are both in diff-equivalence and P1, P2, Q1, Q2 are tagged. Hence, since diff-
equivalence is preserved by disjoint parallel composition, we deduce that Dpar
is in diff-equivalence, and thus, thanks to Lemma 17, we obtain that Dparn is
in diff-equivalence for all n ∈ N. Applying Lemma 19, we deduce that Dseqn is
also in diff-equivalence. Note that diff-equivalence still holds on the biprocess
Dvseqn obtained from D
seq
n by adding some assignment variables to “explicit the
sharing”.
Given n ∈ N, in order to conclude, we have to show that Svn obtained from
Sn by adding some assignments variables to explicit the sharing satisfies diff-
equivalence. We form two new biprocesses SDL and SDR as follows:
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– fst(SDL) = fst(S
v
n) and snd(SDL) = fst(D
vseq
n );
– fst(SDR) = snd(S
v
n) and snd(SDR) = snd(D
vseq
n );
We will apply Theorem 5 on biprocesses SDL and SDR to establish the strong
relationship between the two components of each biprocess, and together with
the fact Dvseqn satisfies diff-equivalence, this will allow us to conclude that S
v
n
satisfies diff-equivalence too.
Considering the two abstraction functions (ρα, ρβ) as defined in Section G.1,
in order to apply Theorem 5 on SDL (resp. SDR), it remains to show that
fst(Dvseqn ) and snd(D
vseq
n ) do not reveal the value of their assignment variables
w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ). This is actually achieved by application of Lemma 21 with the
facts that
– (E0;C[new k.(Q1{k/x1} | Q2{
k/x2})];Ψ ; ∅) and (E0;C[P1[0] | P2[0]];Φ; ∅) do
not reveal key in {n, pk(n), vk(n) | n ∈ fn(P1, P2)∩ fn(Q1, Q2)∩bn(C)}, and
– (E0;C[new k.(Q1{k/x1} | Q2{
k/x2})];Ψ ; ∅) do not reveal k, pk(k), vk(k), and
– P1/P2/Φ is a good key-exchange protocol under E0 and C, that implies in
particular that (E0;Pgood;Φ) does not reveal bad where Pgood is defined as
follows:
Pgood = new bad , d.
(
C[new id.(P1[out(d, 〈x1, id〉)] | P2[out(d, 〈x2, id〉)])]
| in(d, x).in(c, z).
if z ∈ {proj1(x), pk(proj1(x)), vk(proj1(x))}
thenout(c, bad)
)
Now, let BS be a biprocess such that
Svn
tr
=⇒biBS
def
= (ES ;PS ;ΦS ;σS)
for some tr. By definition of diff-equivalene, we have to show that:
1. new ES .fst(ΦS) ∼ new ES .snd(ΦS);
2. if fst(BS)
ℓ
−→ AL then there exists B
′ such that BS
ℓ
−→bi B
′ and fst(B′) = AL
(and similarly for snd).
Let us now focus on the case where the composition context is not of the
form C[! ].
We have fst(Svn)
tr
=⇒fst(BS) as well as snd(Svn)
tr
=⇒snd(BS). By Lemma 26, we
obtain that fst(BS) as well as snd(BS) is compatible with (ρα, ρβ). Hence, relying
on Theorem 5 (first item), we deduce that there exist biprocesses SD′L and SD
′
R
such that:
– SDL
tr
=⇒biSD′L, fst(SD
′
L) = fst(BS), and static equivalence holds between the
two frames issued from the biprocess SD′L;
– SDR
tr
=⇒biSD′R, fst(SD
′
R) = snd(BS), and static equivalence holds between
the two frames issued from the biprocess SD′R.
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Since, we know thatDvseqn satisfies diff-equivalence, we have thatD
vseq
n
tr
=⇒biD′vseqn
with fst(D′vseqn ) = snd(SD
′
L) and snd(D
′vseq
n ) = snd(SD
′
R). Then, by transitivity
of static equivalence, we deduce that
new ES .fst(ΦS) ∼ new ES .snd(ΦS).
Now, assume that fst(BS)
ℓ
−→ AL. In such a case, we have that fst(Sn)
tr
=⇒fst(BS)
ℓ
−→
AL. By Lemma 26, we obtain that AL is compatible with (ρα, ρβ), and relying on
Theorem 5 (first item), we deduce that there exists a biprocess SD′′L such that:
SDL
tr
=⇒bi
ℓ
−→bi SD′′L with fst(SD
′′
L) = AL. Since D
vseq
n satisfies diff-equivalence,
we have that Dvseqn
tr
=⇒bi
ℓ
−→bi D′′vseqn for some biprocess D
′′vseq
n with fst(D
′′vseq
n ) =
snd(SD′′L). Now, applying Theorem 5 (second item) on biprocess SDR, we de-
duce that SDR
tr
=⇒bi
ℓ
−→bi SD
′′
R with snd(SD
′′
R) = snd(D
′′vseq
n ). This allows us to
ensure the existence of the biprocess B′ required to show diff-equivalence of Svn.
We will have fst(B′) = fst(SD′′L) = AL and snd(B
′) = fst(SD′′R).
In the case where the composition context is of the form C′[! ], all the traces
issued from Svn are not compatible anymore w.r.t. the abstraction functions ρα
and ρβ . Nevertheless, thanks to Lemma 27, we can always find a similar trace
that is compatible, then using Theorem 5, we will ensure that these traces also
exist in the disjoint case, and we also ensure their compatibility (see Proposi-
tion 1).
Then, relying on the diff-equvialence of the biprocess (E0; new d.C[P+];Φ),
we deduce that for any trace Dvseqn
tr
=⇒biD′, fst(D′) is compatible w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ) if
and only if snd(D′) is compatible w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ). This allows us to ensure that
Dseqn is also in diff-equivalence when considering compatible traces only. Thanks
to this, we are able to conclude as in we did in the case where the composition
context were not of the form C′[! ].
G.5 Composing reachability
Theorem 2. Let C be a composition context, E0 be a finite set of names of
base type, and s be a name that occurs in C. Let P1[ ] (resp. P2[ ]) be a plain
process without replication and with an hole in the scope of an assignment of
the form [x1 := t1] (resp. [x2 := t2]). Let Q1 (resp. Q2) be a plain process such
that fv(Q1) ⊆ {x1} (resp. fv(Q2) ⊆ {x2}), and Φ and Ψ be two frames. Let
P = P1[0] | P2[0] and Q = new k.[x1 := k].[x2 := k].(Q1 | Q2) for some fresh
name k, and assume that:
1. P/Φ and Q/Ψ are composable under E0 and C;
2. (E0;C[Q];Ψ) does not reveal k, pk(k), vk(k);
3. (E0;C[P ];Φ) satisfies the abstractability property; and
4. P1/P2/Φ is a good key-exchange protocol under E0 and C.
If (E0;C[P ];Φ) and (E0;C[Q];Ψ) do not reveal s then (E0;C[P1[Q1]|P2[Q2]];Φ ⊎ Ψ)
does not reveal s.
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Proof. Let S = (E0;C[P1[Q1] | P2[Q2]];Φ ⊎ Ψ ; ∅). By hypothesis, we know that:
– (E0;C[P1[0] | P2[0]];Φ; ∅), and
– (E0;C[new k.(Q1{k/x1} | Q2{
k/x2})];Ψ ; ∅)
does not reveal s. Since, secrecy is preserved by disjoint composition, and the
transformations introduced at the beginning of the section (e.g. unfolding, adding
assignment variables, ...), we easily deduce that Dvseqn do not reveal s.
We show the result by contradiction. Assume that Svn reveals the secrecy s.
We consider a trace witnessing this fact, i.e. a process S′vn such that
Svn
tr
=⇒S′vn
def
= (ES ;PS ;ΦS ;σS)
and for which new ES.ΦS ⊢ s.
We form a biprocess SD by grouping together Svn and D
vseq
n in order to apply
Theorem 5.
In order to apply Theorem 5, we first must prove that Dvseqn does not reveal
the value of its assignment variables w.r.t. (ρα, ρβ) as defined in Section G.1.
This is achieved by application of Lemma 21 with the facts that
– (E0;C[new k.(Q1{k/x1} | Q2{
k/x2})];Ψ ; ∅) and (E0;C[P1[0] | P2[0]];Φ; ∅) do
not reveal key in {n, pk(n), vk(n) | n ∈ fn(P1, P2)∩ fn(Q1, Q2)∩bn(C)}, and
– (E0;C[new k.(Q1{k/x1} | Q2{
k/x2})];Ψ ; ∅) do not reveal k, pk(k), vk(k), and
– P1/P2/Φ is a good key-exchange protocol under E0 and C, that implies in
particular that (E0;Pgood;Φ) does not reveal bad where Pgood is defined as
follows:
Pgood = new bad , d.
(
C[new id.(P1[out(d, 〈x1, id〉)] | P2[out(d, 〈x2, id〉)])]
| in(d, x).in(c, z).
if z ∈ {proj1(x), pk(proj1(x)), vk(proj1(x))}
thenout(c, bad)
)
As done previously, relying on Lemma 26 (or Lemma 27 in case C is of the
form C′[! ]), we may assume that the trace under study is compatible. Applying
Theorem 5, we deduce that there exists a biprocess SD′ such that SD
tr
=⇒biSD′
with fst(SD′) = S′vn , and static equivalence holds between the two frames issued
from the biprocess SD′. Moreover, if we denote by ΦS and ΦD the respective
frame of fst(SD′) and snd(SD′), we ensure that δ(ΦS↓) = ΦD↓ (see Proposi-
tion 1).
Therefore, since Dvseqn does not reveal the secret s, and we already proved
that Dvseqn does not reveal his assignment variables, then by Lemma 16, we can
deduce that Svn does not reveal s, and so S does not reveal s either.
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